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Financial integration has increased over the past decades following the 
liberalization of capital flows.
1 In Europe, the introduction of the euro and the 
harmonization of financial regulations have accelerated financial integration 
further (Hartmann, Maddaloni, & Manganelli, 2003 and Baele, Ferrando, 
Hördahl, Krylova, & Monnet, 2004). There are, however, still differences in the 
degree of integration across the EU financial sector. While wholesale markets are 
already highly integrated, EU retail-banking markets are still fragmented along 
national lines (Baele et al., 2004). One reason for the lack of integration in EU 
retail-banking markets is that retail markets are, in contrast, to wholesale markets 
still local and cross-border business limited (European Commission, 2009). This 
suggests that the most effective way for foreign banks to get access to local retail-
banking markets is the acquisition of or the merger with a local bank (Cabral, 
Dierck, & Vesala, 2002). Data from the European Central Bank (ECB), however, 
indicates that cross-border consolidation is still limited in the EU banking sector. 
The cross-border dimension is particularly unimportant in Western Europe, while 
cross-border consolidation is more advanced in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Cabral et al., 2002). 
                                           
1Economists have studied financial integration from several angles. Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, & Kose 
(2006) and Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2003) examine current controls on capital flows as a measure 
of financial integration, while Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) measure financial integration by 
looking at differences in interest rates among the United States, United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany. Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula, & Pagano (2002) use several indicators to measure 
the degree of financial integration in Europe. All authors find that financial markets have become 
more integrated as a result of financial liberalization. CHAPTER 1       2 
International Capital Mobility and Current Account Targeting in Central and 
Eastern European Countries 
The differences in the degree of financial integration between Western Europe 
and Central and Eastern Europe are analyzed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. In 
chapter 2, I introduce the Feldstein-Horioka Test as indicator for financial 
integration in Europe. This test measures the degree of financial integration based 
on savings-investment correlations. I show that the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe have according to the Feldstein-Horioka Test already reached a 
higher degree of financial integration than the member countries of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). The results are robust to current account targeting 
policies. Since the standard Feldstein-Horioka Test is not suitable for detecting 
such policies, I test the statistical properties of the current account series to find 
out whether the governments in Central and Eastern Europe have targeted the 
current account. These tests suggest that in particular those Central and Eastern 
European countries targeted the current account that adopted savings programmes 
in the 1990s.  
The higher degree of international capital mobility in Central and Eastern Europe 
might be explained by the liberalization of international capital flows and the 
underdevelopment of the financial markets in these countries. It may, however, 
also reflect the fact that many banks in Central and Eastern Europe have been 
taken over by foreign credit institutions, while cross-border M&A are less 
important in Western Europe. These differences are reflected in the market share 
of foreign banks. While foreign banks had, on average, a market share of almost 
68 percent - measured by total bank assets - in Central and Eastern Europe in 
2007, foreign credit institutions reported an average market share of less than 28 
percent in Western Europe (ECB, 2008). In large Western European countries, the 
market share of foreign banks is even lower. For example, in Germany, foreign 
banks accounted for only 11, in Spain for 12, and in France only for 13 percent of 
the local banking market in 2007. In Chapter 3, I analyze why the cross-border 
dimension is less important in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  CHAPTER 1       3 
Merger Control as Barrier to Integration: Transparency of Regulation and Cross- 
Border Bank Mergers 
Chapter 3 shows that cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector is 
mainly limited by political interference. Using a unique dataset on the 
transparency of merger control in the EU banking sector I demonstrate that banks 
are significantly less likely to be taken over by a foreign bank if the merger 
review process in the banking sector is not transparent. This gives supervisors and 
politicians the scope to block cross-border M&A for other than prudential reasons. 
Particularly large banks are less likely to be acquired, while domestic M&A are 
not affected. The results confirm anecdotal evidence from Italy where the Bank of 
Italy blocked the acquisition of Banca Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de 
Lavoro  by the Dutch ABN Amro and the Spanish Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria in 2005 during merger control for reasons that were not related to the 
soundness and prudence of the proposed acquirers. The small number of the 
cross-border M&A in some Western European countries can, hence, be attributed 
to high implicit barriers to consolidation. Explicit barriers like, for instance, 
restrictions on capital flows and financial activities, in contrast, do not seem to 
matter for cross-border M&A. Such barriers have been lowered over time through 
liberalization and regulatory harmonization.  
I also show that cross-border consolidation is limited by efficiency barriers to 
integration. Such barriers reduce the efficiency gains that can be generated from 
takeovers. Since efficiency gains are a key driver for consolidation in the banking 
sector, cross-border consolidation will likely be limited in Western Europe as long 
as efficiency barriers exist that offset most of the potential efficiency gains from 
M&A. This suggests that the small number of cross-border M&A in Western 
Europe relative to Central and Eastern Europe is primarily the result of a 
combination of net comparative disadvantages of foreign banks in these countries 
and relatively high implicit barriers to consolidation.  
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Ownership Structure, Regulation, and the Market for Corporate Control in the 
EU Banking Sector 
Cross-border consolidation is not only important for the integration of EU retail-
banking markets. A large number of cross-border M&A is also an indicator for an 
active market for corporate control. The takeover market is an external corporate 
governance mechanism to discipline bank managers, since managers are more 
likely to act in the interest of shareholders if the threat of a takeover is high. To 
increase the power of the market for corporate control the EU Commission 
adopted several directives in the past. Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of these 
directives on the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector. I illustrate 
that the effect of EU corporate governance regulations depends on the ownership 
structures of banks. These widely differ. While ownership is usually concentrated 
in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. I 
show that owing to these differences EU corporate governance regulations have a 
different impact on the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector. 
While regulations to increase the power of the market for corporate control have 
almost no effect in the United Kingdom, they have even reduced the efficiency of 
the takeover market in Continental Europe. The “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
harmonize the existing legal and regulatory framework, hence, seems to be 
inappropriate for the EU banking sector. Chapter 4 also shows that there is a 
trade-off between better a higher level of investor protection and a higher 
efficiency of the market for corporate control.  
An active market for corporate control is not only important for the corporate 
governance of banks, as argued by Gropp & Kasyhap (2009), it is also an 
important determinant for financial integration. This suggests that regulations that 
improve the market for corporate control also lead to a higher degree of financial 
integration in the EU. Politicians have for a long time promoted the integration of 
EU financial markets through liberalization and harmonization to generate the 
benefits that are attributed to integrated markets. These are improved risk-sharing, CHAPTER 1       5 
allocative efficiency, and economic diversification.
2 This should not only lead to 
higher economic growth, but also increase stability. 
Because of the financial crisis, the focus has recently shifted from the benefits to 
the risks that are associated with integration. Owing to the greater 
interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets and more highly 
correlated financial risks financial integration has also increased the risk of 
transmitting financial shocks across borders (Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, & 
Laeven, 2010). This suggests that financial integration also exposes domestic 
financial systems to the risk of instability (Fecht, Grüner, Hartmann, & Lo Duca, 
2009). The shocks are not only limited to the financial sector.
3 As demonstrated 
by the crisis, shocks in the financial sector also affect the real economy.
4  
Bank Owners or Bank Managers: Who is Keen on Risk? Evidence From the 
Financial Crisis 
Given the importance of banks in mobilizing and allocating funds and risks, it is 
important to have corporate governance mechanisms that prevent banks from 
taking “excessive” risks, which are transmitted via the international financial 
market to other financial institutions and finally also to the real economy. The 
recent crisis suggests that such mechanisms have failed in the banking sector. The 
OECD, for example, argues that “a massive failure in corporate governance [of 
banks]… and ‘godsmacking’ weaknesses in the way banks are regulated led to the 
current crisis” (Hosking, 2009). The OECD (2009) particularly criticizes the 
governance of remuneration systems which failed because managers took 
                                           
2Bekaert, Harvey, & Lundblad (2006), for example, find that financial integration reduces the 
volatility of consumption growth, suggesting improved risk-sharing. This allows countries to 
specialize in their most productive sectors, thereby leading to increased economic efficiency 
(Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Financial integration also improves  allocative 
efficiency and economic diversification.  Giannetti & Ongena (2009), for instance, show that 
cross-border banking tends to improve overall economic performance by ensuring that productive 
capital is channelled towards the most efficient firms. This also reduces the risk of crises 
stemming from the mispricing of investment risk (Giannetti & Ongena, 2009). 
3Furthermore, it is argued that financial integration may widen the wealth gap between rich and 
poor countries (Fecht et al., 2009). 
4Popov and Udell (2010), for example, show that a shock to a cross-border bank’s capital results in 
a reduction in lending to firms and consumers in countries which were not the origins of the 
shock. CHAPTER 1       6 
advantage of insufficient control by shareholders to obtain compensation 
packages that disproportionately reward short-term risk-taking. This suggests that 
bank managers wanted to increase risk to increase their short-term profits.  
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, Reint Gropp and I analyze whether this hypothesis is 
true or whether the shareholders forced the management to engage in “excessive” 
risk-taking to increase their return on investment. We show that banks operating 
in countries with better shareholder rights and banks with a controlling 
shareholder recorded larger losses during the crisis than banks operating in 
countries with poor shareholder rights and banks without a controlling 
shareholder. In the period before the crisis, however, the owner-controlled banks 
show superior performance. Both imply that owner-controlled banks incurred 
greater risks compared to manager-controlled banks in the pre-crisis period.  
We also find that the probability of owner-controlled banks to receive government 
assistance during the crisis is significantly higher than that of manager-controlled 
banks. The results contradict the popular sentiment that managers wanted to 
increase risk-taking to raise their salary. They also do not support the idea that 
aligning the interests of management better with shareholders will reduce risk-
taking of banks. Instead they suggest the opposite. If the management is better 
controlled by shareholders, banks may increase their risk-taking. Indeed, one may 
be able to interpret the observed compensation schemes before the crisis as 
attempts by shareholders to induce bank managers to increase their risk-taking in 
line with the preferences of shareholders. At the same time, weakening the control 
of shareholders over the management would not only reduce risk, but may also 
entail significant efficiency costs for banks.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in that it focuses on the interaction 
between integration, regulation, and corporate governance in the EU banking 
sector. It is structured as follows. In the next chapter, I measure the degree of 
financial integration in Europe and analyze whether the Central and Eastern 
European member countries of the EU have used current account targeting 
policies to balance the current account. Chapter 3 focuses on the integration of the CHAPTER 1       7 
EU banking sector and identifies the merger review process in the banking sector 
as important barrier to cross-border consolidation. In Chapter 4, I analyze the 
impact of EU corporate governance regulations on investor protection and the 
market for corporate control in the EU banking sector against the background of 
differences in the ownership structures of banks. Finally, in Chapter 5, Reint 
Gropp and I concentrate on the reasons for the recent crisis and analyze whether 
bank owners or bank managers wanted to increase risk-taking to improve 
performance. 
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International Capital Mobility 
and Current Account 
Targeting in Central and 





1  Introduction 
In May 2004, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia (hereafter: CEEC-5) joined the European Union (EU). Since a condition 
for accession to the EU was the adoption of the acquis communitaire, the CEEC-5 
have to join the euro area in the following years. Since monetary policy in a 
monetary union is made by a single central bank, differences in the financial 
structure and the degree of financial integration across member countries cannot 
be taken into account. These differences may lead to an asymmetric transmission 
of monetary shocks if the CEEC-5 join the euro area. This has already been a 
topic of research. The papers of Cecchetti (2001) and Jarocinsk (2009), however, 
only focus on the effect of different financial structures on monetary transmission, 
while the effect of different degrees of financial integration have not yet been 
analyzed.  
This chapter attempts to fill this gap. To find out whether differences in the degree 
of financial integration may lead to an asymmetric transmission of monetary 
shocks in an enlarged European Monetary Union (EMU), I compare the degree of 
financial integration in the CEEC-5 with the euro area. I show that the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe have already reached a higher degree of integration in 
terms of savings and investment correlations than the eleven EMU member 
countries. This suggests that asymmetries in the transmission of monetary shocks 
will not arise from a lower degree of financial integration in the CEEC-5. I do not CHAPTER 2  10
find evidence that my results are biased by current account targeting policies, 
although statistical tests indicate that some governments in the CEEC-5 
successfully targeted the current account between 1980 and 2003. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the Feldstein-
Horioka Test as indicator for the degree of financial integration in Europe. Section 
3 and 4 descriptively analyze the degree of capital mobility in the CEEC-5 based 
on the development of savings rates, investment rates, and the current account. In 
Section 5, I use the Feldstein-Horioka Test to measure the degree of capital 
mobility in the CEEC-5 and in the euro area. Since some governments in Central 
and Eastern Europe have adopted savings programmes to balance the current 
account, I test whether these policies have biased the degree of capital mobility in 
the CEEC-5 in Section 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes. 
2  Measuring Financial Integration 
Financial integration implies that there are no frictions that discriminate between 
economic agents in their access to and the investment of capital on the basis of 
their location (Hartmann et al., 2003 and Baele et al., 2004). Based on this 
definition for integration three concepts can be distinguished that measure the 
degree of financial integration in Europe. 
Quantity indicators measure the degree of financial integration based on the 
volume of cross-border capital flows. Since cross-border capital flows may be 
triggered by currency or financial crises, a large amount of cross-border capital 
flows does not necessarily indicate a high degree of financial integration. For this 
reason, quantity indicators are complemented by price indicators. Price indicators 
are based upon the law of one price. According to price indicators, financial 
markets are perfectly integrated in the world capital market if the nominal and real 
interest rate parity holds. The Feldstein-Horioka Test combines quantity and price 
indicators of integration. This test is named after Feldstein & Horioka (1980), who 
used it to measure the degree of international capital mobility in 16 OECD 
countries. The idea behind the Feldstein-Horioka Test is that in a closed economy 
domestic investments are limited by domestic savings. Domestic savings and CHAPTER 2  11
investment rates are, hence, expected to be highly correlated if the domestic 
financial market is separated from the world capital market. In order to test their 
hypothesis, Feldstein & Horioka (1980) regress the domestic savings rate on the 
domestic investment rate averaged over period between 1960 and 1974 for a 
sample of 16 OECD countries: 
                                             (I/Y)i = α + β (S/Y)i + εi,                                            (1) 
 
where i is a country index, (I/Y) the domestic investment, and (S/Y) the domestic 
savings rate. ε is a random error term with zero mean and constant variance. The 
beta coefficient measures the degree of capital mobility and is called Feldstein-
Horioka coefficient. According to Feldstein and Horioka financial markets are 
perfectly integrated in the world capital market if the Feldstein-Horioka 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. In this case, domestic 
investments do not depend on domestic savings, since they are completely 
financed by the worldwide pool of capital. If the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is 
one, financial markets are, in contrast, perfectly separated from the world capital 
market. In this case, domestic investments are completely financed by domestic 
savings and a drop of the domestic savings rate leads to a proportional decline of 
the domestic investment rate. A low Feldstein-Horioka coefficient, hence, 
indicates a high degree of international capital mobility. Since Feldstein & 
Horioka (1980) find savings retention coefficients of 0.87 for gross and 0.93 for 
net savings rates, they reject the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility and 
conclude that  
“the evidence strongly contradicts the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility and 
indicates that most of incremental saving tends to remain in the country in which 
the saving is done” (Feldstein & Horioka, 1980, p. 321).  
This conclusion has triggered a discussion about the validity of the Feldstein-
Horioka Test as indicator for the degree of financial integration. Critics of the 
econometric approach argue that the degree of international capital mobility is CHAPTER 2  12
biased downward because of the endogenity of the savings rate (Feldstein & 
Horioka, 1980, Harberger, 1980, and Murphy, 1984). Critics of the interpretation 
of the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient as indicator for the degree of financial 
integration question that it measures the degree of capital mobility, since savings 
and investment rates are highly correlated even in case of perfectly integrated 
capital markets because of productivity effects, population effects, the existence 
of an intertemporal budget constraint, and current account targeting policies (Artis 
& Bayoumi, 1991, Bayoumi, 1990, Coakley, Kulasi, & Smith, 1996 and 1999, 
Feldstein & Horioka, 1980, Sinn, 1992, and Summers, 1989). Taking this 
criticism into account and applying the Feldstein-Horioka Test to other countries 
and time periods, however, has not yet solved the Feldstein-Horioka Paradox.  
Buch (1999) uses the Feldstein-Horioka Test to measure the degree of 
international capital mobility in Central and Eastern Europe. In her paper on 
capital mobility and EU enlargement, she estimates the degree of financial 
integration for a panel of Central and Eastern European countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). Three Southern European 
countries (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) are used as benchmark. Buch (1999) 
concludes that the Central and Eastern European countries have reached almost 
the same degree of capital mobility as the three Southern European countries and, 
hence, 
“that membership in the EU was unlikely to boost capital market integration to a 
significant degree and to trigger huge capital inflows” (Buch, 1999, p. 28). 
This paper extends the approach by Buch (1999) in three ways. First, I extend the 
sample by the Slovak Republic and the 11 EMU member countries (hereafter: 
EMU-11) to compare the degree of capital mobility in Central and Eastern Europe 
with the euro area. The advantage of this approach is that I can analyze if the 
CEEC-5 countries have to further integrate into the world capital market to ensure 
an efficient monetary policy in an enlarged EMU. Second, I increase the sample 
size by the period from 1998 to 2003. This allows me to test the hypothesis of 
Buch (1999) that EU membership will likely increase the degree of capital CHAPTER 2  13
mobility in the CEEC-5 further. Third and last, I analyze the effect of current 
account targeting policies on the degree of international capital mobility in the 
CEEC-5. These policies might have biased the degree of capital mobility in 
Central and Eastern Europe, since many governments in this region targeted the 
current account during their transformation to prevent large current account 
deficits. 
3  Saving Rates, Investment Rates, and the Current 
Account  
Because of a recession at the beginning of the transformation savings rates and 
investment rates decreased in Central Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Since 
savings rates dropped stronger than investment rates, the CEEC-5 faced a lack of 
capital. To finance domestic investment projects, the CEEC-5 imported foreign 
capital, which was attracted by stable exchange rates and a large number of 
investment opportunities. Further capital was imported as investment rates began 
to rise following higher economy growth in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
mid-1990s. This capital was withdrawn as the countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe slipped into recession, and the confidence of international investors in 
their investments and the sustainability of the exchange rate regime diminished. In 
particular, countries that had attracted high volumes of short-term portfolio 
investments in the past were vulnerable to capital outflows and had to devalue 
their currency following high pressure on the exchange rate target of the central 
bank. These currency crises often went hand in hand with severe economic and 
financial crises.  
The Central and Eastern European countries reacted differently to these shocks. 
While some countries adopted even harder exchange rate regimes, others let the 
exchange rate float without interventions. Almost similar to all countries was the 
adoption of government savings programmes that were targeted at reducing the 
current account deficit. 
Czech Republic: Following the recovery of the Czech economy in 1992 and 
1993, investment rates and savings rates increased (see Figure A1 in the CHAPTER 2  14
appendix). Since savings rates did not rise as fast as investment rates, domestic 
investments had to be financed by foreign capital. Due to the import of foreign 
capital, the Czech Republic recorded large current account deficits in the mid-
1990s. They peaked in 1996 and 1997 at a deficit of more than 12 percent. As 
these deficits became unsustainable, foreign investors launched a speculative 
attack against the Czech Koruna. The attack led to a banking crisis and forced the 
Czech central bank to abandon its exchange rate target. As a result of a savings 
programme of the Czech government, a higher private savings rate, and a lower 
investment rate, the current account deficit dropped to six percent in 1998 and 
1999.  
Hungary: The transition of Hungary into a market-based economy started with a 
recession, which led to the decline of savings and investment rates. Since the 
savings rate dropped stronger than the investment rate, Hungary had to import 
foreign capital. The import of foreign capital led to a current account deficit of 10 
percent in 1993 and 1994. The deficit dropped to almost five percent after the 
Hungarian government launched a savings programme in May 1995. Following 
lower savings rates in the succeeding years, but constantly high investment rates 
the current account deficit temporarily increased again to more than eight percent 
in 2000. 
Poland: Because of a recession the savings rate and the investment rate dropped 
in Poland in the early 1990s. Since the investment rate started to rise earlier than 
the savings rate, Poland had to imported foreign capital. The import of foreign 
capital led to a current account deficit of more than six percent in 1993. This 
deficit dropped to less than five percent in 1995, before it started to increase 
again. Between 1997 and 1999 the current account deficit rose to more than 12 
percent. Owing to lower investment rates the Polish current account deficit 
decreased in the following years and stabilized at a level of less than seven 
percent in 2002. 
Slovak Republic: After a large current account deficit in 1993, a lower 
investment rate and a higher savings rate led to an almost balanced current CHAPTER 2  15
account in 1994. In the mid-1990s, the investment rate started to increase again, 
while the savings rate remained relatively stable. This led to a current account 
deficit of 13 percent in 1996 and 14 percent in 1998. Since the deficit was mainly 
financed by short-term foreign debt, international investors launched a speculative 
attack against the Slovak Koruna in 1998. The attack led to a currency crisis and 
forced the central bank to give up its exchange rate target. After the crisis, the 
Slovak government launched a programme to increase public savings. However, 
owing to a lower private savings rate aggregate savings decreased further. In 
2000, the current account deficit dropped owing to a lower investment rate to 
almost seven percent. Because of an investment boom the deficit rose again to 
more than 13 percent in 2001, before it stabilized at a level of five percent in 
2003. 
Slovenia: The savings rate and the investment rate remained relatively stable in 
Slovenia compared to the other CEEC-5 countries. In 1991, Slovenia even 
recorded a current account surplus. Because of a lower savings rate and a higher 
investment rate the surplus, however, soon evolved into a current account deficit. 
At the peak of an investment boom in 1999 and 2000, the deficit reached a level 
of almost eight percent. Because of an economic downturn the investment rate 
declined in the following years and led to a current account deficit of less than 
four percent in 2003. In contrast to most other Central and Eastern European 
countries, the Slovenian government did not launch a savings programme between 
1990 and 2003 to increase public savings and to balance the current account. 
4  Savings and Investment Correlations in the CEEC-5 
Because the CEEC-5 imported foreign capital the domestic investment rate did 
not depend on the domestic savings rate between 1993 and 2003. This suggests 
that the Central and Eastern European countries are integrated in the world capital 
market according to the Feldstein-Horioka Test. To measure to what extent they 
are integrated into the world capital market, I calculate correlation coefficients 
between the savings rate and the investment rate in the CEEC-5. If capital is not 
mobile, domestic investments are completely financed by domestic savings. In CHAPTER 2  16
this case, savings rates and investment rates are perfectly correlated and the 
correlation between the savings rate and the investment rate is one. In contrast, if 
countries are perfectly integrated in the world capital market, domestic 
investments are completely financed by the worldwide pool of capital. In this 
case, the correlation between the domestic savings and the domestic investment 
rate is zero. Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients between the savings rate 
and the investment rate in the CEEC-5 for the period between 1980 and 2003. 
Table 1: Correlation Coefficients between Domestic Savings and Investment    
Rates 
   Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland  Slovak Republic  Slovenia 
          
(S/Y) and (I/Y)  -0.02  0.68  0.86  0.29  0.42 
                 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2005) and own calculations (2005). Table 1 reports the correlation between annual 
savings (S/Y) and investment rates (I/Y) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia for 
the period between 1980 and 2003. The investment rate (I/Y) is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation and changes in 
inventories divided by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The savings rate (S/Y) is equal to the sum of gross investments 
and the balance of the current account divided by GDP. 
Based on savings-investment correlations the Czech Republic is almost perfectly 
integrated in the world capital market, since the correlation between the savings 
rate and the investment rate is almost zero. Poland, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, 
and Slovenia report higher correlation coefficients. This suggests that they are not 
integrated in the world capital market in terms of the Feldstein-Horioka Test. The 
degree of international capital mobility seems to be particularly low in Poland. 
The correlation coefficient between the Polish savings rate and investment rate is 
0.86 indicating that 86 percent of domestic investments were financed by 
domestic savings between 1980 and 2003.  
5  International Capital Mobility in the CEEC-5: The 
Feldstein-Horioka Approach 
I use the Feldstein-Horioka approach to measure the degree of international 
capital mobility in the CEEC-5. Because of a lack of long time-series data the 
degree of capital mobility is estimated only for the group of countries and not for 
each country separately. The advantage of this panel approach is that information 
from cross-sectional and time-series data is used to estimate the relationship 
between domestic savings and investments in the CEEC-5. The time-series CHAPTER 2  17
properties can then be interpreted as capturing the short-run dynamics of savings 
and investments, while the cross-sectional estimates reflect the long-run 
relationship between savings and investment rates (Obstfeld, 1995). The panel is 
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
To compare the degree of capital mobility of the CEEC-5 with the euro area, I 
estimate savings-investment correlations for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (EMU-11) 
as well.
5 If the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is significantly smaller in the euro 
area than in Central and Eastern Europe, the EMU-11 are more integrated into the 
world capital market in terms of the Feldstein-Horioka criterion than the CEEC-5. 
This may lead to an asymmetric transmission of monetary shocks in the CEEC-5 
if they join the EMU. 
Equation (1) is estimated for annual data for the reform period (1989 to 2003) and 
for the entire period (1980 to 2003) (hereafter: aggregate savings regression). To 
control for serial correlation, I include first- and second-order autoregressive 
terms. To account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across cross-
sectional units, the equation is additionally estimated with country dummies. The 
results are presented in the left columns of Table 2.  
The regressions confirm the results of correlation analysis in Section 4. The 
Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is 0.41 (with a standard error of 0.05) over the entire 
period and 0.32 (0.06) over the reform period. This indicates that the CEEC-5 are 
neither perfectly integrated into nor perfectly separated from the world capital 
market. A Feldstein-Horioka coefficient of 0.41 means that 41 percent of   
  
                                           
5Luxembourg is excluded from the sample because it is an outlier due to its characteristics as a 
small country with a huge financial market place. The investment rates (I/Y) is the ratio of gross 
fixed capital formation and changes in inventories divided by GDP. Saving rates (S/Y) are 
calculated according to the current account identity by dividing the sum of gross investment and 
the balance of the current account by GDP. Because of a lack of data for the Czech Republic and 
the Slovak Republic savings and investment rates could only be calculated for the period between 
1993 and 2002 and 1993 and 2003, respectively, and for Slovenia only for the period between 
1990 and 2003. Data on the Polish and Hungarian savings and investment rates are available for 
the entire period. All data are from the International Monetary Fund (2005). CHAPTER 2  18
 Table 2: Domestic Savings and Investment Correlations  
Source: Own calculations (2005). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. Table 2 reports the results of OLS panel regressions for Equation (1). The dependent variable is the 
domestic investment rate. (S/Y) is the aggregate savings retention coefficient. The regression is estimated with first- and 
second-order autoregressive terms (AR) and cross-section weights control for serial correlation and groupwise 
heteroscedasticity. Country-specific intercepts are used to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across cross-
sectional units. CZ, HU, PL, SLK, and SL are the individual country intercepts for the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary 
(HU), Poland (PL), the Slovak Republic (SLK), and Slovenia (SL). The intercepts for the EMU-11 are not reported. They 
are available from the author upon request. 
   CEEC-5 EMU-11 
   1980-2003
1 1989-2003  1980-2003
2 1989-2003 
   Levels 
S/Y 0.41***  0.32***  0.55***  0.47*** 
   (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
              
CZ  0.21***  0.23***       
   (0.01)  (0.01)       
HU  0.16***  0.18***       
   (0.01)  (0.01)       
PL  0.15***  0.16***       
   (0.01)  (0.01)       
SLK  0.21***  0.23***       
   (0.02)  (0.02)       
SL  0.16***  0.18***       
   (0.01)  (0.01       
              
AR(1) 0.69***  0.81***    1.03***  1.12*** 
   (0.10)  (0.12)   (0.05)  (0.08) 
AR(2) -0.18**  -0.31***    -0.25***  -0.41*** 
   (0.10)   (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
              
H0: (S/Y) = 1  127.77***  105.24***  73.09***  98.41*** 
Obs. 72  58  240  163 
R
2 0.80  0.82  0.88  0.88 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  1.83  2.08  1.77  1.85 
   First Difference 
              
D(S/Y) 0.41***  0.36***  0.56***  0.52*** 
   (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
              
H0: (S/Y) =  1 96.75*** 85.60***  61.83***  65.47*** 
Obs. 67  55  229  163 
R
2 0.41  0.44  0.52  0.44 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  2.00  2.21  1.70  1.90 
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domestic investments is financed by domestic savings. I use a Wald test to find 
out whether the degree of capital mobility is higher in the reform period than over 
the entire period. The Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients 
are significantly different. This indicates that the degree of international capital 
mobility in the CEEC-5 has increased over the reform period.
6  
To compare the degree of international capital mobility in the CEEC-5 with the 
euro area, I estimate equation (1) for the EMU-11 as well. The regression results 
are presented in the right columns of Table 2. The Feldstein-Horioka coefficient 
for the EMU-11 is 0.55 (with a standard error of 0.05) for the entire period and 
0.47 (0.05) for the reform period. The coefficients are close to the coefficients of 
Buch (1999). I use a Wald test to find out whether the degree of capital mobility 
in the reform period is different from the degree of capital mobility over the entire 
period. As in case for the CEEC-5, the test does not reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients are significantly different. The degree of capital mobility, hence, 
seems to have increased in the EMU-11 over the reform period as well. To find 
out whether the CEEC-5 are more integrated in the world capital market than the 
EMU-11, I next test the hypothesis that the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is 
significantly lower in the CEEC-5 than in the EMU-11. The Wald test does not 
reject this hypothesis. This indicates that the degree of international capital 
mobility is higher in Central and Eastern Europe than in the 11 EMU member 
countries.
7  
                                           
6The test results are available from the authors upon request.   
7To find out whether the common market and the euro have changed the relationship between 
savings and investments in the EMU-11, I use intercept and slope dummies. These dummies take 
a value of one in the period of the Common Market (1992-2003) and after the introduction of the 
euro (1999-2003), respectively, and zero in all the other years. The Common Market slope 
dummy turns out to be highly significant in the aggregate savings regression indicating that the 
degree of capital mobility has increased after 1992. The Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is, 
however, still higher than in the CEEC-5. Probably due to the small number of observations, the 
euro dummy variable turns out to be insignificant. I find no evidence that saving and investment 
rates are not significantly correlated as observed by Adam et al. (2002) for the period between 
1995 and 2000. The results are available from the author upon request. 
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A problem with panel regressions is that the time-series used may be non-
stationary, since the regression of a non-stationary variable on another non-
stationary variable leads to spurious results when the series are not co-integrated 
(Granger & Newbold, 1974). In this case, the results are biased, and any inference 
about the degree of financial integration meaningless. Following Buch (1999), I, 
hence, estimate equation (1) in first differences as well. Since differencing 
eliminates the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, the first difference 
regressions do not include country dummies. The regression results are presented 
at the bottom of Table 2. As expected, taking differences worsens the fit of the 
regression. The Feldstein-Horioka coefficient for the CEEC-5 is, however, still 
significant and insignificantly different from the coefficients of the regression in 
levels. For comparison purposes, I estimate equation (1) for the EMU-11 in first 
differences as well. The Feldstein-Horioka coefficient of the first-difference 
regression is slightly higher than in the regression in levels. Wald tests, however, 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are significantly different from each 
other. 
To summarize, the results indicate that the degree of capital mobility increased 
between 1980 and 2003 in the CEEC-5 and in the EMU-11. Hypotheses tests, 
furthermore, indicate that according to the Feldstein-Horioka Test the degree of 
international capital mobility is already higher in the CEEC-5 than in the EMU-
11. This may reflect the removal of capital controls and other barriers that limit 
the import and export of capital following the accession of the CEEC-5 to the 
OECD and the preparation of these countries for EU accession. Another reason is 
the need for external capital to finance their transformation from centrally-planned 
into market-based economies. Owing to the under-development of the capital 
markets and the small capital stock the CEEC-5 have to import foreign capital to 
finance domestic investment projects. The EMU-11, in contrast, have well-
developed capital markets and a large capital stock and, hence, rely less on the CHAPTER 2  21
import of foreign capital than the CEEC-5.
8 The results are in line with the 
hypothesis of Buch (1999) that 
“the Central and Eastern European countries have already reached the same 
degree of integration into the world capital market like the member states of the 
EU and that the accession process would likely not boost capital market 
integration to a large extent and to trigger huge capital inflows” (Buch, 1999, p. 
28). 
6  The Feldstein-Horioka Approach and Current Account 
Targeting  
The Feldstein-Horioka approach is criticized, since the degree of capital mobility 
may be biased by current account targeting policies (Artis & Bayoumi, 1991, 
Coakley et al., 1996 and 1999). To make the relationship between fiscal policies 
and the current account clear, I start with the current account identity according to 
which the current account balance is equal to the difference between domestic 
savings and investments: 
                                                          CA = S - I,                                                   (2) 
where CA is the current account balance, S domestic savings, and I domestic 
investments. Since domestic savings can be decomposed into private and public 
savings, the identity above can be re-written as: 
                                                     CA = SG + SP - I,                                               (3) 
                                           
8This corresponds to findings in Harberger (1980) and Murphy (1984). They analyze the effect of 
country size on the degree of international capital mobility. They divide the sample of Feldstein 
& Horioka (1980) according to country size into two different groups to find out whether the 
degree of capital mobility is related to country size. Their results indicate that smaller countries 
have a significantly lower Feldstein-Horioka coefficient than larger countries. They interpret this 
as evidence for the existence of a “country effect” that biases the degree of international capital 
mobility. 
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where I is private investment, SP private, and SG public savings. Since the amount 
of public savings depends on the amount of public revenues and public 
expenditures, equation (3) can be rearranged to: 
                                                 CA = (T - G) + (SP – I),                                        (4) 
where T denotes public revenues and G public expenditures. Equation (4) 
illustrates that the fiscal budget may work as an adjustment variable, since the 
government can balance the current account by adjusting its budget to the 
difference between private savings and investments. If the investment rate is 
larger than the private savings rate, the government has to reduce government 
expenditures and/or to raise taxes to reduce the current account deficit. In contrast, 
if domestic savings exceed domestic investments, the government has to increase 
its debt to reduce the current account surplus. Hence, I expect the correlation of 
the difference between private savings and investments (SP – I) and the fiscal 
budget (T – G) to be negative if the government targets the current account.
9  
The correlation between the fiscal budget and the difference between private 
savings and investment may, however, also be negative, even if the government 
has not targeted the current account. Feldstein & Bachetta (1989) argue that the 
negative correlation might also be caused by the crowding out or crowding in of 
private investments in a world of immobile capital. If capital is not mobile, the 
domestic interest rate is completely determined by the domestic demand for and 
the supply of capital. An increase of public expenditures then causes the domestic 
interest rate to rise and to crowd out private investments, whereas a reduction 
causes the interest rate to decrease and to crowd in private investments. Thus, 
even in a world of immobile capital, the fiscal budget (T – G) can be negatively 
correlated with the difference between private savings and investments (SP – I).  
                                           
9Summers (1986) regresses the difference between domestic savings and investments on the 
government deficit to find out whether the Feldstein and Horioka paradox can be explained by 
current account targeting. He finds evidence that current account targeting policies influence the 
Feldstein-Horioka coefficient and criticizes the interpretation of the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient 
as an indicator for the degree of capital mobility. CHAPTER 2  23
To find out whether my results are biased by fiscal policies, I follow Feldstein & 
Bachetta (1989) and regress the domestic investment rate on the private and the 
public savings rate for the period between 1980 and 2003 (hereafter: private 
savings regression). 
                                      (I/Y)it = αi + β1 (SP/Y)it + β2 (SG/Y)it + εit,                         (5) 
where i is a country and t a time index. (SP/Y) is the private and (SG/Y) the public 
savings rate. β1 is the private and β2 the public savings retention coefficient. ε is a 
random error term with zero mean and constant variance. To allow for time-
invariant heterogeneity across cross-section units, equation (5) is estimated with 
country-specific dummy variables. Autoregressive terms are used to control for 
serial correlation. Since some of the CEEC-5 countries launched government 
savings programmes between 1993 and 2003 to reduce the current account deficit, 
I expect the public savings retention coefficient to be significant and the private 
savings retention coefficient to be significantly lower in the private savings 
regression than in the regression with aggregate savings rates. In this case, fiscal 
policies have biased the degree of capital mobility in the CEEC-5 in the previous 
regressions downward. The results with private and public savings rates are 
presented in Table 3.  
The regression model fits the data well and all variables are significant. The 
private savings retention coefficient is 0.35 (with a standard error of 0.06) for the 
entire period and 0.32 (0.14) for the reform period. The public savings retention 
coefficient is 0.45 and 0.66 (0.24), respectively. Since the private savings 
retention coefficients are smaller in the private savings regression, the degree of 
capital mobility in the CEEC-5 seems to be biased by fiscal policies in the 
aggregate savings regression. However, a Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the 
aggregate and the private savings retention coefficient are significantly different. 
The degree of international capital mobility, thus, does not seem to be 
significantly biased by current account targeting policies in the CEEC-5. The 
results for the EMU-11 indicate that the degree of capital mobility is downward  CHAPTER 2  24
Table 3: Private and Public Savings and Investment Correlations 
   CEEC-5 EMU-11 
   1980 to 2003
1  1989 to 2003  1980 to 2003
2  1989 to 2003 
   Levels 
SP/Y 0.35***  0.32**  0.52*** 0.44*** 
 (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
SG/Y 0.45***  0.66***  0.59*** 0.48*** 
 (0.12)  (0.24)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
             
CZ  0.22***  0.24***       
  (0.01)  (0.03)       
HU  0.17***  0.19***       
  (0.01)  (0.03)       
PL  0.19***  0.20***       
  (0.01)  (0.02)       
SLK  0.21***  0.23***       
  (0.02)  (0.03)       
SL  0.17***  0.18***       
  (0.01)  (0.02)       
             
AR(1) 0.80***  0.81***  1.01*** 1.09*** 
 (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
AR(2) -0.41***  -0.44***  0.23*** -0.38*** 
 (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
             
H0: (SP/Y) = 1  105.79***  21.96***  70.66***  97.62*** 
Obs. 53  44 209  132 
R
2 0.74  0.72  0.88 0.89 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  1.99  2.23  1.86  1.97 
  First Difference 
D(SP/Y) 0.23*  0.21  0.55*** 0.49*** 
 (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
D(SG/Y) 0.40**  0.53** 0.64***  0.57*** 
 (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
H0: D(SP/Y) = 1  41.25***  34.27***  56.26***  66.15*** 
Obs. 59  48 198  132 
R
2 0.13  0.12  0.55  0.49 
Durbin-Watson Stat.  1.79  1.89  1.82  2.14 
Source: Own calculations (2005). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. Table 3 reports the results of OLS panel regressions for Equation (5). The dependent variable is the 
domestic investment rate. (SP/Y) is the private and (SG/Y) the public saving rate. The public savings rate is the difference of 
public revenues and public expenditures divided by the GDP. Data on public savings is not available for Austria, France, 
Germany, Greece, and Portugal for the period between 1999 and 2003. The regression is estimated with first- and second-
order autoregressive terms (AR) and cross-section weights to control for serial correlation and groupwise 
heteroscedasticity. Country-specific intercepts are used to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across cross-
sectional units. CZ, HU, PL, SLK, and SL are the individual country intercepts for the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary 
(HU), Poland (PL), the Slovak Republic (SLK), and Slovenia (SL). The intercepts for the EMU-11 are not reported. They 
are available from the author upon request. 
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biased as well. The private savings retention coefficients is 0.52 (with a standard 
error of 0.05) for the entire period and 0.44 (0.05) for the reform period. The 
public savings retention coefficients are 0.59 (0.07) and 0.48 (0.06), respectively. 
Wald tests reject the hypothesis that the coefficients in the private savings 
regression are significantly different from the coefficients in the aggregate savings 
regression, however. This indicates that the degree of capital mobility in the 
EMU-11 is significantly not biased by current account targeting policies either.  
To control for non-stationarity, I estimate equation (5) in first differences as well. 
The results are presented at the bottom of Table 3. As for the aggregate savings 
regressions, taking differences worsens the fit of the regression. The Feldstein-
Horioka coefficients for the CEEC-5 and the EMU-11 are, however, still (weakly) 
significant over both periods. Moreover, Wald tests reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients for the private and public savings retention coefficients in the first-
difference regression are significantly different from the coefficients in the 
regression in levels.  
To summarize, the private savings regressions suggest that the degree of 
international capital mobility in the CEEC-5 and the EMU-11 was not biased by 
fiscal policies between 1980 and 2003. The results also indicate that the public 
savings rate is correlated with the investment rate. However, this cannot be taken 
as evidence for current account targeting policies in the CEEC-5 and the EMU-11, 
since a significant public savings retention coefficient is consistent with a 
crowding out of private investments in the case of low capital mobility and 
current account policies in the case of high capital mobility. The private savings 
approach is, hence, appropriate to control for the influence of fiscal policies on the 
degree of international capital mobility, but inappropriate to find out if the 
governments in the CEEC-5 have targeted the current account. Hence, I have to 
use other econometric techniques to determine whether the governments in 
Central and Eastern Europe have used fiscal policies to balance the current 
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7  Current Account Targeting in the CEEC-5  
If the government systematically adjusts public revenues and expenditures to the 
difference between private savings and investments to balance the current 
account, a country cannot infinitely run current account deficits or current account 
surpluses. For this reason, if the governments in the CEEC-5 successfully targeted 
the current account between 1980 and 2003, the current account time series 
cannot be non-stationary. This hypothesis can be tested by analyzing the statistical 
properties of the current account time series for the CEEC-5. To do the test, I first 
generate the current account series according to equation (2) as the difference 
between the domestic savings and the domestic investment rate. Then, I perform 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of the current account series to test for the 
existence of a unit root (Dickey & Fuller, 1979). I assume that the government did 
not (successfully) target the current account if these tests indicate that the current 
account is non-stationary.  
Table 4: ADF Tests of the Current Account  
   Level  First Difference  Degree of  
   Specification
1 t-value Specification  t-value  Integration 
               
Czech Republic  0C1  -3.33**  0C1  -2.84*  I(0) 
               
Hungary 0C0  -1.66  0C0  -4.82***  I(1) 
               
Poland 0C0  -1,51  0C0  -4.27***  I(1) 
               
Slovak Republic  0C1  -3.36**  0C1  -2.83*  I(0) 
               
Slovenia 0C0  -2.73*  0C0  -7.86***  I(0) 
                 
Source: Own calculations (2005). Trend, constant, lag length. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. 
Table 4 reports the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests (ADF) for the current account of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The current account series is the difference between the savings rate 
and the investment rate. The sample period is 1993 to 2002 for the Czech Republic, 1980 to 2003 for Hungary and Poland, 
1993 to 2003 for Slovakia, and 1991 to 2003 for Slovenia. 
Table 4 presents the results of the ADF tests. They come to different conclusions 
about influence of the governments in the CEEC-5 on the current account. While 
the Polish and the Hungarian current account are non-stationary, the current 
account series for the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia are 
stationary. These results have two different implications: First, the non-CHAPTER 2  27
stationarity of the Polish and the Hungarian current account series indicates that 
the governments in these countries did not (successfully) target the current 
account between 1980 and 2003. Second, the stationarity of the current account 
series in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia suggests that the 
governments in these countries might have adopted current account targeting 
policies.  
It has, however, to be noted that the current account can also be stationary due to 
changes in the private savings and investment rate. Hence, the stationarity of the 
current account cannot be taken as evidence for current account targeting in these 
countries. However, the ADF results indicate that such policies might have been 
used in these countries to prevent large current account deficits. The results, 
furthermore, do not contradict the observations I made in Section 3, since the 
governments in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic launched saving 
programmes after they experienced currency crises in 1997 and 1998 to reduce the 
current account deficit. The test results for Hungary and Slovenia are more 
difficult to interpret, since the Slovenian current account is stationary although no 
government savings programmes were observed. The stationarity of the current 
account might, however, also been caused by changes in the private savings and 
investment rate. The ADF result for the Slovenian current account series, hence, 
does not contradict my observations in Section 3. Only the test result for Hungary 
is contradicting. Since the Hungarian government adopted savings programmes in 
1995 to reduce the current account deficit, I expect the Hungarian current account 
series to be stationary. The ADF test results, however, indicate the opposite. This 
suggests that the Hungarian government did not (successfully) target the current 
account.  
To test the robustness of the ADF test results, I additionally do Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) tests (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, & 
Shin, 1992). The KPSS test tests the null hypothesis that the current account series 
is stationary, whereas the ADF test assumes that the series is non-stationary. The 
test results confirm the ADF test results for the Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic, and for Slovenia. However, the KPSS test comes to different CHAPTER 2  28
conclusions regarding the stationarity of the current account in Hungary and 
Poland. This may indicate that the unit root test results are not robust. They, 
hence, have to be interpreted with caution. The small sample period may be a 
reason for this. It may also explain the conflicting results I got for the Hungarian 
current account. 
8  Conclusions 
The motivation of this chapter was to compare the degree of financial integration 
in the CEEC-5 with the euro area to find out whether differences in the degree of 
financial integration may cause asymmetric responses to monetary shocks if these 
countries join the EMU. 
According to the analysis of saving and investment correlations neither the 
CEEC-5 not the EMU-11 are perfectly integrated in the world capital market. 
However, both country groups have become more integrated over time. The 
empirical analysis, furthermore, shows that asymmetric responses to monetary 
shocks cannot be expected in an enlarged EMU because of a lower degree of 
financial integration in Central and Eastern Europe, since the CEEC-5 have 
according to the Feldstein & Horioka (1980) already reached a higher degree of 
international capital mobility than the eleven EMU member countries. This might 
be explained with the removal of capital controls and other barriers that limit the 
import and export of capital following the accession of the CEEC-5 to the OECD 
and the preparation of these countries for EU accession. Another reason is the 
need for external capital to finance their transformation from centrally-planned to 
market-based economies. 
Since the CEEC-5 experienced large current account deficits in the 1990s, many 
governments adopted savings programmes to balance the current account. To find 
out whether such policies have biased the degree of international capital mobility, 
I estimate the Feldstein-Horioka equation with private and public savings rates. 
The results indicate that the degree of capital mobility is not biased by fiscal 
policies. They, however, also reveal that public savings are significantly 
correlated with the domestic investment rate. Since the standard Feldstein-CHAPTER 2  29
Horioka approach is not suitable for detecting current account targeting policies in 
the CEEC-5, I test the statistical properties of the current account time series on 
the basis of unit root tests. These tests suggest that, in particular, those CEEC-5 
countries targeted the current account that adopted government savings 
programmes between 1980 and 2003. However, robustness checks and the small 
sample period suggest that the results of these tests should be taken with caution 
and not be interpreted as evidence, but rather as indication for the adoption of 
current account targeting policies in some Central and Eastern European 
countries. CHAPTER 3  30
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Merger Control as Barrier to 
Integration: Transparency of 
Regulation and Cross-Border 
Bank Mergers 
 
“Every time there is an attack on the banking system, every government in Europe 
is active, they intervene… France is just like the others.”  
Henri Guaino, close advisor of French President Nicolas Sarkozy
10 
1  Introduction 
Although the EU has removed barriers to cross-border banking through regulatory 
harmonization and liberalization, the number of cross-border M&A in the EU 
banking sector is still small compared to cross-border M&A in other sectors of the 
economy (European Commission, 2005a). The cross-border dimension is 
particularly unimportant in Western European banking markets, while cross-
border consolidation is more advanced in Central and Eastern Europe (Cabral et. 
al., 2002). This suggests there are still barriers to cross-border M&A in some EU 
member countries.  
This chapter shows that cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector is 
mainly limited by political interference. Using a unique dataset on the 
transparency of merger control in the EU banking sector I demonstrate that banks 
are significantly less likely to be taken over by a foreign bank if the merger 
review process in the banking sector is not transparent. This gives supervisors and 
politicians scope to block cross-border M&A for other than prudential reasons. 
Particularly large banks are less likely to be acquired. Domestic M&A are not 
                                           
10Quote from an article on speculations that the French bank Société Générale becomes the target 
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affected. The results confirm anecdotal evidence from Italy where the Bank of 
Italy blocked the acquisition of Banca Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de 
Lavoro by the Dutch ABN Amro and the Spanish Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria in 2005 during merger control. Because it became later public that 
both deals were not blocked for prudential reasons, but to protect local banks from 
foreign investors, the EU Commission brought actions against Italy for 
infringement of the principle of the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment. Furthermore, the Commission complained that the merger review 
process of the Bank of Italy creates legal uncertainty and lacks transparency. This 
may lead to a situation in which the supervisor can block M&A based on opaque 
concerns (European Commission, 2005b).  
Political interference is not only a barrier to cross-border M&A in Italy. For 
example, in 2008, the French Prime Minister Francois Filion warned that the 
government “will not allow Société Générale to be the target of hostile raids by 
other companies” (Société Générale Shares Rise on Takeover Report, 2008). This 
was not the first time that French politicians intervened in the acquisition of a 
domestic bank. The case of Crédit Lyonnais is another example. Crédit Lyonnais 
was privatized in 1999 with the government retaining 10 percent of ownership 
shares until the end of 2000. This made the acquisition of Crédit Lyonnais more 
difficult, since government officials repeatedly stated they would oppose a 
takeover by a foreign bank. This is reflected by a statement of Sir Brian Pitman, 
the chairman of Lloyds TSB at that time. In an interview with the French 
newspaper  Le Figaro, he said that Lloyds would like to take over Crédit 
Lyonnais, but was put off by the political climate in France (Paterson, 1999).
11 
According to French politicians, political interference is not a new phenomenon in 
the EU banking sector.
12 “Every time there is an attack on the banking system, 
every government in Europe is active, they intervene. France is just like the 
                                           
11Political influence also played a role in the bidding war for Crédit Industriel et Commercial 
(CIC) in 1998 (Boot, 1999). Although ABN Amro was favoured because of its excellent track 
record vis-à-vis competing French bidders, CIC was sold to Crédit Mutuel. 
12Political interference also plays a role in other EU countries. For example, Portuguese politicians 
blocked the acquisition of the financial group Champlinaud by the Spanish Banco Santander 
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others”, said a close advisor of French President Nicolas Sarkozy (BNP Weighing 
Bids for Crisis-Hit Société Générale, 2008).  
Although these examples demonstrate that political interference makes cross-
border M&A more difficult, systematic empirical evidence is missing. This 
chapter aims to fill this gap. Its first main contribution is that it introduces indices 
that measure the scope of politicians and supervisors to block M&A for reasons 
that are not related to the soundness and prudence of the proposed investor. The 
indices are constructed based on a questionnaire that was sent to the supervisory 
authorities in the 25 EU member countries between November 2006 and March 
2007. The second main contribution is that the indices are used in an econometric 
model to find out whether merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to M&A 
in the EU banking sector.  
To my knowledge this is the first study that analyzes the probability that a bank is 
taken over as a function of bank characteristics, country characteristics, and the 
transparency of merger control. The results indicate that cross-border bank 
mergers are systematically more likely if merger control is transparent. In 
particular, large banks are more likely to be taken over by if the merger review 
process is transparent. This supports the hypothesis that politicians, supervisors, 
and local banks operate in close concert to keep the largest banks in their country 
in domestic hands (Boot, 1999). Domestic M&A are, in contrast, not affected. 
The results do not only have implications for consolidation in the EU banking 
sector, but also for efficiency. Since government intervention is usually not driven 
by efficiency considerations, political interference should not only make cross-
border M&A less likely, but also decrease the efficiency and valuation of banks. 
This corresponds to findings in Carletti, Hartmann, & Ongena (2007). They find 
that M&A in the EU banking sector generate larger announcement effects if 
merger control is more transparent and the supervisor more independent. Both 
reduces the discretion of the regulatory process and enhances the efficiency of 
envisioned M&A (Carletti et al., 2007). Efficiency enhancements may also arise 
from greater pressure on managers to maximize shareholder value. Since the CHAPTER 3  33
incumbent bank managers may loose their job and perquisites after a takeover, 
they have larger incentives to manage the company in the interest of the 
shareholders if banks are more likely to be taken over. The results are, hence, 
important for corporate governance in the EU banking sector as well. This may be 
particularly relevant in the moment, since the crisis cast doubt on whether internal 
corporate governance mechanisms like the supervisory board are able to discipline 
bank managers.
13 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview over 
the current state of integration in the EU banking sector. Section 3 concentrates on 
the motives and the barriers to M&A in the banking sector. In Section 4, I focus 
on merger control as barrier to integration. I show that the current regulatory 
framework in the EU gives supervisors considerable latitude in discouraging or 
rejecting a proposed acquisition. To measure the scope for supervisors and 
politicians to block M&A during the merger review process, I construct indices 
that measure different aspects of merger control in the banking sector in Section 6. 
In Section 7, these indices are used to descriptively analyze whether merger 
control constitutes a barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU banking 
sector.  
2  The Integration of EU Banking Markets 
Financial markets are integrated if domestic and foreign financial institutions face 
the same set of rules and are treated in a non-discriminatory manner when they 
operate in the market (Hartmann et al., 2003 and Baele et al., 2004). The most 
accurate and direct way to measure the degree of integration in the EU banking 
sector would, hence, be to list all frictions and regulations and to check if they 
apply differently to domestic and foreign banks. This is, however, impossible 
(Baele et al., 2004). For this reason, the integration of EU banking markets can 
only be measured indirectly by price and quantity indicators of integration.  
                                           
13The OECD, for instance, writes that the “boards of financial companies were ineffective and not 
capable of objective and independent judgement” (OECD, 2009). CHAPTER 3  34
Quantity indicators measure the degree of banking integration based on quantities 
like, for example, the volume of cross-border retail operations (Baele et al., 2004 
and Gual, 2004). These data suggest that cross-border retail flows are generally 
much less important than wholesale or money market flows in the euro area. Data 
from the European Central Bank (ECB), for example, suggests that wholesale and 
money market flows are large across borders within the euro area. Cross-border 
retail flows are, in contrast, less than six percent (ECB, 2009). This not 
necessarily indicates that there is a lack of integration in EU retail-banking 
markets if retail business is local and cross-border business limited. For this 
reason, the number of cross-border M&A is often used as an additional indicator 
for integration in the retail field and the absence of such deals is often taken as 
evidence for the fragmentation of EU retail-banking markets (Cabral et al., 2002).  
A problem with quantity indicators is that a large number of cross-border M&A 
does not indicate a higher degree of banking integration if the acquired banks 
continue to operate as before in the local market so that the pricing conditions do 
not converge across markets (Cabral et al., 2002). For this reason, quantity 
indicators are often supplemented by price indicators. The idea behind price 
indicators is that identical products should cost the same price in perfectly 
integrated markets. If this is not the case, customers will move from the high-price 
country to the low-price country and drive down price differentials. Persistent 
price differentials, hence, indicate that financial integration is still incomplete. 
Price indicators suggest that prices still differ in the EU retail-banking market, 
while wholesale prices show a high degree of convergence (Adam et al., 2002, 
Baele et al., 2004, and European Commission, 2009). 
Problematic is that the price of retail-banking products often consists of different 
components like the interest rate and a fixed service charge (European 
Commission, 2009). Moreover, some products can often only be bought as a 
package. Certain products may, hence, be under-priced to attract new clients, 
while other products are over-priced (European Commission, 2009). The bundling 
of services is particularly widespread in EU retail-banking markets (European 
Commission, 2009). Because data on interest rates is often highly aggregated and CHAPTER 3  35
not broken down into its components, products differ and the prices of retail-
banking products are not easily comparable across countries (Cabral et al., 2002). 
Prices may also continue to differ owing to differences in tax systems, 
preferences, risk characteristics, or other demand characteristics (Gropp & 
Kashyap, 2009). For this reason, Gropp & Kashyap (2009) argue hat perfect price 
convergence is neither necessary nor sufficient for integration. They propose a 
new test of financial integration that is based on the convergence in banks' 
profitability. Their test emphasises the role of an active market for corporate 
control and competition in banking integration. Gropp and Kashyap (2009) 
demonstrate that the profitability of listed European banks appears to converge to 
a common level. There is also weak evidence that competition eliminates high 
profits for these banks, while underperforming banks tend to show improved 
profitability. Unlisted banks differ markedly. Their profits show no tendency to 
revert to a common target rate of profitability that indicates that markets are 
integrated. This suggests that EU banking markets are still far from being 
integrated (Gropp & Kashyap, 2009). 
3  Motives and Barriers to Consolidation in the EU 
Banking Sector 
The fragmentation of EU retail-banking markets may be explained by the fact that 
retail markets are, in contrast, to wholesale markets still local and cross-border 
business limited (European Commission, 2009). This indicates that the most 
effective way to get access to foreign retail-banking markets is the acquisition of 
or the merger with a local bank (Cabral et al., 2002). However, M&A in the non-
financial sector still outnumber cross-border M&A in the banking sector 
(European Commission, 2009). This suggests that there is a link between the 
fragmentation of EU retail-banking markets and the small number of cross-border 
M&A. This section analyzes the motives and barriers to consolidation in the EU 
banking sector. 
M&A are undertaken for motives that can broadly be distinguished into value-
maximizing and non-value maximizing ones (Berger, Demsetz, & Strahan, 1999). CHAPTER 3  36
Managers may engage in M&A that are not driven by value maximization if they 
derive utility from empire building. Takeovers can then be viewed as a 
manifestation of the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. In line with that Allen & Cebenoyan (1991) and Banning (1999) find 
that banks with a widely dispersed ownership structure and considerable power of 
the management are more likely to make acquisitions that increase size than credit 
institutions that are dominated by a large shareholder that monitors the 
management.  
If managers maximize shareholder value, M&A are undertaken to increase profits. 
One way is to generate economies of scale and scope from takeovers (Berger et 
al., 1999 and Berger, DeYoung, & Udell, 2001). Despite the potential to generate 
cost synergies cross-border consolidation is limited in the EU banking sector. 
Berger et al. (2001) explain the absence of cross-border M&A with the existence 
of barriers that reduce the efficiency gains that can be generated from takeovers. 
Examples for efficiency barriers are differences in the regulation and supervision 
of banks. Since foreign banks have to comply with regulations at home and 
abroad, domestic banks have cost advantages because complying with two 
different sets of regulations imposes additional costs on foreign credit 
institutions.
14  
M&A also generate X-efficiency gains if the acquiring institution increases the 
efficiency of the acquired bank up to its own level (Berger et al., 1999 and Berger 
et al., 2001). Owing to cultural diversity, different languages, and corporate 
cultures X-efficiency gains are likely to be limited in cross-border M&A. Cross-
border M&A are also less attractive as compared to domestic M&A due to 
problems in monitoring managers at distance (Buch & De Long, 2003, Buch, 
                                           
14Differences in regulations also limit the degree to which products can be standardized across 
borders. This has recently been confirmed by a survey of the EU Commission (2005a). The survey 
indicates that differences in product regulation and consumer protection are an important barrier to 
cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector. This makes cross-border takeovers less 
attractive relative to domestic M&A, since cost synergies are a key driver for consolidation in the 
financial sector (Berger, Buch, DeLong, & DeYoung, 2004a).  
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2005, and Berger et al., 2004a). Buch & DeLong (2004), for instance, explain the 
relative absence of cross-border deals in the banking sector by regulatory barriers 
and information costs related to distance and cultural factors. 
The empirical literature on the efficiency effects of M&A in the banking sector 
suggests that efficiency barriers exist. Beitel & Schierenbeck (2006), for example, 
find that the changes of the combined value of the bidder and the target are zero or 
even negative in case of cross-border M&A, while the values of the combined 
institution is positive for domestic M&A. Studies that compare the efficiency of 
foreign and domestic banks do not find much evidence for efficiency gains 
through cross-border M&A either. Vander Vennet (1996), for instance, concludes 
that foreign banks in Europe had about the same cost efficiency as domestic 
banks, while Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel (2005) find that foreign banks are more 
cost efficient than domestic banks in Central and Eastern Europe. This indicates 
that foreign banks have advantages over local banks in developing countries 
(Berger, 2007). In contrast, the research for developed countries suggests that 
foreign banks are less efficient than local institutions in industrial countries 
(Berger, 2007).  
M&A also generate efficiency gains if a more diverse scope of or mix of financial 
services, or a better geographical diversification of risks allows banks to improve 
the trade-off between risk and return (Berger et al., 2001). Takeovers may also be 
undertaken to increase the market share (Berger et al., 1999) or to get access to 
foreign banking markets (Berger et al., 2001). Market access is particularly 
relevant for banks that have a large market share in their home country and that 
are restricted in acquiring local banks for antitrust concerns. Furthermore, cross-
border M&A are considered the most effective way to enter foreign retail-banking 
markets (Cabral et al., 2002).
15 In particular, banks with a large branch network 
and a large market share are attractive targets. Despite the benefits of acquiring 
                                           
15This is consistent with the literature that analyzes foreign bank expansion. It usually finds that 
subsidiaries are the dominant entry mode for banks that operate with local clients, while branches 
are more often chosen to provide financial services to local clients when they operate abroad 
(Foccarelli & Pozzolo, 2005 and Cerutti, Dell’Arricca, & Soledad Martinez Peria, 2007). 
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such banks, large cross-border deals are limited in some Western European 
countries (see e.g. Table 9 in Section 6). Banks mainly enter these countries via 
branches or via the acquisition of small banks. In the EU banking sector, market 
entry via branches is easier than via subsidiaries, since branches of banks from 
other EU countries do not need prior approval by the supervisor in the host 
country (“single passport”). The acquisition of small banks, in contrast, is less 
likely to be blocked if politicians and supervisors only want the largest banks in 
domestic hands.  
Boot (1999) argues that central banks, ministries of finance, and domestic banks 
operate in close concert to block cross-border and to promote domestic M&A. For 
Berger (2007) implicit government barriers are one of the main reasons for the 
small market share of foreign banks in Western Europe relative to Central and 
Eastern Europe. These include delaying or denying cross-border takeovers and 
encouraging domestic banks to merge with each other to become larger and more 
difficult to acquire (Berger, 2007). Merger control is an implicit barrier to 
consolidation. In contrast to explicit barriers like, for example, restrictions on 
capital flows and foreign ownership, implicit barriers do not single out foreign 
banks in a formal way. Since many explicit barriers have been lowered over time 
through liberalization and regulatory harmonization, implicit barriers may be 
more important to cross-border M&A in the EU banking sector at present (Berger, 
2007). Implicit barriers also arise from differences in the rules and regulations that 
govern banks and their market environment (Berger, 2007). State ownership and 
subsidy of banks by the state constitutes an implicit barrier as well (Berger, 2007). 
Banks that are subsidized often have mandates to make loans at below-market 
rates to targeted customers like specific firms, industries, or regions. State-owned 
banks may also have lower credit standards than private banks. In some countries, 
state banks also have a large market share. This may crowd out private banks and 
make foreign bank entry less attractive (Berger, 2007). 
To identify the motives for and the barriers to consolidation, several empirical 
studies have analyzed the determinants of domestic and cross-border M&A in the 
banking sector. Foccarelli & Pozzolo (2001) focus on the acquirer. They find that CHAPTER 3  39
large and efficient banks are more likely to be the acquirer in cross-border M&A 
in the OECD. Banks with a larger share of non-interest income are also more 
likely to engage in cross-border M&A. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
efficient banks are more likely to overcome efficiency barriers and to generate a 
sufficient return on investment from takeovers. Pasiouras, Tanna, & Gaganis 
(2007) focus on acquirer and targets in 15 EU countries. Their results indicate that 
targets are larger in size, less capitalized, less liquid, and less efficient compared 
to banks that were not involved in M&A. This is consistent with findings in 
Hernando, Nieto, & Wall (2009). They distinguish between cross-border and 
domestic M&A and find that poorly managed banks are more likely to be 
acquired in the EU banking sector. Large banks are also more likely to be taken 
over in case of domestic M&A. Banks operating in more concentrated markets 
are, in contrast, less likely to be acquired by domestic, but are more likely to be 
taken over by foreign credit institutions. This suggests that the likelihood that a 
bank is taken over not only depends on the characteristics of the bank, but also on 
the characteristics of the country where the bank is located. The effect of these 
characteristics may, furthermore, differ for domestic and cross-border takeovers.  
4  Merger Control in the EU Banking Sector  
The next sections focus on merger control as implicit barrier to cross-border 
M&A in the EU banking sector. The main objective of merger control is to 
maintain competition in the market. In the EU, merger control is regulated in 
decree No. 4064/1989. It determines that the EU Commission is responsible for 
the control of cross-border M&A if the transaction reaches certain turnover 
thresholds (also called “community dimension”). Furthermore, it requires that all 
M&A that create or strengthen a dominant position which impedes effective 
competition shall be declared incompatible with the common market (Art. 2, p. 2). 
M&A between foreign and domestic firms whose turnover exceeds the 
predetermined thresholds and which do not restrict competition in the single 
market should, hence, be approved by the EU Commission. This is, however, not 
the case for M&A that involve banks, because Article 21 of decree No. 4064/1989 
grants member states the right “to take appropriate measures to protect legitimate CHAPTER 3  40
interests” (Article 21, p. 3). Legitimate interests are defined as public security, 
plurality of the media, and prudential rules (Article 21, p. 3, s. 3). Since prudential 
rules relate, in particular, to financial services (European Commission, 1998), 
Article 21 grants member countries the right to block cross-border M&A on 
prudential grounds if the supervisor is not satisfied with the soundness and 
prudence of the potential investor.
16 , merger control in the banking sector usually 
focuses on the financial solidity of the new entity and M&A are primarily 
approved based on a prudential assessment.  
4.1 Prudential Assessment of M&A in the EU Banking Sector 
Because M&A in the banking sector are subject to a prudential assessment, M&A 
can be blocked by national regulators if they deem the potential investor as not 
suitable to ensure the sound and prudent management of the acquired credit 
institution. This allows member countries to block certain acquisitions in the 
banking sector even if they reach “community dimension”. This is also regulated 
by the existing legal framework. It grants supervisors the right to veto ownership 
transfers in the banking sector, if they are “in view of the need to ensure sound 
and prudent management of the credit institution, […] not satisfied as to the 
suitability [of the potential investor]” (Article 19, p. 1, s. 2 of directive 
2006/48/EC).  
Problematic is that the current regulatory framework in the EU does not provide 
specific criteria that supervisory authorities have to use for assessing the 
suitability of potential investors. Regulators, hence, have considerable latitude in 
accepting, discouraging, or rejecting a proposed acquisition. This could lead to 
undue interference by the member states that frustrates investors and makes cross-
border M&A impractical. This has recently been confirmed by a survey of the EU 
Commission on the obstacles to cross-border consolidation in the EU financial 
sector (EU Commission, 2005a). According to market participants with previous 
                                           
16 Dewatripont & Tirole (1994), Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-Suarez, & Weisbrod 
(1998), and Herring & Litan (1995) list the potential instability and the key role the financial 
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experience in M&A, the supervisory approval process, the misuse of supervisory 
powers, and political interference are important barriers to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU financial sector (European Commission, 2005a).  
Besides this survey evidence, there were also cases in the past in which regulators 
tried to block cross-border M&A for other than prudential reasons. The first case 
that became public was the acquisition of the Portuguese financial group 
Champlinaud by the Spanish Banco Santander Central Hispanio in 1999. The 
acquisition was vetoed by the Portuguese government. The grounds for opposing 
the deal included not only “late and incomplete notification” and the “absence of 
a transparent structure” in the new group, but also the “necessity to protect the 
national interest” (European Commission, 1999a). The veto was overruled by the 
EU Commission, since it was not justified on prudential grounds (European 
Commission, 1999b). A more recent example is the acquisition of Banca 
Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro in 2005 by ABN Amro and Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, respectively. Together with the results from the 
survey these examples demonstrate that the merger control has the potential to 
restrict cross-border consolidation and to prevent efficiency enhancing M&A in 
the EU banking sector. 
4.2 Directive Proposal of the EU Commission 
Initiated by the events in Italy in 2005 and the survey the EU Commission 
proposed to change Article 16 of the EU Banking Directive (2000/12/EC) in 
September 2006 (European Commission, 2006a). Article 16 regulates the transfer 
of ownership in the EU banking sector. The proposal’s aim at improving the legal 
certainty, clarity, and transparency of the merger review process in the EU 
banking sector (European Commission, 2006a). The proposal modifies the 
existing framework with regard to the criteria and the procedure used by the 
supervisory authorities to assess the suitability of the proposed investor.  
The directive proposal sets a list of non-discriminatory criteria according to which 
supervisors have to assess the soundness and prudence of proposed investors. The 
criteria proposed are (1) the reputation of the investor, (2) the experience of the CHAPTER 3  42
future management, (3) the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, (4) the 
ongoing  compliance with EU directives, and (5) no connection to money 
laundering and terrorism finance (European Commission, 2006b). These criteria 
should allow courts to decide on the legality and correct application of the merger 
review process in case of the refusal of an application (European Commission, 
2006b). To control if the supervisory authorities fulfil their obligations, they 
should additionally provide the EU Commission with all relevant documents on 
which they have based the prudential assessment. This should reduce the scope 
for supervisors to block M&A for reasons that are not justified on prudential 
grounds. Moreover, the EU Commission proposed that the reasons that led to the 
denial of an acquisition should be made public (European Commission, 2006b). 
To decrease legal uncertainty and risk, the directive proposal, furthermore, aims at 
reducing the time period supervisory authorities have to veto an acquisition. 
Under the current directive, regulators have three months to veto an acquisition 
(Article 19, p. 1, s. 2). According to the proposal, the EU Commission plans to 
reduce the assessment period to 30 working days for intra-EU mergers (European 
Commission, 2006b). If the supervisor requests additional information to assess 
the soundness and prudence of the potential investor, this period shall be extended 
only once and shall not exceed ten working days. M&A involving banks from 
third countries shall be assessed within a period of maximum 50 working days 
(European Commission, 2006b). If the supervisory authorities do not oppose the 
proposed acquisition within this period, the transaction shall be deemed to be 
approved. The reform proposal was implemented in 2007 by directive 
2007/44/EC. 
5  Indices on Merger Control 
I made a survey among the supervisory authorities in the EU between November 
2006 and March 2007 to measure the degree of transparency of merger control in 
the EU banking sector. The regulators were asked to provide detailed information 
on ownership limits, reporting and approval requirements for ownership transfers 
in the banking sector, and on the criteria that are used by the supervisor to assess CHAPTER 3  43
the suitability of potential investors. The questionnaire is presented in Table A1 in 
the appendix. The questionnaire was filled out by the supervisors in the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Sweden. In case that regulators did not fill out 
the questionnaire, I use other sources of information like, for example, national 
banking laws and various reports of the International Monetary Fund to assess the 
transparency of merger control. I also use these sources of information to cross-
check the information obtained from the questionnaire. Additional information 
comes from the Banking and Supervision Database of the World Bank (Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine, 2001 and 2006). For a complete list of data sources see Table 
A2.  
Based on these sources I have constructed three indices that measure the scope for 
supervisors and politicians to block M&A in the banking sector for reasons that 
are not related to the soundness and prudence of the proposed investor. The 
indices are available for the following 20 EU countries for the period between 
1997 and 2005: Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Italy (hereafter: Western Europe), as well 
as Malta, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, and Poland (hereafter: Central and Eastern Europe).  
The indices constructed are: 
  Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 
  Transparency of Merger Control Index  
  Frequency of Merger Control Index 
 
Each of these indices measures different aspects of merger control in the EU 
banking sector. The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index measures 
the independence of the supervisor from banks and politicians. If supervisors are 
more independent, politicians and local banks are less able to put pressure on the 
regulator to block M&A for reasons that are not justified on prudential grounds. 
The Transparency of Merger Control Index measures the transparency of the CHAPTER 3  44
merger review process. I assume that regulators have more scope to block cross-
border M&A if merger control lacks transparency. The Frequency of Merger 
Control Index focuses on how often ownership transfers require approval by the 
supervisor. The index, hence, measures how often regulators have the chance to 
block ownership transfers for other than prudential reasons.  
5.1 Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 
The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index measures the degree of 
independence of the supervisory authority. The index is constructed based on data 
from the Banking and Supervision Database of the World Bank (Barth et al., 2001 
and 2006). Additional information comes from national banking laws and other 
sources. Additional sources are necessary, since data from the Banking and 
Supervision Database are only available for the years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, and 
2008. The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index consists of two 
components.  
The first component measures the degree to which the supervisory authority is 
independent from the government. 
  If the head of the supervisory authority is only accountable to the Prime 
Minister, the Minister of Finance, or any other member of the cabinet, the 
index gets a value of zero.  
  If the head of the supervisory authority is accountable to a legislative body, 
such as parliament or congress, the index gets a value of one.  
This corresponds to the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index-Political 
(Barth et al., 2006). The second component is the Independence of the 
Supervisory Authority Index-Banks (Barth et al., 2006). This index measures 
whether supervisors are legally liable for damages to a bank caused by its actions. 
It, hence, measures the degree to which the supervisor is independent from banks. 
Both indices are used by Carletti et al. (2007) as well.  CHAPTER 3  45
Figure 1: Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 



















































Source: Own calculations (2007). Figure 1 shows the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index for the years 1997, 
2001, and 2005. The countries for which index values are available are Austria (AT), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia 
(EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LI), Luxembourg 
(LU), Malta (MT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), the Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SL), Spain (ES), and Sweden (SE).  
 CHAPTER 3  46
Table 5: Summary Statistics for the Independence of the Supervisory  
Authority Index 
   Obs. Mean  Median Max  Min  Std.  Dev. 
All  Countries  180  1.10 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.35 
Western  Europe  99 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 
Central and Eastern Europe  81  1.29  1.50  2.00  0.00  0.39 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Western Europe vs. Central and Eastern Europe: -6.9417*** 
Source: Own calculations (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 5 shows descriptive 
statistics for the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index. Descriptive statistics are calculated for the period 
between 1997 and 2005. Western Europe includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Central and Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.  
  If the supervisory authority can be held liable for damages to a bank caused by 
its actions, the index gets a value of zero.  
  If the supervisory authority cannot be held liable for damages to a bank 
caused by its actions, the index gets a value of one.  
The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index is calculated as the sum of 
the first and the second component. The index, hence, ranges from zero to two 
with higher values indicating greater independence. Figure 1 shows the index for 
the years 1997, 2001, and 2005. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5. 
The independence of the supervisory authority varies across countries and years. 
In general, the regulators have become more independent over time. In particular, 
the supervisors in Central and Eastern Europe are more independent. The only 
exception is Poland where the regulator has lost some of its independence. On 
average, however, the supervisory authorities are significantly more independent 
in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe (with a T-test statistic of -
6.9). The lowest degree of independence is reported in France, Italy, and Spain. In 
these countries, the supervisor is accountable to the government and the banks 
supervised. 
5.2 Transparency of Merger Control Index 
The Transparency of Merger Control Index measures the transparency of the 
merger review process in the EU banking sector. The degree of transparency is 
measured based on the idea that merger control is more transparent if regulators 
have to assess the soundness and prudence of potential investors based on criteria CHAPTER 3  47
like the reputation or the financial soundness of the proposed investor. This is in 
line with the proposal of the EU Commission (2006b). The proposal aims at 
increasing the transparency and legal certainty of the merger review process in the 
EU banking sector by introducing a list of non-discriminatory criteria which are 
known in advance and according to which the supervisory authority has to assess 
the soundness and prudence of the proposed investor. This should allow courts to 
decide on the legality and correct application of the merger review process in case 
of the refusal of an application (EU Commission, 2006b).  
The index is constructed as follows: 
  The index gets a value of zero if no specific criteria are listed in national 
banking laws according to which the supervisory authority has to assess the 
soundness and prudence of a proposed investor. In this case, merger control 
lacks procedural transparency and supervisors are able to refuse authorization 
based on opaque concerns.  
  If the supervisor assesses the soundness and prudence of a proposed investor 
based on either (1) the reputation, (2) the financial soundness of the proposed 
investor, or (3) the experience and skills of future managers and directors, the 
index value is 0.33. Each of these criteria has been proposed by the EU 
Commission (2006a) in its reform proposal.  
  If the supervisory authority uses two of these criteria, the index gets a value of 
0.67.  
  If all of these criteria are listed in banking laws, the index gets a value of one.  
The index, hence, ranges from zero to one with higher values indicating that 
merger control is more transparent. Figure 2 shows the Transparency of Merger 
Control Index for the years 1997, 2001, and 2005. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 6. In most countries, merger control lacks transparency. This 
could lead to a situation in which the supervisors can refuse authorization based  
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Figure 2: Transparency of Merger Control Index 
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Source: Own calculations (2007). Figure 2 shows the Transparency of Merger Control Index for the years 1997, 2001, and 
2005. The countries for which index values are available are Austria (AT), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LI), Luxembourg (LU), Malta 
(MT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), the Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SL), Spain (ES), and Sweden (SE).  CHAPTER 3  49
Table 6: Summary Statistics for the Transparency of Merger Control Index 
   Obs. Mean  Median Max  Min  Std.  Dev. 
All  Countries  180  0.18 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.31 
Western  Europe  99 0.03 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.95 
Central and Eastern Europe  81  0.37  0.33  1.00  0.00  0.38 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Western Europe vs. Central and Eastern Europe: -7.8523*** 
Source: Own calculations (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 6 shows descriptive 
statistics for the Transparency of Merger Control Index. Descriptive statistics are calculated for the period between 1997 
and 2005. Western Europe includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and Sweden. Central and Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.  
on opaque concerns (European Commission, 2005b). The reform proposal of the 
EU Commission (2006b) intends to change this. It requires the member countries 
to provide specific criteria in national banking laws according to which the 
regulator  has to assess the soundness and prudence of the proposed investor. This 
should increase transparency and reduce the scope for supervisors to block certain 
acquisitions. If the proposal is implemented, all member states should have an 
index value of one. Some countries already use part of the proposed criteria. 
These countries are mainly located in Central and Eastern Europe. The most 
frequently used criterion is the financial solidity of the proposed investor. The 
only countries in Central and Eastern Europe that do not provide any public 
criteria in their banking laws are the Czech Republic and Poland. On average, 
however, merger control is significantly more transparent in Central and Eastern 
Europe than in Western Europe (with a T-test statistic of -7.8). This gives 
supervisors more latitude in discouraging or rejecting a proposed acquisition in 
Western Europe. 
5.3 Frequency of Merger Control Index 
The Frequency of Merger Control Index measures how frequently ownership 
transfers in the banking sector have to be approved by the supervisory authority. 
The first component of the index measures how large the initial shareholding (in 
banking laws mostly referred to as ”qualified holding”) has to be to become 
subject to approval by the regulator.  
  If the initial shareholding that requires supervisory approval is less than five 
percent, the index value is zero. CHAPTER 3  50
  If the initial shareholding is equal to or larger than five percent, but less than 
ten percent, the index gets a value of 0.5.  
  If the initial shareholding that requires approval is equal to or larger than ten 
percent, the index value is one.  
The 10-percent threshold is consistent with the EU norm (Article 4, p. 11 of 
directive 2006/48/EC). The EU member countries are, however, allowed to set 
lower limits, since the 10-percent threshold is only a minimum requirement. 
Because the scope for regulators to block ownership transfers decreases as the size 
of the initial holding that does not require approval increases, a larger value 
indicates fewer opportunities for  supervisors to block ownership transfers in the 
banking sector. More important than the size of the qualified holding may be how 
often the increase of an existing shareholding has to be approved. The EU norm is 
that every ownership transfer that leads to an increase of a qualified holding so 
that the shareholding exceeds 20, 33, and 50 percent requires additional approval 
(Article 19, p. 1 of directive 2006/48/EC). The same holds if investors want to 
reduce their shareholding below these thresholds. The EU member states are, 
however, free to set more than three thresholds. The second component of the 
Frequency of Merger Control Index measures which the member countries have 
used this option. 
  If there are more than or equal to six thresholds that require additional 
approval by the regulator, the index gets a value of zero. 
  If there are 5/4/3 or less than three thresholds, the index has a value of 
0.25/0.5/0.75/1, respectively. 
The Frequency of Merger Control Index is calculated as the sum of the first and 
the second component. The index, hence, ranges from zero to two with higher 
values indicating fewer opportunities for supervisors to block certain acquisition. 
Figure 3 shows the index for the years 1997, 2001, and 2005. Descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 7. The Spanish supervisory authority has the most 
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Figure 3: Frequency of Merger Control Index 





































































Source: Own calculations (2007). Figure 3 shows the Frequency of Merger Control Index for the years 1997, 2001, and 
2005. The countries for which index values are available are Austria (AT), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LI), Luxembourg (LU), Malta 
(MT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), the Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SL), Spain (ES), and Sweden (SE).  
 CHAPTER 3  52
Table 7: Summary Statistics for the Frequency of Merger Control Index 
    Obs. Mean  Median Max  Min  Std.  Dev. 
All  Countries  180  1.52 1.75 2.00 0.50 0.40 
Western  Europe  99 1.51 1.75 2.00 0.50 0.47 
Central and Eastern Europe  81  1.54  1.75  1.75  0.75  0.30 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Western Europe vs. Central and Eastern Europe: -0.4354 
Source: Own calculations (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 7 shows descriptive 
statistics for the Frequency of Merger Control Index. Descriptive statistics are calculated for the period between 1997 and 
2005. Western Europe includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and Sweden. Central and Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.  
opportunities to accept, discourage, or reject a takeover, since it not only has to 
approve every ownership transfer that exceeds five percent, but also every 
ownership transfer that increases an existing shareholding above the 10-, 15-, 20-, 
25-, 33-, 40-, 50-, 66-, and 75-percent threshold. Italy, Portugal, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia report low index values as 
well. The Frequency of Merger Control Index does not indicate significant 
differences in approval requirements between Central and Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe. 
6  Merger Control and Cross-Border Consolidation in 
the EU Banking Sector 
To find out whether merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector, I analyze the relationship between my 
indices and different indicators of banking market integration. The first indicator 
is the total number and the total deal value of domestic and cross-border M&A in 
the EU banking sector. Table 8 indicates that domestic deals outnumber cross-
border deals in Western Europe. The largest number of domestic M&A is reported 
in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and France. These countries also record 
the largest number of cross-border M&A. However, relative to domestic deals 
cross-border deals are less important. 
Table 9 indicates that Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe also differ 
in terms of the average deal size. While domestic and cross-border deals are of 
almost equal size in Western Europe, cross-border deals are much larger thanCHAPTER 3  53
Table 8: Total Number of Deals and Total Deal Value of Domestic and     
Cross-Border M&A in the EU Banking Sector  
   Domestic M&A  Cross-Border M&A 
 
Number of Deals  Deal Value 
(Mio. Euro)  Number of Deals  Deal Value 
(Mio. Euro) 
Austria  23 7,826 13 9,997 
Belgium 73  26,912  26  12,065 
Denmark  38 9,001 20 4,890 
Finland 73  3,372  11  17 
France 162  76,384  67  15,801 
Germany 190  42,586  52  21,864 
Greece 47  2,357  4  429 
Ireland  18 1,625 19 3,670 
Italy 259  51,491  34  5,295 
Luxembourg 19  129  31  5,405 
Netherlands  43 8,054 43 4,543 
Portugal  32 8,097 15 4,105 
Spain 58  30,196  39  1,041 
Sweden 37  1,730  17  485 
United Kingdom  563  106,917  184  43,382 
Western  Europe  1,635  376,677 575 132,989 
Cyprus 6  29  6  115 
Czech Republic  17  309  34  4,946 
Estonia 8  0  27  2,062 
Hungary  39 106 30 602 
Latvia 4  0  27  53 
Lithuania 9  86  15  285 
Malta 0  0  1  205 
Poland  45 1,256 54 4,430 
Slovak Republic  5  37  14  1,003 
Slovenia 6  3  4  350 
Central and Eastern Europe  139  1,826  212  14,051 
Source: Zephyr (2009). Table 8 shows the total number and the total deal value of domestic and cross-border M&A in the 
EU banking sector between 1997 and 2005. 
domestic deals in Central and Eastern Europe. There are, however, large 
differences across countries. While cross-border M&A are, on average, always 
larger in Central and Eastern Europe, cross-border M&A are larger only in the 
smaller Western European countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium, and Ireland). In the 
larger Western European countries (e.g. France, Germany, and Italy), in contrast, 
domestic deals are much larger than cross-border M&A. Boot (1999) argues that 
in some EU countries central banks, ministries of finance, and domestic credit 
institutions operate in close concert to promote domestic and to block cross-
border M&A because they want the largest banks in their country to be in 
domestic hands.  CHAPTER 3  54
Table 9: Average Deal Size of Domestic and Cross-Border M&A in the EU   
Banking Sector  
   Domestic M&A  Cross-Border M&A 
 
Number of Deals  Average Deal Size 
(Mio. Euro)  Number of Deals  Average Deal Size 
(Mio. Euro) 
Austria  23 340 13 769 
Belgium  73 369 26 464 
Denmark  38 237 20 245 
Finland 73  46  11  2 
France  162  472 67 236 
Germany  190  224 52 420 
Greece  47 50  4 107 
Ireland 18  90  19  193 
Italy  259  199 34 156 
Luxembourg  19 7 31  174 
Netherlands  43 187 43 106 
Portugal  32 253 15 274 
Spain  58 521 39  27 
Sweden  37 47 17 29 
United  Kingdom  563 190 184 236 
Western Europe  1,635  230  575  231 
Cyprus 6  5  6  19 
Czech Republic  17  18  34  145 
Estonia 8  0  27  76 
Hungary  39 3 30  20 
Latvia  4  0 27 2 
Lithuania 9  10  15  19 
Malta 0  .  1  205 
Poland  45 28 54 82 
Slovak Republic  5  7  14  72 
Slovenia 6  1  4  88 
Central and Eastern Europe  139  13  212  66 
Source: Zephyr (2009) and own calculations (2009). Table 9 shows the total number and the average deal size of domestic 
and cross-border M&A in the EU banking sector between 1997 and 2005. The average deal size is calculated by dividing 
the total deal value by the total number of deals. 
Another indicator for the degree of banking market integration is the market share 
of foreign branches and subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are usually established via the 
acquisition of local banks and are the dominant entry mode for banks that operate 
with local clients (Foccarelli & Pozzolo, 2005 and Cerutti et al., 2007). Table 10 
indicates that foreign subsidiaries while having a large market share in Central 
and Eastern Europe usually only have a small market share in Western Europe. 
Notable exceptions are Luxembourg and Ireland reflecting their position as 
international financial centres. The large market share of foreign subsidiaries in 
Finland is the result of a consolidation process in the Nordic countries (EU   
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Table 10: Market Share of Foreign Banks in the EU Banking Sector  
 


















Austria 720,534  6,427  137,729  0.01  0.19 
Belgium 1,055,305  49,583  196,620  0.05  0.19 
Denmark 722,096  34,932  114,310  0.05  0.16 
Finland 234,520  12,781  124,175  0.05  0.53 
France 5,090,058  145,951  445,360  0.03  0.09 
Germany 6,826,558  103,346  623,494  0.02  0.09 
Greece 281,066  28,489  49,401 0.10  0.18 
Ireland 941,909  94,974  314,093  0.10  0.33 
Italy 2,509,436  138,996  99,343  0.06  0.04 
Luxembourg 792,418  145,477  603,701  0.18  0.76 
Netherlands 1,697,708  15,827  23,345  0.01  0.01 
Portugal 360,190  19,542  62,009  0.05  0.17 
Spain 2,150,650  159,862  87,319  0.07  0.04 
Sweden 653,178  55,034  3,677  0.08  0.01 
United Kingdom  8,320,254  3,260,000  1,049,000  0.39  0.13 
Western Europe  32,355,880 427,1221  3,933,576  0.13  0.12 
Cyprus  60,366 4,319 12,338  0.07  0.20 
Czech Republic  104,950 9,694  88,336  0.09  0.84 
Estonia  11,830 1,161 10,573  0.10  0.89 
Hungary  74,653 112 43,871 0.00  0.59 
Latvia  15,570 0  8,276  0.00 0.53 
Lithuania  13,099 0  9,797  0.00 0.75 
Malta  27,195 0  8,802  0.00 0.32 
Poland  152,086 1,385 100,674  0.01  0.66 
Slovak Republic  36,399 8,055 27,383  0.22  0.75 
Slovenia  30,049 523  6,234  0.02  0.21 
Central and Eastern Europe  526,197 25,249 316,284  0.05  0.60 
Source: ECB (2009) and own calculations (2009). Table 10 shows the total assets and the market share of foreign branches 
and subsidiaries in the EU banking sector in the year 2005. The market share is calculated by dividing the total assets of 
foreign branches and subsidiaries, respectively, by total banking sector assets. 
Commission, 2005a). The main outcome of this regional consolidation process is 
the emergence of a large financial services group operating in the Nordic and 
Baltic Sea region. Since Sweden is the home base of the group, the market share 
of foreign subsidiaries is zero in this country. This suggests that the small market 
share of foreign subsidiaries can in some EU countries be attributed to the fact 
that these countries serve as home base for large internationally active banking 
groups (ECB, 2006). Since branches are the main entry mode for banks that enter 
foreign banking markets to provide financial services to local clients when they 
operate abroad, they usually have a smaller market share than foreign subsidiaries 
(Foccarelli and Pozzolo, 2005 and Cerutti et al., 2007). They only exceptions are 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In these countries, foreign CHAPTER 3  56
branches have a larger market share than foreign subsidiaries. In the EU, market 
entry via branches is easier than via subsidiaries, since EU branches do not need 
prior approval by the supervisor in the host country.  
To find out whether merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector, I calculate piecewise correlation 
coefficients between different indicators of banking market integration and my 
indices. Since the indices are ordinal-scaled, Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients are used. Rank correlations require at least one ordinal-scaled 
variable. An additional advantage is that Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
do not require normally distributed variables. The results of the correlation 
analysis are reported in Table 11. The correlation analysis suggests that degree of 
political independence of the supervisory authority and the transparency of merger 
control matter for the level of integration in the EU banking sector. The 
correlation between the proportion of domestic and cross-border M&A and the 
Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index and Transparency of Merger 
Control Index is positive and significant both in terms of deal number (0.46 and 
0.65, respectively) and deal value (0.49 and 0.68, respectively). Both indices are 
also positive and significantly correlated with the market share of foreign 
subsidiaries (0.31 and 0.56, respectively). This might have been expected, since 
subsidiaries are usually established via the acquisition of or the merger with a 
foreign credit institution. This is also reflected by the significant and positive 
correlation between the market share of foreign subsidiaries and the proportion of 
cross-border deals (0.63 in terms of deal number and 0.67 in terms of deal 
volume). Interesting is that the market share of foreign branches is negatively 
correlated with the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index and the 
Transparency of Merger Control Index (-0.10 and -0.20, respectively). Although 
the coefficients are not significant, the negative correlation indicates that banks 
choose branches as entry mode in countries where the supervisor is less 
independent and merger control less transparent. Politicians and supervisors 
cannot block foreign bank entry via branches, since EU branches do not need 
prior approval by the supervisor in the host country. The frequency of approval  CHAPTER 3  57 
 








































Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index  1.0000            
Transparency of Merger Control Index  0.7917*  1.0000           
Frequency of Merger Control Index  -0.0419  -0.1852  1.0000         
Proportion of Domestic Deals (Number)  -0.4651*  -0.6522*  0.1628  1.0000        
Proportion of Cross-Border Deals (Number)  0.4651* 0.6522*  -0.1628  -1.0000*  1.0000         
Proportion of Domestic Deals (Deal Value)  -0.4960* -0.6873* 0.0070  0.8403*  -0.8403*  1.0000       
Proportion of Cross-Border Deals (Deal Value)  0.4960* 0.6873*  -0.0070  -0.8403*  0.8403*  -1.0000*  1.0000     
Market Share of Foreign Branches (Assets)  -0.1077  -0.2050  -0.1006  0.1677 -0.1677 0.1979 -0.1979 1.0000   
Market Share of Foreign Subsidiaries (Assets)  0.3174 0.5641*  -0.1219  -0.6392*  0.6392*  -0.6722*  0.6722*  0.0198  1.0000 
Source: Own calculations (2009). * indicates significance at the 10-% level. Table 11 reports Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index, the 
Transparency of Merger Control Index, the Frequency of Merger Control Index and different indicators for the integration of the EU banking sector. The indices are average values for the period between 1997 and 
2005. Statistics on domestic and cross-border M&A are based on data on takeover activity in the EU banking sector between 1997 and 2005. The market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries is calculated for 
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requirements, in contrast, does not seem to matter for the level of consolidation in 
the EU banking sector. The correlation coefficient, between the Frequency of 
Merger Control Index and the proportion of domestic and cross-border M&A is 
zero. The correlation between the Frequency of Merger Control Index and the 
market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries is not significant as well. The 
correlation analysis confirms the picture that a more independent supervisor and a 
more transparent merger review process promote cross-border M&A in the EU 
banking sector. This suggests that the proposal of the EU Commission to increase 
the legal certainty and transparency of merger control should facilitate cross-
border consolidation. However, the low importance of the cross-border M&A in 
some Western European countries may also be the result of comparatively higher 
efficiency barriers in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. This 
suggests that a more thorough empirical analysis is necessary to find out which 
barriers restrict cross-border M&A. 
This is done in the following sections. The next section presents the model that is 
used to determine which barriers limit the degree of cross-border consolidation in 
the EU banking sector. The dataset and the econometric model is described in 
Section 7. The determinants that affect the decision to take over domestic or 
foreign banks are presented in Section 8. In Section 9, I use logit and multinomial 
logit regressions to estimate the probability that a bank is taken over as a function 
of bank characteristics, country characteristics, and the transparency of merger 
control. The robustness of the results is tested in Section 10. Section 11 concludes. 
7  Data and Econometric Model 
7.1 Data 
The dataset includes data on banks and M&A in the EU banking sector for the 
period between 1997 and 2005. The countries included are Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Information on 
M&A comes from Zephyr (2008). Bank balance-sheet data is taken from CHAPTER 3  59
Bankscope (2008). I use consolidated balance sheets whenever possible and focus 
on commercial banks. The geographical distribution of banks and deals is reported 
in Table 12. The dataset includes 1,407 banks. The largest number of banks is 
located in Germany (256), France (246), Italy (158), and the United Kingdom 
(153). All other countries have fewer than 100 banks. The dataset comprises 150 
M&A of which 77 were domestic and 73 cross-border. Table 12 indicates that 
there are differences in takeover activity across EU countries. While domestic 
takeovers outnumber cross-border M&A in most Western European countries, 
cross-border deals are more important in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
distribution of deals across years is reported in Table 13.  
7.2 Econometric Model 















where   is the probability that bank j is taken over in period t. X is a matrix of 
bank- and country-specific variables that are relevant for a bank becoming a 
target.
jt P
β  is the coefficient vector.  
Problematic is that the effect of the explanatory variables may differ for domestic 
and cross-border M&A. Banks may, for example, by less likely to be acquired by 
foreign banks if supervisors and politicians block cross-border takeovers. 
Domestic M&A may, in contrast, be more likely if politicians promote M&A 
among local credit institutions to make them larger and more difficult to acquire. 
Hence, I additionally estimate a multinomial logit model that allows multiple 
choices. The probability that a bank is taken over is then described as follows: 
exp( )
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Table 12: Banks and Deals by Country 









Austria 57  2  1  1 
Belgium 36  1  1  0 
Cyprus 18  0  0  0 
Czech Republic  27  7  1  6 
Denmark 60  3  3  0 
Estonia 6  11  0  11 
Finland 7  0  0  0 
France 246  13  7  6 
Germany 256  27  20  7 
Greece 25  3  1  2 
Hungary 21  8  2  6 
Ireland 39  1  0  1 
Italy 158  22  21  1 
Latvia 25  9  1  8 
Lithuania 11  5  1  4 
Netherlands 49  2  0  2 
Poland 51  10  8  2 
Portugal 10  1  1  0 
Slovak Republic  21  11  1  10 
Slovenia 25  4  2  2 
Spain 87  4  3  1 
Sweden 19  2  2  0 
United Kingdom  153  4  1  3 
Total 1,407  150  77  73 
Source: Zepyhr (2008) and Bankscope (2008). Table 12 shows the geographical distribution of banks and M&A included 
in the sample.  
 








1997 4  1 3 
1998 3  1 2 
1999 15  10 5 
2000 20  11 9 
2001 22  14 8 
2002 26  15  11 
2003 16  7  9 
2004 15  8  7 
2005 29  10  19 
Total 150  77 73 
Source: Zepyhr (2008). Table 13 shows the annual number of domestic and cross-border M&A in the EU banking sector 
that took place between 1997 and 2005. 
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and 
exp( )
















D P  and   is the probability that a bank is taken over by a domestic and 
a foreign bank, respectively. 
jt
CB P
D β  is the coefficient vector for domestic and 
CB β  
for cross-border targets. The effect of the explanatory variables is, hence, allowed 
to differ for domestic and cross-border M&A. 
8  Determinants of M&A in the EU Banking Sector 
8.1 Bank Characteristics  
To find out which banks are more likely to be taken over, I control for bank assets 
(SIZE), the return-on-assets (ROA), the ratio of net-interest revenue to total 
revenue (NIREV), the ratio of total equity to total bank assets (CAPITAL), and 
the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding (LIQUID). All 
variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level.  
ROA – The return-on-assets controls for the motive to generate X-efficiency 
gains from takeovers. Since X-efficiency gains are more likely to be achieved if 
the target is inefficient, I expect that banks with a low ROA are more likely to be 
acquired. Underperforming banks may not only offer greater opportunities for 
efficiency enhancement. They may also be more risky if the source of the 
underperformance is a high level of bad loans. In such a case, a domestic acquirer 
may be in a better position to reduce the amount of bad loans and to improve 
performance than a foreign acquirer (Hernando et al., 2009). This suggests that 
efficiency enhancement should a priori be more relevant for domestic than for 
cross-border M&A.  
SIZE – The logarithm of total bank assets measures bank size. SIZE controls for 
the motive to generate economies of scale and scope. Since economies of scale 
and scope increase with bank size, large banks are more attractive targets. CHAPTER 3  62
However, organizational complexity also increases with SIZE (Berger, Saunders, 
Scalise, & Udell, 1998). This may reduce the potential to generate cost synergies 
from takeovers and lower the probability that a bank is taken over. The acquisition 
of large banks may also be more likely to raise problems with the antitrust 
authority. This should be particularly relevant for domestic M&A, since foreign 
credit institutions usually do not have any or only a small market share in the host 
country. This suggests that the effect of SIZE may differ for domestic and cross-
border M&A. 
NIREV – I use the ratio of net-interest revenue to total revenue to control for the 
business model of a bank. A large proportion of interest income indicates that a 
bank is more active in retail-banking. This may be relevant for banks that take 
over foreign banks to get access to retail-banking markets. Since foreign retail-
banking markets are not easily conquerable from distance, the most effective way 
to get access to such markets seems to be the merger with or the acquisition of an 
existing local credit institution (Cabral et al., 2002). Retail-banking has become 
more attractive because it provides a more stable source of income than 
investment banking. Retail-banks also face lower refinancing costs, since 
refinancing via deposits is cheaper than via interbank borrowing. Both has 
become visible in the recent crisis. However, retail-banking is often regarded as 
more costly in terms of the required branch network and staff (Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 2000). Non-interest-earning activities are also often considered as 
having a larger growth potential than interest-earning activities. For this reason, 
NIREV is often regarded as measuring bank inefficiency as well (Foccarelli & 
Pozzolo, 2001). Banks with higher values for NIREV may, hence, not only have a 
stronger focus on retail-banking activities, but may also be less efficient. Both 
suggest that banks are more likely to be acquired if they focus on interest-earning 
activities. Since market access is more important for foreign than for domestic 
banks, I expect NIREV to be more relevant for cross-border than for domestic 
M&A.  
CAPITAL – I include the ratio of total equity to total bank assets to control for 
the level of bank capital. The effect of CAPITAL is not clear a priori. On the one CHAPTER 3  63
hand, a higher level of capital may raise the probability that a bank is acquired if 
highly capitalized banks are less diversified. Such banks are attractive for 
acquirers that are more diversified, since they can free capital if they transfer their 
knowledge on risk diversification on the target (Hernando et al., 2009). However, 
a high level of capital may also indicate better management skills (Hernando et 
al., 2009). This may reduce the likelihood that a bank is acquired, since X-
efficiency gains are expected to be smaller. Moreover, Hannan & Pilloff (2009) 
point out that acquirers prefer highly leveraged (low capitalized) targets because it 
enables them to maximize the magnitude of post-merger performance gains 
relative to the cost of achieving those gains.   
LIQUID  – The ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding is 
included to find out whether liquidity affects that likelihood that a bank is taken 
over. The effect of LIQUID is unclear. On the one hand, banks are more likely to 
be acquired if they are close to illiquidity and need external support (Pasiouras, et 
al., 2007). Hence, a low level of liquidity should raise the likelihood that a bank is 
taken over. On the other hand, a high level of liquidity may also indicate a lack of 
investment opportunities and managerial inefficiency (Pasiouras, et al., 2007). 
This should increase the likelihood that a bank is acquired. 
Table 14 present summary statistics for the bank-specific variables. T-tests on the 
sample mean are reported in Table A3 and piecewise correlation coefficients in 
Table A4 in the appendix. The numbers are broadly consistent with the 
hypotheses put forward. Large banks (SIZE) are more likely to be taken over than 
small credit institutions consistent with the hypothesis that banks are acquired to 
obtain market power and to generate economies of scale and scope. Measured by 
the cost-income ratio (CIR) and the return-on-assets (ROA) targets are also less 
efficient than banks that were not acquired. This supports the hypothesis that 
banks tend to take over less efficient credit institutions to generate X-efficiency 
gains from better management and organization. Particularly domestic M&A 
seem to be driven by the motive to improve X-efficiency. Banks that were not 
taken over are, in contrast, better capitalized (CAPITAL) and more liquid   
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Table 14: Summary Statistics  
All Banks  Obs.  Mean Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  5,815  13.55  13.39  19.60  9.49  1.91 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  5,724  71.33  66.56  273.55  7.69  35.84 
Return-on-Assets (ROA)  5,815  0.65  0.58  9.19  -9.08  1.88 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  5,815  12.46  8.47  88.50  1.00  12.96 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding 
(LIQUID)  5,815 37.32  22.63  271.43  0.00  45.54 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV) 5,815  32.82  32.45  92.86  -6.55  18.28 
            
Domestic and Cross-Border Targets   Obs. Mean Median  Max.  Min. Std.  Dev.
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  150  14.30  14.13  19.60  9.49  2.01 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  149  82.51  75.52  250.00  19.97  33.50 
Return-on-Assets (ROA)  150  0.21  0.59  8.13  -9.08  2.16 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  150  10.54  8.24  73.30  1.00  9.69 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding 
(LIQUID)  150 25.86 20.03  180.19 0.02  25.37 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV)  150  35.44  35.25  78.54  -0.32  14.94 
            
Domestic Targets   Obs.  Mean Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  77  14.44  14.21  19.60  9.49  2.20 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  76  87.64  76.85  250.00  34.49  40.12 
Return-on-Assets (ROA)  77  0.07  0.31  8.13  -9.08  2.26 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  77  10.56  7.60  73.30  1.00  11.01 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding 
(LIQUID)  77 26.32 25.80 105.80  0.15  21.67 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV)  77  32.84  32.59  78.54  3.94  14.78 
            
Cross-Border Targets   Obs.  Mean Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  73  14.15  14.08  19.60  10.49  1.79 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  73  77.18  73.89  173.26  19.97  23.96 
Return-on-Assets (ROA)  73  0.35  0.81  3.02  -9.08  2.05 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  73  10.53  8.58  53.61  1.00  8.16 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding 
(LIQUID)  73 25.38 15.12 180.19  0.02  28.91 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV)  73  38.19  39.51  77.77  -0.32  14.72 
            
Banks that were not taken over  Obs.  Mean Median Max. Min. Std.  Dev.
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  5,665  13.53  13.37  19.60  9.49  1.90 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  5,575  71.03  66.26  273.55  7.69  35.86 
Return-on-Assets (ROA)  5,665  0.66  0.58  9.19  -9.08  1.87 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  5,665  12.51  8.47  88.50  1.00  13.03 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding 
(LIQUID)  5,665 37.62  22.69  271.43  0.00  45.91 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV) 5,665  32.75  32.22  92.86  -6.55  18.35 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Table 14 shows descriptive statistics for the bank variables included in the regression model. To 
eliminate outliers, all bank variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-% level.  
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(LIQUID) consistent with the hypothesis that less capitalized and less liquid 
banks are more likely to be acquired. The proportion of net interest revenue to 
total revenue (NIREV), in contrast, is significantly higher for targets than for 
banks that were not acquired. This indicates that targets are more active in retail-
banking. In particular, cross-border targets derive a large proportion of their 
income from interest-earning activities. This supports the hypothesis that foreign 
banks take over domestic credit institutions to get access to local retail-banking 
markets.  
8.2 Explicit and Implicit Barriers to M&A in the Banking Sector 
The likelihood that a bank is taken over also depends on the extent of explicit and 
implicit barriers to consolidation (Berger, 2007). Such barriers arise from the legal 
and regulatory environment in the country where the bank is located. Berger et al. 
(2004b) show that banks are more likely to be taken over by foreign credit 
institutions if restrictions on financial activities are low and supervisory 
authorities more reliable. Pasiouras et al. (2007) find that the level of banking 
regulations affects the decision of a bank to acquire a credit institution in the EU-
25 as well. In particular, more stringent capital and disclosure requirements raise 
the likelihood that a bank is acquired. This is consistent with Buch & DeLong 
(2004). They find that financial institutions appreciate strict regulatory standards 
and do not engage in regulatory arbitrage. Their overall results, however, suggest 
that banking regulation and supervision only plays a relatively modest role in 
explaining cross-border M&A.  
It may be more relevant whether capital flows and ownership in the banking 
sector are restricted, however. To find out whether such explicit government 
barriers limit consolidation in the EU banking market, I include an Index on 
Investment Freedom (INVFREE). The likelihood that a bank is taken over may 
also depend on whether banks are restricted in their business activities. Cross-
border consolidation may also be limited by government ownership and subsidy 
of banks by the state (Berger, 2007). To find out whether government ownership 
and restrictions on financial activities reduce the probability that a bank is taken 
over, I use an Index on Financial Freedom (FINFREE). Both indices are from the CHAPTER 3  66
Heritage Foundation (2008). Since a larger value for FINFREE and INVFREE 
indicates fewer restrictions on capital flows and greater financial freedom, I 
expect that both indices are positively related with the likelihood that a bank is 
taken over. In particular, cross-border M&A should be more likely if investment 
and financial freedom is high.  
Consolidation may also be limited by merger control if supervisors block certain 
acquisitions during merger control to protect local banks. This was demonstrated 
in Italy in 2005 in case of Banca Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro. 
For Berger (2007), such implicit government barriers are one of the main reasons 
for the small market share of foreign banks in Western Europe relative to Central 
and Eastern Europe. To find out whether merger control constitutes an implicit 
barrier to consolidation, I include the Independence of the Supervisory Authority 
Index (INDEPENDENCE) and the Transparency of Merger Control Index 
(TRANSPARENCY).  
INDEPENDENCE – The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 
measures the degree of independence of the supervisory authorities in the EU 
banking sector. The index ranges from zero to two with higher values indicating 
that the supervisor is more independent. I assume that politicians are less able to 
put pressure on the supervisor to block cross-border M&A if the supervisory 
authority is more independent. Hence, it should be easier for foreign credit 
institutions to take over domestic banks if the supervisor is more independent. 
Domestic M&A may, in contrast, be less likely. This suggests that the effect of 
INDEPENDENCE may differ for domestic and cross-border takeovers. 
TRANSPARENCY – The Transparency of Merger Control Index measures the 
degree of transparency of the merger review process in the EU banking sector. 
The index ranges from zero to one with higher values indicating a greater degree 
of transparency. I assume that regulators have more scope to block cross-border 
M&A if the merger review process lacks transparency. This is emphasized by the 
EU Commission (2005b). The Commission argues that the supervisory authority 
has more scope to block certain acquisitions if merger control lacks transparency. CHAPTER 3  67
This suggests that it should be easier for foreign banks to take over domestic 
credit institutions if merger control is more transparent. If politicians promote 
mergers among local banks, domestic M&A may, in contrast, be less likely. This 
suggests that the effect of TRANSPARENCY may differ for domestic and cross-
border M&A.  
8.3 Other Country Characteristics 
To find out whether the likelihood that a bank is taken over depends on other 
country variables as well, I include the ratio of aggregate imports to GDP 
(IMGDP), the size of the banking sector (DBAGDP), the level of stock market 
capitalization (STKMCAP), and the degree of banking market concentration (C3).  
IMGDP – The ratio of ratio of aggregate imports to GDP measures the degree of 
trade openness. IMGDP should be relevant for banks that want to provide trade-
related services to local clients when they operate abroad (Heinkel & Levi, 1992, 
Ter Wengel, 1995, and Yamori, 1998). Hence, banks located in countries that are 
more open to trade should be more likely to be acquired. However, the empirical 
evidence suggest that banks that pursue a follow-your-customer strategy often use 
branches as main entry mode, while subsidiaries are more often chosen in order to 
operate with local clients (Foccarelli & Pozzolo, 2005 and Cerutti et al., 2007). 
The follow-your-customer strategy may, thus, not be the dominant motivation 
behind cross-border M&A. IMGDP may also matter for domestic banks if they 
provide services to foreign customers and want to increase their market share. 
However, a priori IMGDP should be more relevant for cross-border takeovers. 
DBAGDP – The size of the banking sector is measured by the ratio of total 
banking sector assets to GDP. The effect of DBAGDP is not clear a priori. A large 
banking sector may raise the probability that a bank is taken over, since it offers 
greater opportunities to generate economies of scale and scope (Buch and 
DeLong, 2004). It also has a larger market potential than a small banking sector. 
This makes a country more attractive for cross-border M&A. Domestic takeovers 
may also become more likely if greater expansion opportunities reduce the need 
of local banks to expand abroad. However, a larger banking sector may also CHAPTER 3  68
reduce the likelihood that a bank is acquired if larger and more developed banking 
markets are less profitable (Buch & DeLong, 2004 and Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 1999 and 2000). 
STKMCAP – The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP measures the size 
of the local stock market. The effect of STKMCAP is not clear. On the one hand, 
a higher level of stock market capitalization may reduce the probability that a 
bank is taken over, since competition is greater in larger and more developed 
financial systems (Demirgüc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000). However, a larger stock 
market may allow firms to be better capitalized. This should reduce the risk of 
loan default (Demirgüc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000). Furthermore, at a higher level of 
stock market capitalization more information on publicly traded firms is available. 
This enables banks to better evaluate credit risk (Demirgüc-Kunt & Huizinga, 
2000). This should increase profits and increase the likelihood that a bank is 
acquired. 
C3 – The level of banking market concentration is measured by the market share 
of the three largest banks. The effect of C3 is not clear a priori (Hannan & 
Rhoades, 1987 and Hannan & Pilloff, 2009). On the one hand, a higher level of 
banking market concentration may raise the probability that a bank is taken over 
by a domestic bank, since market power can be enhanced by the acquisition. On 
the other hand, domestic M&A may be less likely if antitrust authorities fear that 
the merger reduces the level of competition in the banking sector. Cross-border 
M&A are less likely to be challenged for antitrust concerns, because a foreign 
acquirer likely has only a small or no market share in the target’s domestic 
market. Cross-border M&A may also be more likely if concentrated banking 
markets are more profitable owing to lower competition between local credit 
institutions. This suggests that C3 may affect domestic and cross-border takeovers 
differently. 
Finally, I include a dummy variable that is one for EMU member countries 
(EMU) and zero otherwise. EMU membership may increase the probability that a 
bank is taken over by a foreign credit institution, since a common currency CHAPTER 3  69
eliminates exchange-rate risks. This should facilitate cross-border consolidation in 
the euro area. If banks are afraid of being taken over by foreign credit institutions, 
EMU may also raise the pressure for domestic consolidation. For a list of the 
variables used in the regression analysis see Table A5. 
9  Results 
9.1 Logit Regression 
The regression analysis proceeds in different steps. First, I include the bank and 
the country variables separately in the regression. Then both types of variables are 
put together in the same regression. This model constitutes my baseline. In the 
next step, I add one legal and regulatory variable after the other to the baseline 
model. Finally, I estimate a model with all regulatory variables together in a 
single regression. The results of the logit regressions are reported in Table 15. To 
control for time-fixed effects, I use time dummies. The regression coefficients 
reported are to be interpreted as affecting the odds ratio with respect to the 
baseline case and not as marginal probability. 
The results are in line with the hypotheses put forward. Consistent with Pasiouras 
et al. (2007), I find that large banks are more likely to be taken over as indicated 
by the significant and positive coefficient for SIZE. Less efficient banks are also 
more likely to be acquired. ROA is significant and has a negative sign. This 
suggests that M&A in the EU banking sector are driven by the motive to generate 
efficiency gains from economies of scale and scope and higher X-efficiency. To 
test the robustness of the result, I replace ROA by the cost-income ratio (CIR). 
CIR is significant and negative indicating that banks with a lower level of cost-
efficiency are more likely to be taken over. NIREV is significant as well. The 
positive coefficient suggests that banks with stronger focus on retail-banking 
activities are more likely to be acquired. The degree of liquidity and the level of 
capitalization, in contrast, do not matter. Both LIQUID and CAPITAL are 
insignificant.   CHAPTER 3  70 
 
      Table 15: Logit Regression 










of the Supervisor 
Transparency 
of Merger Control   
SIZE 0.233***    0.417***  0.412***  0.416***  0.430***  0.446***  0.442*** 
 (4.05)    (6.34)  (6.40)  (6.31)  (6.40)  (6.77)  (6.89) 
ROA -0.173***    -0.196***  -0.198***  -0.201***  -0.174***  -0.182***  -0.184*** 
 (-3.59)    (-4.10)  (-4.01)  (-4.15)  (-3.45)  (-3.60)  (-3.51) 
NIREV 0.0152***    0.0210***  0.0205***  0.0206***  0.0201***  0.0190***  0.0172** 
 (2.97)    (3.32)  (3.19)  (3.24)  (3.05)  (2.84)  (2.49) 
CAPITAL 0.00346    0.00292  0.00264  0.00248  0.00397  0.00647  0.00684 
 (0.38)    (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.38)  (0.63)  (0.66) 
LIQUID -0.00676***    -0.0000312  -0.000737  -0.000273  0.00194  0.00165  0.000822 
 (-2.66)    (-0.01)  (-0.31)  (-0.12)  (0.78)  (0.66)  (0.32) 
EMU   0.205  0.0339  -0.000434  0.171  0.358  0.289  0.436 
   (0.75)  (0.12)  (-0.00)  (0.56)  (0.75)  (0.60)  (0.95) 
IMGDP   1.628**  1.584*  1.306*  1.159  2.359**  1.807  1.385 
   (1.99)  (1.94)  (1.66)  (1.38)  (2.00)  (1.43)  (1.10) 
STKMCAP   -1.105***  -1.463***  -1.255***  -1.617***  -1.309***  -1.185**  -0.943** 
   (-3.38)  (-3.92)  (-3.51)  (-4.29)  (-2.78)  (-2.51)  (-2.07) 
DBAGDP   -1.091***  -1.364***  -1.793***  -1.433*** -1.543***  -1.240***  -1.843*** 
   (-2.88)  (-3.71)  (-4.65)  (-3.86)  (-3.42)  (-2.76)  (-3.80) 
C3   0.115  0.277  -0.208  0.524  0.547  0.256  -0.226 
   (0.12)  (0.31)  (-0.26)  (0.60)  (0.58)  (0.27)  (-0.24) 
INVFREE       0.0290***        0.0275** 
       (2.66)        (2.08) 
FINFREE         0.0106     0.00921 
         (1.36)      (0.93) 
INDEPENDENCE           0.0240    -0.514 
           (0.06)    (-1.18) 
TRANSPARENCY            1.001**  1.194** 
             (2.48)  (2.37) 
Observations 5,815  5,815  5,815  5,815  5,815  4,537  4,537  4,537 
Pseudo R
2 0.063  0.104  0.164  0.173  0.165  0.163  0.168  0.180 
Log Likelihood  -652.7  -624.1  -582.5  -576.3  -581.4  -526.0  -522.5  -515.4 
Source: Own calculations (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 15 reports the results of logistic regressions. Robust standard-errors clustered on bank-level are reported in 
parentheses. The time-dummies and the constant term are not reported. The dependent variable is a binary variable that is one if a bank was taken over between 1997 and 2005 and zero otherwise. The regression 
coefficients reported are to be interpreted as affecting the odds ratio with respect to the baseline case and not as marginal probability. To eliminate outliers, all bank-specific explanatory variables are winsorized at 
the 1- and 99-% level. The full sample includes 1,407 commercial banks and 150 deals of which 77 are domestic and 73 cross-border M&A. Since INDEPENDENCE and TRANSPARENCY are not available for 
all countries, the number of observation drops from 5,815 to 4,537. The smaller sample includes 1,103 banks and 141 deals of which 72 were domestic and 69 cross-border. For a list of the variables used in the 
regression analysis see Table A5. CHAPTER 3  71
The probability that a bank is taken over also depends on the characteristics of the 
country where the bank is located. I find that banks from countries with a larger 
stock market (STKMCAP) and a larger banking sector (DBAGDP) are less likely 
to be taken over. This is consistent with Buch & DeLong (2004), Pasiouras et al. 
(2007), and Pozzolo (2009). Demirgüc-Kunt & Huizinga (1999) argue that profit 
opportunities are lower in countries with a larger and more developed financial 
system. Since profits are one of the main drivers for consolidation, banks are less 
likely to be taken over if a bank is located in a country with more competitive 
financial sector. The degree of banking market concentration (C3), in contrast, 
does not matter. IMGDP and EMU are not significant either.  
The probability that a bank is taken over also depends on the extent of explicit and 
implicit government barriers to consolidation. The results for INVFREE suggest 
that banks are more likely to be acquired if capital flows and ownership in the 
banking sector are not restricted. However, there is no evidence that greater 
financial freedom (FINFREE) makes M&A more likely. The transparency of the 
merger review process also matters. TRANSPARENCY is significant and has a 
positive sign consistent with the hypothesis that banks are more likely to be 
acquired if merger control is transparent. The independence of the supervisor, in 
contrast, does not matter. INDEPENDENCE is insignificant. 
9.2 Multinomial Logit Regression 
A problem is that the effect of the explanatory variables may differ for domestic 
and cross-border M&A. Hence, I additionally estimate a multinomial logit model 
that allows the effect of the explanatory variables to differ for domestic and cross-
border M&A. The results are reported in Table 16. They confirm the results of the 
logistic regressions. SIZE increases the probability that a bank is taken over. 
Inefficient banks are also more likely to be acquired. Both is consistent with 
previous studies on domestic and cross-border M&A in the EU banking sector 
(Lanine & Vander Vennet, 2007, Pasiouras et al., 2007, and Hernando et al., 
2009). NIREV is significant and positive for cross-border M&A in line with the 
hypothesis that banks take over foreign credit institutions to get access to local  
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Table 16: Multinomial Logit Regression 
  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16 





















































SIZE  0.284***  0.177**      0.359*** 0.482*** 0.353*** 0.485*** 0.360*** 0.480*** 0.366*** 0.503*** 0.368*** 0.533***  0.367***  0.537*** 
  (3.49)  (2.31)      (4.40) (4.97) (4.38) (5.12) (4.39) (4.98) (4.33) (5.05) (4.37)  (5.47)  (4.38)  (5.62) 
ROA  -0.195***  -0.147**      -0.18*** -0.213*** -0.18*** -0.216*** -0.18*** -0.217*** -0.17*** -0.182*** -0.17***  -0.192***  -0.177*** -0.195*** 
  (-3.20)  (-2.13)      (-3.06) (-3.30) (-2.98) (-3.21) (-3.07) (-3.34) (-2.73) (-2.59) (-2.76)  (-2.79)  (-2.69)  (-2.75) 
NIREV  0.00822  0.0227***      0.00808 0.0347*** 0.00771 0.0341*** 0.00739 0.0344*** 0.00781 0.0352*** 0.00725  0.0330***  0.00554  0.0322*** 
  (1.18)  (3.39)      (1.07) (3.45) (1.01) (3.35) (0.98) (3.40) (0.98) (3.28) (0.92)  (3.01)  (0.68)  (2.88) 
CAPITAL  0.00996  -0.00412      0.00933 -0.00368 0.00944 -0.00399 0.00919 -0.00407  0.0109  -0.00362  0.0120  0.00129  0.0123  0.00116 
  (0.75)  (-0.37)      (0.71) (-0.26) (0.72) (-0.30) (0.69) (-0.29) (0.83) (-0.25) (0.92)  (0.09)  (0.92)  (0.08) 
LIQUID  -0.00782** -0.00570      -0.00443 0.00325 -0.00507 0.00278 -0.00460 0.00295 -0.00295 0.00579 -0.00325  0.00540  -0.00375  0.00499 
  (-2.41)  (-1.48)      (-1.41) (0.93) (-1.63) (0.79) (-1.46) (0.84) (-0.90) (1.50) (-0.99)  (1.37)  (-1.16)  (1.24) 
EMU      0.229 -0.416  0.0256  -0.528 0.109 -0.682 0.149 -0.395 -0.433 0.134 -0.475 0.0578  -0.299  0.155 
      (0.64) (-0.99)  (0.07) (-1.21) (0.27) (-1.48) (0.38) (-0.89) (-0.76) (0.22) (-0.82)  (0.09)  (-0.57)  (0.26) 
IMGDP      -3.489* 3.666*** -3.517* 3.855*** -3.517* 3.457*** -4.064* 3.610*** -3.638* 4.916***  -4.322** 4.279***  -5.058**  4.153*** 
      (-1.72) (4.13)  (-1.83) (4.40) (-1.90) (4.05) (-1.91) (3.96) (-1.78) (3.56) (-2.10)  (2.94)  (-2.27)  (2.84) 
STKMCAP      -1.994*** -0.778 -2.28*** -1.110* -1.84*** -1.212* -2.38*** -1.245* -1.98***  -1.052  -2.02***  -0.885  -1.417**  -0.937 
      (-3.95) (-1.51)  (-4.19) (-1.83) (-3.64) (-1.88) (-4.41) (-1.94) (-2.86) (-1.36) (-2.87)  (-1.22)  (-2.01)  (-1.17) 
DBAGDP      -0.577 -1.262** -0.693 -1.704*** -1.161** -2.000***  -0.793*  -1.745***  -0.443 -1.702*** -0.276  -1.468** -0.979*  -1.736*** 
      (-1.26) (-2.48)  (-1.54) (-3.42) (-2.27) (-4.01) (-1.66) (-3.50) (-0.86) (-2.68) (-0.54)  (-2.26)  (-1.68)  (-2.63) 
C3      -1.181 1.510  -0.943 1.326 -1.018 0.470 -0.505 1.376 -1.377  2.049*  -1.460  1.705  -1.183  1.138 
      (-0.88) (1.23)  (-0.72) (1.17) (-0.82) (0.44) (-0.38) (1.23) (-0.94) (1.82) (-1.00)  (1.53)  (-0.83)  (0.94) 
INVFREE            0.0210  0.0348**          0.0223  0.0201 
            (1.51)  (2.07)          (1.25)  (1.19) 
FINFREE              0.00955  0.00890        0.0134  0.00564 
              (0.81)  (0.87)        (0.95)  (0.40) 
INDEPENDENCE                -0.327  0.552      -0.910  0.0803 
                (-0.63)  (0.90)      (-1.17)  (0.13) 
TRANSPARENCY                  0.448  1.302**  1.232  1.135** 
                  (0.76)  (2.44)  (1.11)  (2.02) 
Observations  5,815  5,815 5,815 5,815 5,815 4,537  4,537  4,537 
Pseudo R
2  0.064  0.141 0.196 0.203 0.197 0.204  0.208  0.214 
Log  Likelihood  -749.8  -687.5 -643.5 -638.3 -642.8 -578.1  -575.2  -570.9 
Source: Own calculations (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 16 reports the results of multinomial logit regressions. Robust standard-errors clustered on bank-level are reported in 
parentheses. The time-dummies and the constant term are not reported. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a polytomous variable that is zero if a bank was not taken over, one if it was taken by 
a domestic and two if it was acquired by a foreign bank between 1997 and 2005. The regression coefficients reported are to be interpreted as affecting the odds ratio with respect to the baseline case and not as marginal 
probability. To eliminate outliers, all bank-specific explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-% level. The full sample includes 1,407 banks and 150 deals of which 77 are domestic and 73 cross-border M&A. Since 
INDEPENDENCE and TRANSPARENCY are not available for all countries, the number of observation drops from 5,815 to 4,537. The smaller sample includes 1,103 banks and 141 deals of which 72 were domestic and 69 
cross-border. For a list of the variables used in the regression analysis see Table A5. CHAPTER 3     73 
banking markets. However, NIREV is not significant for domestic M&A. 
LIQUID and CAPITAL remain insignificant for both domestic and cross-border 
M&A. 
I also find significant differences for IMGDP. The significant and positive 
coefficient of IMGDP for cross-border M&A is consistent with the follow-your-
customer strategy according to which banks expand into countries where 
customers from the home country are located in order to provide services related 
to their business. Domestic takeovers, in contrast, seem to less likely in countries 
that are more open to trade. The effect of STKMCAP and DBAGDP does not 
differ for domestic and cross-border M&A. Both variables remain significant and 
negative. As in case of the logit regressions, the degree of banking market 
concentration (C3) and EMU are insignificant.  
The effect of INVFREE differs for domestic and cross-border M&A as well. 
While domestic M&A are not affected by restrictions on international capital 
flows, cross-border M&A are. The positive and significant coefficient for 
FINFREE suggests that banks are more likely to be taken over by foreign credit 
institutions if capital flows and ownership in the banking sector are not restricted. 
However, if I include FINFREE, INDEPENDENCE, and TRANSPARENCY as 
additional explanatory variables, INVFREE becomes insignificant. FINFREE is 
not significant either. This may indicate problems with multicollinearity. The 
overall results, however, do not provide strong evidence that explicit government 
barriers limit M&A in the EU banking sector. Since many explicit barriers have 
been lowered over time, implicit barriers may be more important to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector at present (Berger, 2007). 
9.3 Merger Control as Barrier to Consolidation in the EU Banking Sector 
The logit regressions indicate that banks in the EU are more likely to be acquired 
if the merger review process is more transparent. To find whether the effect 
differs for domestic and cross-border M&A, I next include INDEPENDENCE and 
TRANSPARENCY to the multinomial logit model. The results are reported in 
Model 14 to 16 of Table 16.  CHAPTER 3  74
Table 17: Logit and Multinomial Logit Regression with Interaction Terms  
   Model 17  Model 18 
 
Logit Regression  Multinomial Logit Regression 






SIZE  0.413*** 0.363***  0.497*** 
  (6.05) (4.20)  (4.74) 
ROA  -0.188*** -0.180***  -0.195*** 
  (-3.86) (-2.81)  (-2.96) 
NIREV  0.0178*** 0.00738  0.0317*** 
  (2.69) (0.93)  (2.84) 
CAPITAL  0.00648 0.0124  -0.000589 
  (0.63) (0.95)  (-0.04) 
LIQUID  0.00117 -0.00342  0.00536 
  (0.46) (-1.04)  (1.33) 
EMU  0.249 -0.461  0.0170 
  (0.52) (-0.78)  (0.03) 
IMGDP  1.399 -4.453**  4.026*** 
  (1.15) (-2.20)  (2.81) 
STKMCAP  -1.184** -2.037***  -0.858 
  (-2.46) (-2.87)  (-1.17) 
DBAGDP  -1.211*** -0.288  -1.449** 
  (-2.74) (-0.56)  (-2.22) 
C3  0.165 -1.406  1.628 
  (0.18) (-0.95)  (1.48) 
TRANSPARENCY*SMALL  0.737 -0.254  1.299* 
  (1.19) (-0.29)  (1.78) 
TRANSPARENCY*MEDIUM  1.029** 0.908  1.140* 
  (2.22) (1.28)  (1.93) 
TRANSPARENCY*LARGE  2.431** 0.169  2.272** 
  (2.56) (0.06)  (2.31) 
Observations 4,537  4,537 
Pseudo R
2 0.172  0.210 
Log Likelihood  -520.4  -573.8 
Source: Own calculations (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 17 reports the results 
of logistic and multinomial logit regressions with interaction terms for TRANSPARENCY. The regression coefficients 
reported are to be interpreted as affecting the odds ratio with respect to the baseline case and not as marginal probability. 
Robust standard-errors clustered on bank-level are reported in parentheses. Time-dummies and the constant term are not 
reported. The time-dummies and the constant term are not reported. To eliminate outliers, all bank-specific explanatory 
variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-% level. The sample includes 1,097 commercial banks and 141 deals of which 72 
were domestic and 69 cross-border. For a list of the variables used in the regression analysis see Table A5.  
 
The results differ for domestic and cross-border M&A. While INDEPENDENCE 
remains insignificant, TRANSPARENCY is significant for cross-border, but 
insignificant for domestic M&A. The positive coefficient indicates that banks are 
significantly less likely to be taken over by foreign banks if merger control lacks 
transparency. In this case, supervisors have more scope to block cross-border 
M&A. This indicates that merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-
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border M&A in the EU banking sector. Boot (1999) argues that politicians 
particularly protect national flagships.  
This suggests that large banks are less likely to be acquired than small banks if 
merger control lacks transparency. To test this hypothesis, I create three dummy 
variables each representing a different bank size. Banks are considered as small if 
their assets are below the 25-percentile (SMALL), medium-sized if their assets lie 
within the 25- and 75-percentile (MEDIUM), and large if their assets exceed the 
75-percentile (LARGE). Since I multiply these dummies with the 
TRANSPARENCY, each coefficient measures the effect of TRANSPARENCY 
for a different size of banks. The results are presented in Table 17. The interaction 
terms turn out to be insignificant for domestic, but significant for cross-border 
M&A. For cross-border M&A, tests show that the coefficient of the interaction 
term is significantly higher for large (2.27) than for small and medium-sized 
banks (1.29 and 1.14, respectively). This supports the anecdotal evidence that 
supervisors and politicians use merger control to protect “national champions”. 
10 Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of the regression results, I perform several robustness tests. 
First, to control for the fact that many Central and Eastern European countries 
opened their banking sectors to foreign investors during their transformation, I 
include a dummy variable which is equal to one for countries that are located in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and zero otherwise. Second, I estimate my 
model only for the countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. Third, I 
include a set of country dummies. Country dummies control for omitted variables 
that do not vary over time and that are specific to each country. Examples for such 
time-invariant determinants of M&A are culture or language. Country dummies 
also control for the attitude of the government toward foreign investment in the 
banking sector as long as it does not change over time. Fourth, to test the 
robustness of the multinomial logit regressions, I run separate logit regressions for 
domestic and cross-border M&A. Furthermore, I estimate my model using 
multinomial probit instead of multinomial logit regression. The results, however, 
 CHAPTER 3  76
do not change: TRANSPARENCY remains significant and positive for cross-
border, but not significant for domestic M&A. The results are not reported for the 
sake of brevity.   
11 Conclusions 
Although the EU has removed barriers to cross-border banking through the 
harmonization of regulations and liberalization, the number of cross-border M&A 
in the EU banking sector is still small compared to cross-border M&A in other 
sectors (European Commission, 2005a). The level of cross-border consolidation is 
particularly low in Western Europe, while cross-border M&A are more frequent 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Cabral et. al., 2002).  
This chapter has shown that cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector 
is mainly limited by implicit government barriers. Implicit barriers arise from 
merger control if politicians and supervisors block cross-border M&A during the 
merger review process for other than prudential reasons. In particular, large banks 
are less likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions if merger control 
lacks transparency. Explicit barriers like, for example, restrictions on capital flows 
and ownership, in contrast, do not seem to matter. Such barriers have been 
lowered over time through liberalization and regulatory harmonization.  
The results also have implications for the efficiency of the EU banking sector. 
Since government intervention is usually not driven by efficiency considerations, 
a greater degree of transparency of merger control should not only make cross-
border M&A more likely, but also improve the efficiency and valuation of banks 
in the EU. A higher degree of transparency of the merger review process should 
also improve corporate governance in banking sector, since the market for 
corporate control becomes more powerful if takeovers are less likely to be 
blocked by supervisors and politicians. 
The results, furthermore, suggest that consolidation in the EU banking sector is 
driven by the desire to generate economies of scale and scope. X-efficiency gains 
through better management techniques and organization influence the decision to 
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take over a bank as well. Efficiency gains are usually found to be easier to achieve 
in developing countries in which foreign banks have relative advantages over 
local banks. In developed countries, in contrast, foreign banks are less efficient 
than local institutions (Berger, 2007). This suggests that the efficiency gains 
generated from cross-border M&A may not be sufficient to outweigh the relative 
disadvantages of foreign banks in Western Europe. Since efficiency gains are a 
key driver for consolidation in the banking sector, cross-border consolidation will, 
hence, likely to be limited in Western Europe as long as efficiency barriers exist 
that offset most of the potential efficiency gains from M&A. This indicates that 
the small number of cross-border M&A in Western Europe relative to Central and 
Eastern Europe is primarily the result of a combination of net comparative 
disadvantages of foreign banks in these countries and relatively high implicit 
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Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings 
dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is usually 
widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences 
for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. In the United Kingdom, 
minority shareholders are more likely to be expropriated by the management as a 
result of the dispersed ownership structure. In Continental Europe, ownership is 
usually concentrated and agency problems arise between minority shareholders 
and large blockholders. Corporate governance deals with these problems. 
The corporate governance of banks is particularly important in the moment, since 
the financial crisis has led to the failure of several credit institutions and 
considerably reduced bank valuations. According to the OECD, “a massive failure 
in corporate governance [of banks]… and ‘godsmacking’ weaknesses in the way 
banks are regulated led to the current crisis” (Hosking, 2009). Efficient corporate 
governance systems and an effective regulation of credit institutions are not only 
relevant for bank shareholders and bank customers, however. As the crisis has 
shown owing to the importance of banks in mobilizing and allocating funds and 
risks, efficient corporate governance systems in the banking sector are also an 
important determinant for economic growth (Claessens, 2006).  
This chapter analyzes the existing corporate governance structures in the EU 
banking sector and the impact of EU regulations on investor protection and the CHAPTER 4  79
market for corporate control. Using a new dataset on ownership of listed banks in 
the EU banking sector I show that regulations that aim at improving corporate 
governance may have the opposite effect depending on the ownership structure of 
banks. I also show that there is a trade-off in EU regulations between a higher 
level of investor protection and a more efficient market for corporate control. The 
results are important for current and future regulation that aims at improving the 
corporate governance of banks, since they indicate that the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach of the EU Commission to harmonize the existing legal and regulatory 
framework is inappropriate for the EU banking sector and may instead of 
improving corporate governance even further worsen the governance problems in 
banks. 
Corporate governance deals with principal-agent problems. Such problems arise 
because managers and shareholders have the incentive to maximize their personal 
utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since contracts cannot completely specify a 
priori what the manager has to do with the money and how the returns are divided 
between him and the shareholders, the manager has considerable scope to increase 
his utility to the detriment of the shareholder (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The 
shareholder can limit this by monitoring the management. However, given the 
information asymmetries between the management and the shareholders, each 
shareholder has to incur monitoring costs. For this reason, every shareholder free-
rides in the hope that other shareholders do the monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This leaves the management with considerable discretion to divert 
corporate resources for their private benefit (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
17 
The most direct way to align the interests of managers and shareholders is to 
concentrate ownership in the hands of a large shareholder. Large shareholders 
have more voting rights and larger incentives to monitor the management than 
                                           
17Managers may, for example, engage in takeovers if they derive utility from empire building. 
Takeovers can then be viewed as a manifestation of the potential conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers. In line with that Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) find that banks with a 
widely dispersed ownership structure and considerable power of the management are more likely 
to make acquisitions that increase size than banks that are dominated by a large shareholder that 
monitors the management. Similar results are provided by Banning (1999). 
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minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). However, ownership 
concentration also comes with some costs, since large shareholders may represent 
their own interests which do not need to coincide with the interests of the minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, if ownership is concentrated 
principal-agent problems arise between the large shareholders and the minority 
shareholders, while agency problems between managers and minority 
shareholders dominate if ownership is widely dispersed.  
Concentrated ownership is only one way to align the incentives of managers and 
shareholders. Another way is to improve investor protection, since a better 
protection of shareholder rights reduces the need for the emergence of a large 
investor to control the management (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1998, 1999). Investor protection can be improved on various ways. One way is to 
strengthen the rights of shareholders to participate in shareholders’ meetings, to 
call extraordinary shareholders’ meetings or by giving shareholders the right to 
sue directors or the majority for suspected expropriation (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Another way is to increase the efficiency of the market 
for corporate control. Manne (1965) argues that the takeover market increases the 
power and the protection of minority shareholders. The reason is that firms that 
are not managed to increase shareholder value, but to raise the wealth or 
reputation of its managers should perform poorly. This should depress the share 
price of the firm relative to the shares of other companies in the same market and 
make it attractive for takeovers for those who believe that they can manage the 
company more efficiently (Manne, 1965). Since the incumbent managers loose 
their job and perquisites after the takeover, they have larger incentives to manage 
the company in the interest of the shareholders.
18 
Efficient corporate governance systems are particularly important in the banking 
sector, since agency problems are more severe in banks than in non-financial 
                                           
18Better investor protection and the market for corporate control are external mechanisms that 
assure minority shareholders of getting a return on their investment. Internal governance 
mechanisms include incentive contracts and the implementation of a supervisory board that 
controls the management in the interest of the minority shareholders. The latter mechanisms are 
not covered by this study. For a survey see Shleifer & Vishny (1997).  
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firms. The reason is that information asymmetries are larger in the banking sector 
than in the non-financial sector (Morgan, 2002 and Levine, 2004). This makes 
monitoring more difficult and increases the free-riding problem, since minority 
shareholders have to incur larger monitoring costs to overcome their informational 
disadvantage. Banking regulations exacerbate agency problems further. Deposit 
insurance, for example, removes any incentive that insured depositors have to 
monitor the management because their funds are protected regardless of the 
outcomes of the investment strategies the bank selects (Macey & O’Hara, 2003), 
while regulations on entry, mergers, takeovers, and administrative rules restrict 
the power of the market for corporate control to discipline bank managers 
(Prowse, 1995). 
Although agency problems are more severe in the banking sector, the corporate 
governance literature usually focuses on the non-financial sector.
19 The aim of 
this chapter is to fill this gap and to analyze the existing corporate governance 
systems in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory 
environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. The chapter 
proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present descriptive statistics on 
ownership structures in the EU banking sector. Based on the findings in this 
section, Section 3 analyzes the impact of EU corporate governance regulations on 
investor protection and the market for corporate control. Section 4 concludes.  
                                          
2 Ownership Structures in the EU Banking Sector 
The study is based on a new dataset on the ownership structure of listed banks in 
the EU banking sector. Information on bank shareholders comes from Bankscope 
(2008). Virtually all of the data are for 2007 and 2008 though I also have a few 
observations where the data comes from the earlier years. However, since 
ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable and determined by the legal and 
 
19A large part of this literature has been contributed by the European Corporate Governance 
Network. Becht & Röell (1999) provide a summary of the main findings of this network. For 
individual country studies see Becht & Böhmer (1999), Becht, Chapelle, & Renneboog (1999), 
Bianchi, Bianco, & Enriques (1999), Bloch & Kremp (1999), Crespí-Cladera & Garcia-Cestona 
(1999), De Jong, Kabir, Marra, & Röell (1999), Goergen & Renneborg (1999), and Gugler, Kalss, 
Stomper, & Zechner (1999). 
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regulatory environment, the fact that the ownership data do not all come from the 
same year is not a big problem (La Porta et al., 1998 and 1999).  
Table 18: Banks and Shareholders by Country 




Average Number of 
Shareholders 
per Bank 
Germany 36  491  13.64 
France 40  487  12.18 
Spain 14  788  56.29 
Italy 35  927  26.49 
United Kingdom  53  2,558  48.26 
Total 178  5,251  29.50 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Table 18 shows the total number of banks and bank shareholders by country. The average 
number of shareholders per bank is the ratio of the total number of banks divided by the total number of bank shareholders. 
 
Table 19: Banks and Shareholders by Bank Type 
Type of Bank  Number of 
Banks 
Number of  
Shareholders 
Average Number of 
Shareholders 
per Bank 
Bank Holding & Holding Company  17  1,133  66.65 
Commercial Bank  62  1,886  30.42 
Cooperative Bank  23  259  11.26 
Investment Bank/ Securities House  27  781  28.93 
Islamic Bank  1  22  22.00 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank  4  137  34.25 
Non-Banking Credit Institution 39  947  24.28 
Real Estate/ Mortgage Bank  5  86  17.20 
Total 178  5,251  29.50 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Table 19 shows the total number of banks and bank shareholders by bank type. The average 
number of shareholders per bank is the ratio of the total number of banks divided by the total number of bank shareholders. 
 
The dataset includes 178 listed banks from France (40), Germany (36), Italy (35), 
Spain (14), and the United Kingdom (53). The distribution of banks and 
shareholders is shown in Table 18 and according to bank type in Table 19. The 
dataset includes commercial banks (62), bank holding companies (17), 
cooperative banks (23), investment banks (27), Islamic banks (1), medium and 
long term credit banks (4), non-banking credit institution (39), as well as real 
estate, and mortgage banks (5). The United Kingdom records 2,558 shareholders 
in listed banks. This is considerably larger than in France (487), Germany (491), 
Italy (927), and Spain (927) and indicates that ownership is more dispersed in the 
United Kingdom than in Continental Europe. This is also reflected by the average 
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number of shareholders per credit institution. The United Kingdom records, on 
average, 48.26 shareholders per bank (see Table 18). This is lower than in Spain 
where 56.29 shareholders per bank are reported, but considerably larger than in 
France (12.18), Italy (26.49), and Germany (13.64). A detailed list of the banks 
included in the sample and the number of shareholders per bank is presented in 
Table A6 in the appendix.  
Table 20: Largest Blockholdings 
Continental Europe  Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Largest blockholding  133  45.62  47.23  29.08 
2nd largest blockholding  125  15.62  10.00  17.60 
3rd largest blockholding  115  7.33  5.10  8.55 
4th largest blockholding  108  4.39  3.01  4.43 
5th largest blockholding  99  3.18  2.29  3.36 
United Kingdom  Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Largest blockholding  59  14.03  11.09  11.45 
2nd largest blockholding  52  9.89  7.80  6.44 
3rd largest blockholding  54  7.56  5.85  4.09 
4th largest blockholding  50  6.18  5.08  3.19 
5th largest blockholding  57  4.49  4.70  2.71 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Table 20 reports descriptive statistics for different blockholdings in the EU banking sector. 
Continental Europe includes France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. 
 
Ownership concentration is usually measured by the size of the largest 
blockholding (see, for example, Becht & Röell, 1999 and other studies of the 
European Corporate Governance Network). The largest blockholding is defined as 
the largest direct or indirect stake of an individual shareholder or a group of 
shareholders. Table 20 shows descriptive statistics for the largest shareholdings in 
EU banks. Since some banks have more than one dominant shareholder, the 
number of largest blockholdings is larger than the number of banks in the sample. 
Table 20 indicates significant differences in the degree of ownership 
concentration between the United Kingdom and Continental Europe. While the 
median largest blockholding is 11.09 percent in the United Kingdom, it is 47.23 
percent in Continental Europe. This means that in France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain every second bank is dominated by a blockholder that has almost outright  
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Source: Bankscope (2008). Figure 4 shows the distribution of the largest shareholding in the banking sector of Continental 
Europe and the United Kingdom. Continental Europe includes France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The horizontal lines 
indicate the 10- (qualified holding), 25- (blocking minority), 30- (mandatory bid), 50- (simple majority), 75- (super 
majority), and 90-percent (squeeze-out) threshold.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of the Largest Blockholding in the Banking Sector of 








































0 .25 .5 .75 1









































0 .25 .5 .75 1









































0 .25 .5 .75 1









































0 .25 .5 .75 1
Fraction of the data
Spain
 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Figure 5 shows the distribution of the largest shareholding in the banking sector of individual 
EU member countries. The horizontal lines indicate the 10- (qualified holding), 25- (blocking minority), 30- (mandatory 
bid), 50- (simple majority), 75- (super majority), and 90-percent (squeeze-out) threshold. 
 
control. In the United Kingdom, ownership is much less concentrated and the 
largest blockholder needs the second, third, and fourth largest shareholder to have 
at least a blocking minority of 25 percent. The same differences in ownership 
structure are found for the non-financial sector in Europe (Becht & Röell, 1999). 
La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 
(2008) argue that these differences are caused by different degrees of investor 
protection. Since shareholder rights are better protected in common law countries 
(United Kingdom), shareholders do not need to have large blockholdings to exert 
some degree of control over the management and to avoid being expropriated. In 
civil law countries (Continental Europe), in contrast, ownership concentration 
substitutes for weak shareholder rights. 
Figure 4 und Figure 5 give a more detailed picture of the distribution of the largest 
blockholdings in Continental Europe and the United Kingdom. The plots confirm 
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the previous conclusions regarding the degree of ownership concentration in the 
EU banking sector. Although there are some differences in ownership 
concentration across countries, ownership is usually concentrated in Continental 
Europe. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, ownership is widely dispersed with 
the blockholder usually having a stake of less than 25 percent. Figure 4 und 
Figure 5 illustrate the impact of regulations on the ownership structure of banks. 
In Continental Europe, for example, a clustering of blockholdings is visible at the 
25- and 50-percent level. Such blockholdings are necessary to have a blocking 
minority and a simple majority, respectively. In the United Kingdom, the largest 
blockholding is usually lower than the 30-percent threshold that requires a 
mandatory bid to all shareholders. The mandatory bid rule, hence, effectively 
ensures that the growth of blockholdings stops short of the 30-percent threshold.  
The different degrees of ownership concentration in Continental Europe and the 
United Kingdom have implications for corporate governance in the EU banking 
sector. In Continental Europe, owing to the high degree of ownership 
concentration principal-agent problems are more severe between large 
shareholders and minority shareholders than between the management and 
minority shareholders. The opposite is the case in the United Kingdom. British 
banks are controlled by the management, since the largest blockholder alone 
cannot control the bank. He must form a coalition with other investors to have at 
least a blocking minority. Given these differences, the next section discusses the 
impact of corporate governance regulations in the EU on the level of investor 
protection and the efficiency of the market for corporate control in the EU 
banking sector. 
3 Corporate Governance Regulation in the EU 
The corporate governance regulation in the EU has mainly been shaped by the 
2002 report of the High Level Group (Winter et al., 2002). It has resulted in an 
action plan that was adopted by the EU Commission in 2004. In the following, I 
will present the directives that I deem particularly relevant for investor protection 
and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector. They illustrate the 
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trade-off between a higher level of investor protection and a higher efficiency of 
the market for corporate control and the problems that arise if the EU corporate 
governance regulation does not take account of differences in the ownership 
structures of banks. 
3.1 Transparency Directive  
The  Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC (amended by directive 2007/14/EC) 
aims at protecting minority shareholder rights by setting minimum transparency 
requirements regarding the publication of periodic financial information and the 
notification of the acquisition and disposal of major shareholdings. The directive 
requires shareholders to notify the issuer about the proportion of their voting 
rights once the latter exceeds 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50, and 75 percent as a result 
of the acquisition or disposal of shareholdings. The reporting requirement not only 
includes voting rights that are directly held by the investor, but also those that are 
indirectly held by a third party. The Transparency Directive only imposes 
minimum harmonisation requirements. This allows member states to adopt more 
stringent notification requirements to increase transparency. This is reflected in 
Table 21. Italy, for example, sets the initial disclosure threshold at the 2-percent 
and Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom at the 3-percent level. France sets 
the initial disclosure threshold in line with the directive at the 5-percent level.  
The disclosure requirement aims at facilitating the monitoring of large 
shareholders by regulators, minority shareholders, and the market for corporate 
control to avoid that they use their power to extract private benefits at the expense 
of other shareholders (Goergen, Martyonva, & Renneboog, 2005). While the 
Transparency Directive has increased protection of minority shareholders, it has 
also reduced the efficiency of the market for corporate control. The reason is that 
the disclosure of a large blockholding may alert the market that a bid is likely to 
take place. This will drive up the share price. If the shareholders expect the bidder 
to raise the efficiency of the bank, they will not tender their shares unless the  
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Table 21: Disclosure Thresholds  
  
Lower 5  10 15 20 25 30 
(1/3) 
35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 
(2/3) 
80 85 90 95 
Austria  x  x  x  x x x x x x x x     
Belgium  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x 
Finland  x  x  x  x x x x 2/3      
France x  x  x  x x 1/3 x 2/3      x  x 
Germany  3% x  x  x  x x x x x     x 
Greece            
Ireland  3%  with 1% increments
Italy 2%  x  x  x  x x x x x x x 2/3 x      x  x 
Luxembourg  x  x  x  x x 1/3 x 2/3      
Netherlands  x  x  x  x x x x x x x     x 
Portugal  x  x  x  x x 1/3 x x     
Spain 3%  x  x  x  x x x x x x x x x x  x    x   
United Kingdom  3%  with 1% increments
Source: EU Commission (2007). Table 21 shows the disclosure thresholds (in percent) that are applied in individual EU 
countries. 
 
share price offered by the bidder reflects the full efficiency gains from the 
takeover (Grossman & Hart, 1980). It follows that the bidder withdraws his offer, 
because he will not make any profits under these conditions. One solution to this 
problem is that the bidder is allowed to extract private benefits after the takeover 
(Grossman & Hart, 1980).
20 Another is to build up a toehold in the target before 
the official takeover bid is launched (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The toehold 
allows the bidder to make a profit, since he gains on the shares he owns. 
Takeovers are, hence, more likely to take place if the bidder has a blockholding in 
the target before he makes the actual takeover bid.
21 Critical is the level at which 
the toehold has to be disclosed. If the disclosure level is low and the bidder not 
able to acquire a blockholding that is large enough to make profits from the 
                                           
20Grossman & Hart (1980) call this dilution. One method is for shareholders to permit a successful 
bidder to sell the firm’s assets or output to another company owned by the bidder at terms which 
are disadvantageous to minority shareholders (Grossman & Hart, 1980). Dilution of minority 
shareholders is expected to raise the threat of a takeover, since it excludes the shareholders that 
are not tendering from completely sharing in the benefits of improving the corporation after the 
takeover. Grossman & Hart (1980) show that dilution is under certain conditions beneficial for 
minority shareholder as well, since the threat of a takeover forces the management to be more 
efficient.  
21Toeholds also lower the chance of entry of a rival bidder and reduce managerial resistance 
against a takeover (Betton & Eckbo, 2000). For more on this issue see also Bulow, Hiuang, & 
Klemperer (1999). 
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takeover, the threat of a takeover is low, since most of the efficiency gains that 
arise from the takeover have to be passed on to the minority shareholders. This 
suggests that the Transparency Directive has improved investor protection, but 
reduced the efficiency of the market for corporate control in the EU banking 
sector.  
3.2 Takeover Directive 
The  Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC was adopted in 2004 and had to be 
implemented in national law until 2006. The directive has two major goals. On the 
one hand, the directive aims at improving the efficiency of the market for 
corporate control by introducing common rules for takeovers in the EU. The 
directive particularly aims at facilitating takeovers in Continental Europe, since 
the market for corporate control is assumed to be active in the United Kingdom 
(Franks & Mayer, 1996 and Berglöf & Burkart, 2003). On the other hand, the 
Takeover Directive aims at improving investor protection in the case of a 
takeover.  
The main changes of the directive are the introduction of a mandatory bid rule, a 
squeeze-out rule, a sell-out rule, a board neutrality rule, and a breakthrough rule. 
While the mandatory bid and sell-out rule aim at increasing investor protection, 
the aim of the squeeze-out rule, the board neutrality rule, and the breakthrough 
rule is to facilitate takeovers. In the following, each of these rules and their impact 
on investor protection and the market for corporate control are discussed in 
greater detail. 
3.2.1 The Mandatory Bid Rule 
The mandatory bid rule obliges an investor to make a full takeover bid for all 
remaining voting shares of a listed firm once he has taken over a blockholding 
that directly or indirectly gives him de facto control over the acquired company. A 
mandatory bid is only required if the bidder makes a takeover bid to a single 
shareholder or a group of shareholders in a privately negotiated deal. If he makes 
a voluntary offer for all shares of all shareholders, the mandatory bid rule does not 
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apply. De facto control is assumed if the number of voting shares exceeds 
particular thresholds. Most common is the 30-percent threshold which is applied 
in Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom (see Table 22). Germany and France set 
the threshold at 33 percent. The impact of the mandatory bid rule on the 
ownership structure of banks becomes visible in the United Kingdom where most 
of the largest blockholdings stop short of the 30-percent mandatory bid threshold 
(see Figure 4). 
Table 22: Mandatory-Bid, Squeeze-Out, and Sell-Out Thresholds 
 
Mandatory-Bid Threshold  Squeeze-Out Threshold  Sell-Out Threshold 
Austria 30%  90%  90% 
Belgium 30%  95%  95% 
Finland 30%  90%  90% 
France 33%  95%  95% 
Germany 30%  95%  95% 
Greece 33%  90%  90% 
Ireland 30%  90%  90% 
Italy 30%  95%  95% 
Luxembourg 33%  95%  95% 
Netherlands 30% 95%  95% 
Portugal 33%  90%  90% 
Spain 30%  90%  90% 
United Kingdom  30%  90%  90% 
Source: EU Commission (2007). Table 22 shows the mandatory bid, squeeze-out, and sell-out thresholds that are applied in 
individual EU countries. 
 
The mandatory bid rule aims at protecting minority shareholders by granting them 
the right to sell their shares in the event of a change of control (EU Commission, 
2007). Investor rights are protected, since the acquirer may use his control power 
after the takeover to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders. While the mandatory bid rule improves investor protection in the 
case of a takeover, it also reduces the likelihood of a takeover. The reason is that 
the principle of equal treatment requires that minority investors have to be paid 
the same price for their shares as the selling blockholder. Since the selling 
blockholder generally receives a premium for the sale of a control block, the 
mandatory bid rule drives up the share price and makes takeovers more costly 
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(Berglöf & Burkhart, 2003). The bidder will only be willing to pay the higher 
price if he expects to create sufficient added value that compensates for the higher 
share price. Since takeovers require a higher added value if the minority 
shareholders have to be paid the same price as the incumbent blockholder, the 
mandatory bid rule prevents value decreasing transactions (Berglöf & Burkhart, 
2003). It, however, also reduces the bidder’s willingness to take over a bank, even 
though the control transfer would add value (Berglöf & Burkhart, 2003). 
Takeovers are particularly less likely in Continental Europe. Since ownership is 
concentrated, the share price will increase owing to the block premium that has to 
be paid to the incumbent blockholder. This premium will drive up the total 
purchase price and reduce the attractiveness of a bank as a takeover target.
22 If the 
bidder offers a smaller block premium to reduce the total purchase price, the 
incumbent blockholder will most likely not get appropriately compensated for the 
loss of his private benefits of control. This should reduce the likelihood that he 
accepts the bid. The mandatory bid rule, hence, reduces the likelihood of a 
takeover particularly in those countries where the Takeover Directive aims at 
increasing it. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, the market for corporate control 
is almost unaffected. The reason is that the bidders usually do not have to pay a 
block premium because ownership is widely dispersed. Takeovers also usually do 
not take place through privately negotiated sales, but rather through public tender 
offers.  
3.2.2 The Board Neutrality Rule  
The board neutrality rule aims at facilitating takeovers. It provides that during the 
bid period the board of the takeover target must obtain prior authorization from 
the general meeting of shareholders before the adoption of post-bid defences. 
Examples for post-bid defences are share buybacks or the issuance of share 
capital. They are put in place once a company has become subject to a takeover 
                                           
22Nenova (2003) shows that controlling blocks are more valuable in countries where investor 
protection is low and where blockholders have more scope to extract private benefits of control. 
To illustrate, the average value of a control block votes is 4.5 percent of company market value in 
common law countries (e.g. United Kingdom) and 16.6 percent in civil law countries (e.g. 
Continental Europe) (Nenova, 2003). 
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bid. Under the Takeover Directive the board is only allowed to search for an 
alternative bidder (“white knight”). The board neutrality rule should make 
takeovers easier by limiting the board’s power to raise obstacles to takeovers (EU 
Commission, 2007). Managers may use post-bid defences, since the bidder likely 
replaces the management after the takeover. Since bidders usually targets 
inefficient banks, defence mechanisms are likely to prevent value-enhancing 
acquisitions and harm shareholders. Whether the board neutrality rule increases 
the efficiency of the market for corporate control, however, depends on the 
ownership structure of the firm. In the United Kingdom, the introduction of the 
board neutrality rule likely improves the functioning of the takeover market. In 
Continental Europe, in contrast, the effect of the board neutrality rule is 
ambiguous, since the blockholder can be virtue of having a controlling stake alone 
decide on post-bid defenses. This makes him more entrenched, since he has the 
power to affect any corporate decisions not through the management, but directly 
(Goergen et al., 2005).  
3.2.3 The Breakthrough Rule  
The breakthrough rule aims at facilitating takeovers by enabling the bidder to 
break through existing defences that make takeovers more difficult. While the 
board neutrality rule focuses on post-bid defences, the breakthrough rule aims at 
eliminating  pre-bid defences (EU Commission, 2007). It divides the takeover 
process into two different phases. The first phase is the acquisition phase. During 
this phase the breakthrough rule eliminates defensive mechanisms like, for 
example, share transfer restrictions, voting restrictions and multiple voting shares. 
The second phase is the post-takeover phase. During this phase the breakthrough 
rule eliminates all defence mechanisms that prevent the restructuring of the target. 
It provides that once the bidder holds 75 percent or more of the shares carrying 
voting rights no restrictions on the transfer of securities neither on voting rights 
nor any extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the appointment or 
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removal of board members apply on the first general meeting of the shareholders 
after the acquisition.
23  
The breakthrough rule facilitates takeovers, since it allows the bidder to bypass 
the incumbent blockholder. Since every share has only one vote under the 
breakthrough rule, the bidder can directly make a tender offer to the minority 
shareholders to take over control. This means that he does not have to make a 
privately negotiated block trade with the holder of multiple voting shares to 
assume control. This should reduce the purchase price, since the bidder neither 
has to pay a control premium to the controlling blockholder nor has to make a 
subsequent mandatory bid in which he has to pay the premium to the minority 
shareholders. The breakthrough rule, hence, makes value increasing control 
transfers feasible that are frustrated by the opposition of the incumbent 
blockholder or by the mandatory bid rule (Berglöf & Burkhart, 2003). Since 
controlling blocks with less than 25 percent of the votes lose their veto power on 
the first general meeting of the shareholders after the takeover, blockholders that 
have less than a blocking minority lose their control premium. The loss will be 
reflected in smaller price differentials between shares with high voting power and 
shares with low voting power and should manifest in a lower premium paid in 
block trades to the extent that such transactions continue to take place in the 
presence of a mandatory bid (Berglöf & Burkhart, 2003).  
Since blockholders that own less than 25 percent of the voting rights do not get 
appropriately compensated for the loss of private benefits in a block trade, they 
will likely adopt measures to frustrate the bidder. Provided that the incumbent 
blockholders are not financially constrained, one way is to increase the 
blockholding above the 25-percent threshold. If the incumbent blockholder is 
financially constrained, he might sell his shareholding or form a control pyramid 
and enhance cross-shareholding structures (Berglöf & Burkhart, 2003). Such 
                                           
23The breakthrough rule does not apply to securities where the restrictions on voting rights are 
compensated for by specific pecuniary advantages (e. g. non-voting preference shares). 
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defensive mechanisms are not covered by the directive.
24 Bennedsen & Nielsen 
(2004) point out that the breakthrough rule may also have an impact on firms in 
which the controlling blockholder owns more than 25 percent of the capital. Since 
such blockholders are able to block the restructuring of the target after the 
takeover, the likelihood of a takeover is smaller for firms that have a shareholder 
that holds more than 25 percent of the votes. This makes the blockholder more 
entrenched (Berglöf & Burkhart, 2003). The effect of the breakthrough rule on the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control is, hence, ambiguous in Continental 
Europe. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, the breakthrough rule should 
facilitate takeovers. 
3.2.4 The Squeeze-Out Rule and Sell-Out Rule  
The squeeze-out rule allows bidders that have taken over a large part of capital to 
acquire the outstanding shares for a fair price. Forcing out minority shareholders 
out of the bank should liberate the bidder from costs and risks which continued 
existence of minorities could trigger (EU Commission, 2007). The squeeze-out 
rule also reduces the problem that minority shareholders do not tender their shares 
unless the share price offered by the bidder reflects the full efficiency gains from 
the takeover (Grossman & Hart, 1980). As argued in Section 3.1, this will drive 
up the share price and may lead to the withdrawal of the bid. The squeeze-out rule 
reduces this holdout problem because minority shareholders cannot gain from not 
tendering their shares if the bid is conditional on the squeeze-out threshold. This 
implies that they are willing to sell their shares for a price that is less than the 
post-takeover price (Goergen et al., 2005). It follows that the bidder is able to 
internalize more efficiency gains after the takeover. The squeeze-out rule, hence, 
increases the incentive of the bidder to take over a firm and improves the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control. It steps in if the ownership share of 
                                           
24The Winter Group explicitly acknowledges that pyramids and dual class shares serve the purpose 
of keeping control with little equity capital, but recommends that the breakthrough rule should 
not apply to pyramids because it was argued to be too complicated and expensive (Winter et al., 
2002). Bebchuk & Hart (2002) criticize that exempting pyramids the breakthrough rule may 
promote pyramid structures and affect existing corporate governance arrangements 
asymmetrically. 
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the blockholder exceeds particular thresholds. The EU member countries are free 
to set this threshold between 90 and 95 percent. This is reflected in Table 22.  
Most common is the 90-percent threshold which is used in Spain and the United 
Kingdom. France, Germany, and Italy set the threshold at 95 percent. Since 
shareholders can be forced out of the firm against their will, the squeeze-out rule 
reduces the level of investor protection. The effect of the squeeze-out rule differs 
between Continental Europe and the United Kingdom. In Continental Europe, the 
effect on takeovers is ambiguous, since the incumbent blockholder can be virtue 
of having alarge shareholding alone prevent that the squeeze-out rule steps in. 
This should increase the level of entrenchment of the blockholder. In the United 
Kingdom, in contrast, the squeeze-out threshold should facilitate takeovers, since 
ownership is more dispersed.  
The counterpart of the squeeze-out rule is the sell-out rule. It gives shareholders 
the right to sell their shares to the blockholder once the latter has passed the sell-
out threshold. The sell-out rule should protect minority shareholders from being 
expropriated by the blockholder after the takeover (“exit option”). It, however, 
also reduces the likelihood of a takeover if the bidder is not interested in taking 
over all shares. The sell-out rule, hence, increases the level of investor protection, 
but reduces the efficiency of the market for corporate control in the EU banking 
sector.  
To summarize, the Takeover Directive aims at facilitating takeovers and 
protecting minority shareholders in the case of a takeover. While the directive has 
reached its aim to improve investor protection, it has failed to raise the likelihood 
of takeovers in countries where ownership is concentrated. In Continental Europe, 
the mandatory bid and squeeze-out rule have increased entrenchment of the 
blockholder. This is particularly the case when they enjoy large private benefits of 
control. The positive effect of the squeeze-out on the takeover market is offset by 
the introduction of the sell-out rule. The breakthrough rule also fails to improve 
the efficiency of the market for corporate control, because the incumbent 
blockholder is still able to approve defensive mechanisms in the general meeting 
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of the shareholders if ownership is concentrated. He may also increase the level of 
entrenchment by forming control pyramids. Entrenchment may also be increased 
by the possibility to opt-out of the board neutrality and breakthrough rule.  
Table 23: Adoption of the Board Neutrality and Breakthrough Rule 
  
Transposition of the 
Takeover Directive 
Board Neutrality 
Rule  Breakthrough Rule  Principle of 
Reciprocity  
Austria  yes  adopted  not adopted  not adopted 
Belgium  no  not adopted  not adopted  adopted 
Finland yes  adopted  not adopted  not adopted 
France yes  adopted  not  adopted  adopted 
Germany  yes  not adopted  not adopted  adopted 
Greece yes  adopted  not  adopted  adopted 
Ireland  yes  adopted  not adopted  not adopted 
Italy  no  not adopted  not adopted  adopted 
Luxembourg yes  not  adopted  not adopted  not adopted 
Netherlands no  not  adopted not  adopted  adopted 
Portugal yes  adopted  not  adopted  adopted 
Spain no  adopted  not  adopted  adopted 
United Kingdom  yes  adopted  not adopted  not adopted 
Source: EU Commission (2007). Table 6 shows which EU countries have transposed the Transparency Directive and which 
countries apply the board neutrality rule, the breakthrough rule, and the principal of reciprocity. 
 
Table 23 shows that Germany and Italy have used this option. They neither apply 
the board neutrality nor the breakthrough rule. Where the EU member states make 
use of this option, companies have the right to opt-in and to apply the rules. 
France and Spain oblige their companies to apply the board neutrality rule, but not 
the breakthrough rule. They have, however, introduced the principal of 
reciprocity that allows them to exempt their companies from the board neutrality 
rule if the bidder does not apply the board neutrality rule himself. This principal 
was introduced to prevent that a company that is not allowed to use defence 
mechanisms is taken over by a company that is allowed to do so. It has 
undermined the introduction of the board neutrality rule in France and Spain. The 
United Kingdom also applies the board neutrality rule, but not the principle of 
reciprocity. The probability of a takeover is also reduced by the fact that the 
breakthrough rule does not apply to securities that confer special rights on the EU 
member states (“golden shares”). This should reduce the likelihood of a takeover 
if government ownership is high.  
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The shortcomings of the Takeover Directive have been recognized by the EU 
Commission. In its report on the implementation of the takeover directive it states 
that the board neutrality rule as implemented in the member states holds back the 
emergence of a market for corporate control (EU Commission, 2007). The 
Commission, furthermore, notes that it is unlikely that the breakthrough rule will 
bring significant benefits (EU Commission, 2007). It hopes that the directive will 
indirectly improve the conditions for takeovers through the disclosure of takeover 
defences, however (EU Commission, 2007). If investors are aware of such 
defences, they may push the management to abolish them to reduce managerial 
entrenchment. That market forces may prevent the adoption of takeover defences 
is demonstrated by the United Kingdom. Although many devices to separate 
ownership and control are not legally prohibited, British companies usually do not 
apply them (Shearman & Sterling, 2007). 
4  Conclusions 
Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings 
dominate in Continental Europe, ownership is usually widely dispersed in the 
United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance 
in EU banking sector. In the United Kingdom, principal-agent problems arise 
between the management and minority shareholders as a result of the dispersed 
ownership structure in the banking sector. In Continental Europe, ownership is 
concentrated and agency problems occur between minority shareholders and large 
blockholders. Corporate governance deals with these problems. The aim of this 
chapter was to analyze the existing corporate governance systems in the EU 
banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and 
differences in the ownership structure of banks. Table 24 provides a summary of 
the effects of the EU directives discussed in this chapter on the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control and the level of investor protection in the EU 
banking sector. 
The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate 
governance. While the Transparency Directive has improved investor protection 
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by raising transparency, it has also reduced the efficiency of the market for 
corporate control. This illustrates the trade-off between better investor protection 
and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control that is characteristic for 
corporate governance regulation in the EU. The same trade-off characterizes the 
Takeover Directive. While the squeeze-out rule has increased the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control, the sell-out rule has reduced it.  
Another problem of corporate governance regulation in the EU is that it fails to 
take account of the differences in the ownership structure of banks. This has been 
demonstrated by the mandatory bid rule. While it fails to have an effect on 
takeover activity in countries with dispersed ownership structures (United 
Kingdom), it has increased the level of entrenchment in countries with 
concentrated ownership structures (Continental Europe). The consequence is that 
the mandatory bid rule has reduced the efficiency of the takeover market 
particularly in those countries where the EU Commission aims at increasing it. 
This suggests that corporate governance regulations should be customized to the 
specific ownership structures of banks in the EU and not toward harmonising 
national regulations. The “one-size-fits-all” approach to harmonize the existing 
legal and regulatory framework, hence, seems to be inappropriate for the EU 
banking sector. This should be kept in mind if the EU plans to change existing or 
adopt new corporate governance regulations for banks in response to the crisis.          CHAPTER 4         99 
       
       Table 24: Effect of EU Directives on Takeovers and Investor Protection in the EU Banking Sector  
  
  
Concentrated Ownership Structure 
Continental Europe 





Impact on the Market for 
Corporate Control 
Impact on Investor Protection 
Impact on the Market for 
Corporate Control 
Impact on Investor Protection 
Transparency Directive  Fewer M&As  Better Protection  No Impact  Better Protection 
       
Takeover Directive      
Mandatory Bid Rule  Less Trade in  Better Protection  No Impact  Better Protection 
   Controlling Blocks       
        
Board Neutrality Rule  Ambiguous Better  Protection  More M&As  Better Protection 
       
Breakthrough Rule  Ambiguous Ambiguous  More  M&As Better  Protection 
        
Squeeze-Out Rule  Ambiguous  Less Protection  More M&As  Less Protection 
        
Sell-Out Rule  Fewer M&As  Better Protection  Fewer M&As  Better Protection 
            
           Note: Table 24 shows the impact of the regulations discussed in the previous sections on the market for corporate control and the level of investor protection in the EU banking sector.  CHAPTER 5   100 
5 
Bank Owners or Bank 
Managers: Who is Keen on 
Risk? Evidence From the 
Financial Crisis 
 
 “What I think is a much more fundamental question about the structure and the 
short-termism [of remuneration schemes] would probably be by looking at the 
one of the banks that has failed recently. If one of those banks in 2005 decided to 
be more conservative and hold back in their activity, they more than likely would 
have had their CEO and board even replaced in 2006 for failing to take 
advantage of the opportunities, so the structure was one which was one widely 
supported by players, shareholders and everybody.” 
Peter Hahn, Former Citigroup Managing Director in a Report to the Treasury 
Committee of the British Parliament
25  
 
1  Introduction  
In this chapter, Reint Gropp and I examine whether owner-controlled banks or 
manager-controlled banks suffered larger losses during the crisis. We show that it 
is owner-controlled banks that experienced the largest losses. Banks operating in 
countries with better shareholder rights and banks with a controlling shareholder 
recorded larger losses during the crisis than banks operating in countries with poor 
shareholder rights and banks without a controlling shareholder. In the period 
before the crisis, however, the owner controlled banks show superior 
performance. This is consistent with fewer private benefits to managers in those 
                                           
25Quote from a report to the Treasury Committee of the British Parliament on remuneration in the 
banking sector (Remuneration in the Banking Sector, 2010). CHAPTER 5  101
banks, but also with higher risk-taking before the crisis.
26 Overall, the results 
imply that better aligning the incentives of managers with shareholder interests 
will not result in less risk-taking by banks as has been suggested by some in the 
recent policy debate on management compensation.
27 Furthermore, privately 
optimal contracts that align the incentives of management and shareholders may 
not be socially optimal as these contracts do not take the externality of higher 
financial fragility into account. When devising management compensation 
schemes, there appears to be a trade-off between bank efficiency and bank 
stability. A contract that minimises agency costs may, hence, result in socially 
“excessive” risk-taking.  
Our results are consistent with long-standing agency theoretic arguments of a 
negative relationship between risk-taking and shareholder control of management. 
For example, Amihud and Lev (1981), Holmstrom & Ricart I Costa (1986), and 
Hirshleifer & Thakor (1992) argue that managers avoid taking risks due to career 
concerns and undiversifiable employment risk. According to this view, managers 
may even spend corporate resources to diversify their companies’ operational risk 
to protect their position in the firm. They also support the recent findings in 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2009) and Beltratti & Stulz (2009), who show that stock 
price performance during the crisis was worse in those banks, in which the 
incentives of management were better aligned with the interests of shareholders. 
The results contradict popular sentiment, also reflected in some policy reports 
(e.g. OECD, 2009), that in weakly controlled banks, managers were able to obtain 
compensation packages that rewarded short term risk-taking.  
                                           
26The result that owner-controlled banks are riskier highlights the importance of controlling for 
risk when estimating the importance of private benefits of management in manager-controlled 
banks. The results in this paper suggest that risk seems to explain most of the difference in 
performance between owner-controlled banks and manager-controlled banks. Hence, it may be 
problematic to attribute differences in performance entirely to the private benefits of management 
in management-controlled banks. 
27In addition to the quote above, see, for example, the article “U.S. eyes bank pay overhaul: 
Administration in early talks on ways to curb compensation across finance” in the Wall Street 
Journal (Solomon & Parletta, 2009) or “U.S. targets excessive pay for top executives,” in the 
Washington Post (Cho, Goldfarb, & Murakami Tse, 2009). 
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We use a large dataset of OECD banks, for which we collected information on 
ownership concentration. In total, the sample consists of more than 1,100 banks 
for 24 OECD countries. In particular, in addition to most listed banks, the sample 
also includes many unlisted credit institutions. We think this is important for the 
broader applicability of the results, since unlisted banks represent the majority of 
banks in most countries around the world (see e.g. Gropp & Kashyap, 2009 and 
Table 25). We also think that the greater variability in ownership and corporate 
governance structures will help us to identify the effects of governance on risk-
taking. 
We estimate the average performance before the crisis during 2000 to 2006 and 
the deviation from this average performance during the crisis as a function of 
shareholder rights and ownership concentration. We find that owner-controlled 
banks tend to perform better, on average, before the crisis compared to manager-
controlled banks and that owner-controlled banks experienced larger losses in the 
crisis than manager-controlled banks. One innovation of this paper is to use 
realized losses during the crisis relative to average performance in calm times as a 
proxy for the risks that were incurred before the crisis. We claim that this 
approach addresses some of the measurement problems frequently encountered 
when attempting to measure bank risk.
28  
Relying on the literature (John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008 and Laeven & Levine, 
2009), we use two proxies for the degree to which management is controlled by 
shareholders: Ownership concentration (a bank-specific variable) and shareholder 
rights (a country-specific variable). Concentrated ownership may help in 
controlling management, as large blockholders may posses more ability and 
greater incentives to monitor management compared to dispersed shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
29 Better shareholder rights may enable even dispersed 
                                           
28For example, standard accounting measures, like problem loans or loan loss reserves, tend to be 
backward looking and limited to on-balance sheet risk; stock price volatilities are limited to listed 
banks, which constitute only a minority among banks in the OECD (Gropp & Kashyap, 2009 and 
Table 25). 
29They may, however, extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
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shareholders to control the management, for instance, through calling 
extraordinary meetings or through the ability to take legal action against 
management (La Porta et al., 1998 and 1999). 
Theory would tell us that dispersed shareholders have larger incentives to increase 
risk compared to large blockholders, because they are more diversified (Demsetz 
& Lehn, 1985 and Esty, 1998).
30 Large blockholders have greater ability to affect 
bank performance and bank risk-taking, but it is more difficult for them to 
diversify their holdings. In addition, large blockholders may try to protect private 
benefits in the firms that they control (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005 and 
Stulz, 2005). Hence, the effect of large blockholders on risk-taking is ambiguous 
ex ante. On the other hand, the effect of stronger shareholder rights on risk is 
unambiguous. Stronger shareholder rights enable even minority shareholders to 
exercise better control of the management.  
We find that shareholders prefer more risk relative to managers irrespective of 
whether we measure owner control using shareholder rights or ownership 
concentration. For large blockholders, the ability to control management seems 
empirically to be more important than the risk reducing effect of a lack of 
diversification. The results are consistent with Saunders, Strock, & Travlos (1990) 
for banks, John et al. (2008) for non-financial firms, and Laeven & Levine (2009) 
for banks.
31 The evidence shows that bank managers prefer less risk compared to 
owners, whether dispersed or concentrated. The results are robust to controlling 
for differences in regulation and supervision across countries as suggested by 
Laeven & Levine (2009), a host of other legal variables as in Caprio, Laeven, & 
Levine (2007) and differences in profits smoothing (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 
2003). We also find that owner-controlled banks are significantly more likely to 
receive government assistance during the crisis, again irrespective of how we 
measure the ability of owners to control the management. 
                                           
30See also Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer (2003). 
31To our knowledge only Gorton & Rosen (1995) and Knopf & Teall (1996) find the opposite, 
namely that manager controlled banks make the riskiest and most unprofitable investment.  
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We test and control for the endogeneity of the ownership structure of banks as 
originally suggested by Demsetz (1983). He argues that the ownership structure of 
a firm is an endogenous outcome of a competitive selection process in which 
various advantages and disadvantages of different degrees of ownership 
concentration are balanced. The results indicate that different levels of ownership 
concentration are consistent with value maximisation (Stulz, 1988, Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988 and Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).  
The estimates suggest an economically substantial effect of governance on 
performance and risk-taking: A bank whose largest shareholder owns less than 10 
percent and who is headquartered in a country with poor shareholder rights is 
estimated to have an 2000 to 2006 average ROE of 6.3 percent. In 2008, the ROE 
was five percentage points lower. In contrast, a bank headquartered in a country 
with strong shareholder rights and where the largest shareholder owns 75 percent 
of the shares would have an average 2000 to 2006 ROE of 30.1 percent and the 
2008 ROE would be 31 percentage points lower, i.e. a ROE of minus one percent.  
The literature suggests a number of reasons why agency problems in financial 
institutions may be particularly important and strong shareholder rights alone may 
not be sufficient to control managers. For example, Prowse (1997), Macey & 
O’Hara (2003), and Levine (2004) argue that due to the high level of regulation, 
principal-agent problems may be more severe in the banking sector than in other 
sectors. Banking regulations restrict the ability of the market for corporate control 
to discipline banks (Prowse, 1995), as hostile takeovers in many countries are 
explicitly discouraged.
32 Existing management tends to be protected by 
regulations on entry, mergers, takeovers, and administrative rules (Cheng, 
Duncan, & Wall, 1989, Prowse, 1997). Further, deposit insurance may aggravate 
agency problems, since it increases the incentive of shareholders to engage in 
                                           
32For example, the Bundesbank warns against hostile takeovers of large German banks, because 
“an unfriendly takeover of a big bank could create problems of financial stability” (Bundesbank 
Warns Against Hostile Bank Takeovers, 2007). Furthermore, during the crisis of Société 
Générale in 2008 the French Prime Minister Francois Filion warned that the government “will not 
allow Société Générale to be the target of hostile raids by other companies” (Société Générale 
Shares Rise on Takeover Report, 2008).  
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excessive risk-taking (Prowse, 1997 and Macey & O’Hara, 2003). Agency 
problems may also be exacerbated by the opacity of banks (Morgan, 2002 and 
Levine, 2004). Opacity creates additional difficulties for shareholders and debt 
holders to monitor the behaviour of managers and to design contracts that align 
the objectives of managers and shareholders. Intervention by large shareholders is 
also less likely if firms are opaque, because the information costs that have to be 
incurred to understand the institution may be higher (Kahn & Winton, 1998). Seen 
in this light, the extremely generous performance based compensation packages 
given to bank managers may be interpreted as an attempt by shareholders to 
induce management to increase risk-taking.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the data and 
some descriptive statistics on ownership structures, performance, and the losses in 
2008 among OECD banks. The econometric model and the definitions of the main 
variables used in the regressions are presented in Section 3 and our baseline 
results in Section 4. In Section 5, we test whether our results hold if we control for 
bank characteristics. In Section 6 and 7, we check whether they are robust to the 
inclusion of bank regulatory and other country variables. Section 8 examines 
whether the results are driven by profit smoothing and shows that owner 
controlled banks were more likely to require government assistance during the 
recent crisis. Section 9 concludes. 
2  Data and Econometric Model 
2.1. Data  
We use a new dataset on the ownership structure of large banks in 24 OECD 
countries to test our hypotheses. Information on bank shareholders comes from 
Bankscope (2009). Virtually all of our data on ownership structure are for 2007 
and 2008 though we also occasionally use observations from 2005 and 2006. 
However, since ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable over time, we do 
not view this as a serious shortcoming (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999 and Caprio et 
al., 2007). Bankscope is also the source of balance sheet information. We only 
include banks that are larger than one billion US-Dollar in total assets in 2006. CHAPTER 5   106 
Table 25: Bank Sample 
  Number of Banks of which listed of which unlisted 
Australia 13 6 7 
Austria 50  8  42 
Belgium 14  3  11 
Canada 25  11  14 
Denmark 28  19  9 
Finland   3  1  2 
France 126  19  107 
Germany 95  14  81 
Greece 10  9  1 
Ireland 12  2  10 
Italy 99  26  73 
Japan 103  88  15 
Korea, Rep.  14  9  5 
Mexico 17  3  14 
Netherlands 21  4  17 
New Zealand  6  0  6 
Norway 13  10  3 
Portugal 10  5  5 
Spain 25  10  15 
Sweden 16  3  13 
Switzerland 59  21  38 
Turkey 13  10  3 
United Kingdom  53  14  39 
United States  317  180  137 
Total 1,142 475 667 
Source: Bankscope (2009). Table 25 presents summary statistics on the geographical distribution of the banks in our 
sample. We focus on large banks having at least one billion US-Dollar in total assets in the last available year. Banks for 
which we do not have at least three observations for the period between 2000 and 2006 are not included. 
Table 26: Banks by Specialization 
   Number of Banks of which listed of which unlisted 
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 202 31 
Commercial Bank  526  185  341 
Cooperative Bank  92  23  69 
Investment Bank/Securities House  68  20  48 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank  18  6  12 
Multi-Lateral Governmental Bank  1  0  1 
Real Estate/Mortgage Bank  60  13  47 
Savings Bank  95  13  82 
Specialised Governmental Credit Institution  49  13  36 
Total 1,142 475 667 
Source: Bankscope (2009). Table 26 presents summary statistics on the specialization of the banks included in our sample. 
We focus on large banks having at least one billion US-Dollar in total assets in the last available year. Banks for which we 
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We also require that we have at least three observations over the period between 
2000 and 2006 and information on bank performance in 2008. There is some 
survivorship bias here, as our empirical approach requires that banks survive as an 
entity until 2008. We checked whether there were any banks that satisfy the size 
criterion and the criterion of at least three observations in 2000 to 2006, but are 
without information for 2008. We were unable to identify a single bank. In our 
view this is a reflection of the fact that our dataset only contains relatively large 
banks. In case of serious problems, these banks tend to be either bailed out by the 
government or merged with another bank. Hence, in order to address this issue 
head-on, in Section 8 we also estimate the probability that a bank received some 
form of government assistance as a function of governance variables. 
The dataset includes 1,142 banks of which 475 are listed and 667 are unlisted. To 
our knowledge this is the first paper on bank corporate governance that includes 
unlisted banks. The regional distribution of banks is reported in Table 25. Most 
banks are located in the United States (317), France (126), Japan (103), and 
Germany (95). The distribution of banks by specialization is reported in Table 26. 
Most banks are classified either as commercial bank (526) or as bank holding 
company (233), but we also have savings banks (95), cooperative banks (92), 
investment banks (68), mortgage banks (60), and different types of state banks in 
our sample. The sample, hence, represents a broad snapshot of large banks in 
OECD countries. 
2.2. Econometric Model and Main Variables 
We are interested in the relationship between bank performance, bank risk, and 
the strength of shareholder control of management. Ownership and management 
structures are highly persistent and do not respond to annual changes of 
performance (Zhou, 2001 and Caprio et al., 2007). Using a panel estimator with 
fixed effects or first differences may, hence, result in spurious correlation between 
ownership structure and performance (Zhou, 2001). This eliminates the merits of 
using a panel (Caprio et al., 2007). Furthermore, with rational managers 
maximising expected long-term self-interest, it is not clear whether small annual 
changes in ownership are indicative of notable changes in managerial incentives 
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that are likely to lead to substantive annual changes in performance (Zhou, 2001). 
As managers are usually with a bank for many years, their incentives depend on 
the link between their expected long-term self-interest and the bank’s expected 
long-term performance. Hence, the relationship between ownership structure, risk, 
and performance is likely to be a cross-sectional phenomenon (Zhou, 2001). For 
these reasons, we estimate the following equations for bank performance (6) and 
bank risk (7):  
                            01 2 ii c RoE STAKE RIGHTS X i α αα =+ + + Α + ε
i
,             (6) 
and 
                           01 2 ii c DROE STAKE RIGHTS BX u β ββ =+ + + +                       (7) 
i RoE  is the average performance of bank i during 2000 to 2006 and   the 
deviation from average ROE in 2008. DROE is defined as
i DROE
[ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . It 
can be interpreted as one plus the percentage point drop-off in profits in 2008 
relative to the long-run average. Hence, a positive coefficient in equation (7) 
corresponds to larger losses in 2008. Αand  B  are vectors of coefficients. X 
represents a set of bank- and country-specific control variables explained below. 
i ε  and   are the error terms. The variables of interest are STAKE and RIGHTS.   i u
In line with the literature, STAKE is defined as the size of the largest ownership 
block and measures the level of ownership concentration in bank i  (see also 
Glassman and Rhoades, 1980, Cole & Mehran, 1998, Caprio et al., 2007, and 
Laeven & Levine, 2009). The largest ownership block is defined as the largest 
direct or indirect stake owned by an individual shareholder or a group of 
shareholders. A direct stake involves shares registered in the shareholder’s name, 
while indirect ownership involves bank shares that are held by entities that are 
controlled by the ultimate shareholder. We follow Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven 
& Levine (2009) and set every direct and indirect ownership stake below 10 
percent to zero. The 10-percent threshold is widely used in the literature (La Porta 
et al., 1999 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer 2002) and differentiates 
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between widely-held manager-controlled banks and banks that have a 
concentrated ownership structure and may, hence, be more likely to be controlled 
by their shareholders. 
i RoE The relationship between STAKE and   is not clear a priori. If large 
e be
Theory tends to suggest a positive relationship between shareholder concentration 
Our second proxy for the degree to which managers act in the interest of bank 
shareholders have greater incentives and ar tter able to control managers than 
minority shareholders, the relationship between ownership concentration and bank 
performance should be positive as agency costs and private benefits to 
management are reduced (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). However, large shareholders 
may also have the incentive to extract benefits at the expense of the other 
(minority) shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This could reduce long-term 
performance. 
and risk (DROA). Career concerns (Amihud & Lev, 1981), non-diversifiable 
human capital risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and private benefits of control 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985 and Kane, 1985) all would result in shareholders 
preferring more risk compared to managers. However, the ability of shareholders 
to diversify may matter. If large blockholders are unable to fully diversify, they 
would not necessarily be interested in more risk than managers. In addition, large 
shareholders may want to protect private benefits by reducing risk-taking (Stulz, 
2005). Ultimately, which effect dominates is an empirical matter (John et al., 
2008). 
owners is RIGHTS. RIGHTS is an index of anti-director rights taken from La 
Porta et al. (1999). It is commonly used in the literature to measure the level of 
investor protection (Caprio et al., 2007 and Laeven & Levine, 2009). It is 
measured at the country level. If shareholder rights are stronger, even minority 
shareholders are able to exercise better control over management. If this reduces 
the ability of management to extract private benefits, we would expect a positive 
relationship between RIGHTS and  i RoE . Similarly, if minority shareholders push 
for greater risk-taking to increase r return on investment, we would also   thei
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expect a positive relationship between RIGHTS and bank risk (DROE). In 
particular, minority shareholders may have an incentive to increase risk, given 
that they are able to fully diversify firm-specific risk (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The effect of RIGHTS on risk may, hence, be larger than the effect of STAKE.
33 
We use different sets of control variables, X. Our baseline model includes only 
3  Descriptive Statistics  
he OECD Banking Sector 
anks, as well as a 
                                          
bank type dummies. In order to test the robustness of our results, we later also 
control for state ownership (STATE) and foreign ownership (FOREIGN), as well 
as whether the bank is listed or not (LIST). Furthermore, we later add several 
bank-specific variables, such as capital, and country-specific variables, such as 
regulatory quality. We also control for profit smoothing. For a complete list and a 
description of the variables used see Table A7. Summary statistics are presented 
in Table A8.  
3.1 Ownership Concentration in t
Our dataset contains unlisted banks, savings, and cooperative b
number of specialised credit institutions. As this represents a deviation from the 
previous literature, we present detailed descriptive statistics for relationships 
among the main variables of interest. Table 27 presents summary statistics for the 
largest shareholding according to the type of bank. Table 27 indicates that the 
degree of ownership concentration varies across bank types. While ownership in 
bank holding companies and cooperative banks is usually more dispersed, 
ownership is highly concentrated in state banks and investment banks. There are 
also significant differences between listed and unlisted banks. As expected, 
ownership is more dispersed in case of listed credit institutions. However, overall 
ownership tends to be concentrated with the largest blockholder holding, on 
 
33John et al. (2008) argue that there is an indirect effect of RIGHTS on risk-taking that operates 
through ownership concentration. In countries with strong shareholder protection there are fewer 
benefits to having dominant shareholders. This may have the consequence that management has 
more discretionary power and ultimately result in less risk taking. Hence, in all our regressions 
we control for ownership concentration when examining the effect of shareholder rights on risk 
and we also control for the endogeneity of ownership concentration using an instrumental 
variables approach (see Section 4). 
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average, more than 50 percent of the shares. This is consistent with previous 
research that finds that banks are generally not widely held (Caprio et al., 2007).  
Table 27: Ownership Concentration by Specialization 
Max. Min. Std.  Dev.    Obs. Mean Median
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 100. 17.94 0.00 00 0.00  30.54 
Commercial Bank  526  57.80  50.10  100.00  0.00  38.61 
Cooperative Bank  92  32.95  25.00  100.00  0.00  33.18 
Investment Bank/Securities House 68  100.00 
60 
mental Credit Institution 49  22.50 
1
67.09  100.00 0.00  40.89 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank  18  62.99  65.00  100.00  0.00  36.50 
Multi-Lateral Governmental Bank 1  60.11  60.11  60.11 60.11  0.00 
Real Estate/Mortgage Bank  58.99  61.65  100.00  0.00  37.64 
Savings Bank  95  53.99  50.10  100.00  0.00  32.96 
Specialised Govern 76.87 85.00 100.00  24.60 
Total  ,142 48.87 50.10 100.00 0.00  39.83 
  - Listed Banks  475 18.19 0.00 100.00 0.00  26.86 
  - Unlisted Banks  667  70.17  85.00  100.00  0.00  32.49 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Listed Banks v liste : 29.8 . s. Un d Banks 151***
 
-% level. Table 27 presents summary 
ership concentration is measured by 
able 28 indicates that ownership structures also differ across countries. As 
Source: Bankscope (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10
atistics on the degree of ownership concentration for different types of banks. Own st
the largest direct or indirect ownership stake. Every direct and indirect shareholding below 10 percent is set to zero. Means 
equality tests for listed versus unlisted banks reported at the bottom of the table.  
 
T
expected, bank ownership is more dispersed in the United States and the United 
Kingdom compared to most other countries. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that 
differences in the degree of ownership concentration are caused by different levels 
of investor protection. If investor rights are better protected, shareholders have 
less need for a large block of shares to control the management. Hence, ownership 
should be more dispersed in countries where shareholder rights are better 
protected and more concentrated in countries where investor rights are less 
protected. This is reflected in Table 28. With a T-test statistic of 6.8, ownership is 
significantly more concentrated in civil law than in common law countries (La 
Porta et al., 1998). At the same time, shareholder rights are significantly better 
protected in common law than in civil law countries (with a T-test statistic of 
59.6). 
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Table 28: Ownership Concentration and Shareholder Rights by Country 
   Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev.  RIGHTS
Australia 13 42.76 99.77 100.00 11.44 35.58  4 
Austria 50  68.96  73.94  100.00  0.00  27.40  2 
Belgium 14  73.38  99.77  100.00  11.44  35.58  0 
Canada 25  43.73  50.10  100.00  0.00  41.38  5 
Denmark 28  26.59  0.00  100.00  0.00  36.44  2 
Finland   3  59.12  56.90  100.00  20.48  39.80  3 
France 126  61.17  56.46  100.00  0.00  34.51  3 
Germany 95  78.44  92.50  100.00  0.00  27.89  1 
Greece 10  54.49  47.17  100.00 0.00  31.34  2 
Ireland 12  83.33  100.00  100.00  0.00  38.92  4 
Italy 99  49.90  51.03  100.00  0.00  36.77  1 
Japan 103  15.76  0.00  100.00  0.00  31.03  4 
Korea, Rep.  14  54.30  61.25  100.00  0.00  38.13  2 
Mexico 17  75.43  99.97  100.00  0.00  35.28  1 
Netherlands 21  77.43  100.00  100.00  0.00  32.04  2 
New  Zealand  6  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  0.00  4 
Norway 13  2.61  0.00  34.00  0.00  9.42  4 
Portugal 10  64.72  86.20  100.00  0.00  42.76  3 
Spain 25  35.02  14.98  100.00  0.00  37.19  4 
Sweden 16  70.60  100.00  100.00  0.00  40.30  3 
Switzerland 59  73.77  88.10  100.00  0.00  32.77  2 
Turkey 13  72.38  76.99  100.00  30.15  22.49  2 
United Kingdom  53  72.29  100.00  100.00  0.00  41.68  5 
United States  317  29.00  13.65  100.00  0.00  32.20  5 
Total 1,142 48.87 50.10 100.00 0.00 39.83  3.26 
  - of which common law countries  426 38.72 49.00 100.00 0.00 38.67  4.92 
  - of which civil law countries  716  54.91  53.65  100.00  0.00  39.31  2.27 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Common law countries vs. civil law countries: 6.7981***  
          
We additionally test whether anti-director rights (RIGHTS) significantly differ for common law and civil law countries. 
   Obs. Mean Median Max. Min. Std.Dev.   
  - of which common law countries  426 4.92 5 5 4 0.26   
  - of which civil law countries  716  2.27  2  4  0  1.14   
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Common law countries vs. civil law countries: -59.60***  
 
Source: Bankscope (2009) and La Porta et al. (1998). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 28 
presents summary statistics on the degree of ownership concentration and investor protection for different countries. 
Ownership concentration is measured by the largest direct or indirect ownership stake. Every direct and indirect 
shareholding below 10 percent is set to zero. Investor protection is measured by the anti-director rights index (La Porta et 
al., 1998). Means equality tests for common law and civil law countries are reported at the bottom of the table. Common 
law countries are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. All other countries 
are civil law countries. 
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3.2. Bank Performance and Bank Risk-Taking 
We measure bank performance using the return-on-equity (ROE). Given that we 
are interested in the effect of governance by shareholders on performance and 
risk, ROE comes closest to what may enter shareholders’ objective functions, 
given that we are limited to accounting data. Since we are interested in the long-
run structural relationship between the performance and the ownership structure 
of banks, we use the average ROE in the pre-crisis period between 2000 and 2006 
to measure long-term performance. Summary statistics for the long-run 
performance are presented in Table 29. Table 29 indicates that investment banks 
and bank holding companies had the best and governmental credit institutions the 
worst average performance in the pre-crisis period. This may be evidence hat the 
managers of governmental credit institutions had more scope to extract private 
benefits than the managers of investment banks or bank holding companies, but it 
may also simply suggest that governmental institutions are poorly managed, as the 
government may not pursue profit maximizing objectives. Interestingly, savings 
banks (average ROE of 15 percent) do not necessarily show a lower average ROE 
compared to commercial banks (14 percent) or bank holding companies (17 
percent). 
Table 29: Summary Statistics for Bank Performance ( i RoE ) 
   Obs. Mean Median Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 0.17 0.17 0.46 -0.16  0.08 
Commercial  Bank  526 0.14 0.14 0.46 -0.16 0.11 
Cooperative  Bank  92  0.12 0.11 0.46 0.02 0.05 
Investment Bank/Securities House 68  0.20  0.19  0.46 -0.02 0.14 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank  18  0.11  0.10  0.27  0.04  0.06 
Multi-lateral Governmental Bank 1  0.03  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.00 
Real Estate/Mortgage Bank  60  0.12  0.11  0.34  -0.16  0.08 
Savings  Bank  95  0.15 0.14 0.46 0.03 0.07 
Specialised Governmental Credit  49  0.10  0.10  0.46  -0.13  0.10 
Total 1,142 0.14 0.14 0.46 -0.16  0.10 
Source: Bankscope (2009). Table 29 presents summary statistics for bank performance. Bank performance is measured by 
the average return-on-equity (ROE) in period between 2000 and 2006. Banks for which we do not have at least three 
observations are not included. ROE is winsorized at the 1-and 99-% level.  
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Table 30: Summary Statistics for Bank Risk (DROE) 
   Obs. Mean Median Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.
Bank Holding & Holding Company 233 1.19 1.11 2.50 0.41  0.28 
Commercial  Bank  526 1.11 1.05 2.50 0.41 0.28 
Cooperative  Bank  92  1.06 1.04 1.37 0.96 0.08 
Investment Bank/Securities House 68  1.17  1.06  2.50 0.41 0.37 
Medium & Long Term Credit Bank  18  1.19  1.13  1.19  0.41  0.37 
Multi-lateral Governmental Bank 1  0.99  0.99  0.99 0.99 0.00 
Real  Estate/Mortgage  Bank  60  1.05 1.04 2.31 0.41 0.26 
Savings  Bank  95  1.16 1.08 2.50 0.70 0.27 
Specialised  Governmental  Credit  49  1.09 1.03 2.42 0.41 0.27 
Total 1,142 1.13 1.06 2.50 0.41  0.28 
Source: Bankscope (2009). Table 30 presents summary statistics for bank risk. Bank risk is measured by is measured by the 
deviation in ROE in 2008 from its average performance in the period between 2000 and 2006. Banks for which we do not 
have at least three observations are not included. DROE is defined as  [ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . A larger value for DROE, 
hence, indicates greater losses in 2008. To eliminate outliers, DROE is winsorized at the 1-and 99-% level.  
To measure bank risk, we use the 2008 deviation from the long-term average ROE 
(DROE). Since risks have materialized during the crisis, we expect that banks that 
raised their profits between 2000 and 2006 through higher risk-taking should 
perform worse in 2008. The size of the 2008 deviation from the long-run can, 
therefore, be used as an indicator for bank risk-taking in the pre-crisis period. 
Summary statistics for DROE are presented in Table 30.
34 Table 30 shows that 
investment banks, bank holding companies, and medium and long-term credit 
banks suffered the largest and cooperative and mortgage banks the smallest losses 
in 2008 relative to long-run profitability. Investment banks, bank holding 
companies, and medium and long-term credit banks appear to have taken greater 
risk in the pre-crisis period than cooperative and mortgage banks. To illustrate the 
relationship between bank performance and bank risk, we plot ROE against 
DROE. Figure A2 in the appendix shows a significant (at the 1-percent level) and 
positive relationship between average bank performance and bank risk-taking. 
This suggests that the superior long-term performance of investment banks and 
bank holding companies may be attributed to greater risk-taking in the pre-crisis 
period. 
                                           
34Recall that DROE is defined as  [ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 , and is increasing in the 2008 loss.  
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4  Baseline Results 
We start with regressing ROE on STAKE and RIGHTS using OLS without any 
additional control variables. The results of this simple model are reported in the 
first column of Table 31. We find that STAKE and RIGHTS are both significantly 
related to average ROE. The positive coefficient for STAKE and RIGHTS 
indicates that bank performance is higher if ownership is more concentrated and if 
banks are located in countries with a higher level of investor protection. To check 
whether the positive relationship is due to higher risk-taking, we regress DROE 
on STAKE and RIGHTS. The results are reported in the second column of Table 
31. Both STAKE and RIGHTS are highly significant. The positive coefficient for 
RIGHTS indicates that banks in countries with better shareholder protection 
incurred greater risks. In stark contrast to RIGHTS, we obtain a negative 
coefficient for STAKE, which is significant at the 1-percent level. Banks with 
more concentrated owners appear to incur fewer risks. 
The results are inconsistent if the ownership structure of a bank is endogenous and 
the outcome of a competitive selection process in which various advantages and 
disadvantages of different degrees of ownership concentration are balanced 
(Demsetz, 1983). For this reason, we instrument STAKE with a dummy variable 
indicating whether a bank is located in civil law or common law countries 
(COMMON). Since investor rights are better protected in common law countries, 
ownership should be more dispersed in common law than in civil law countries.
35 
Table 28 indicates that ownership concentration is indeed significantly higher in 
civil law than in common law countries. Since COMMON seems to capture 
differences in the ownership structure reasonably well and since it is largely 
determined by cultural and historical facts, we regard COMMON as a valid 
                                           
35We obtain very similar results if we use the average ownership concentration of banks in a given 
country as an instrument as in Laeven & Levine (2009). The results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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instrument for STAKE.
36 The results of the instrumental variables regression are 
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 31.  
Table 31: Baseline Results 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
         Baseline 
   ROE  DROE  ROE  DROE  ROE  DROE 
STAKE 0.000195** -0.000615*** 0.00523* 0.00595*** 0.00362***  0.00348***
 (2.34)  (-2.76)  (4.49)  (3.00)  (5.63)  (2.82) 
RIGHTS 0.0136***  0.0216***  0.0568** 0.0778***  0.0310***  0.0428*** 
 (6.88)  (3.69)  (5.21)  (4.08)  (5.89)  (3.84) 
HOLDING         0.135***  0.162*** 
         (5.70)  (3.55) 
SAVINGS         0.0381**  0.0719** 
         (2.48)  (2.14) 
COOPERATIVE         0.0938***  0.0592 
         (3.80)  (1.44) 
INVESTMENT         0.0116  0.00591 
         (0.46)  (0.11) 
MORTGAGE         0.00356  -0.0309 
         (0.17)  (-0.75) 
STATE-BANK         -0.0583***  -0.00258 
         (-3.30)  (-0.06) 
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142  1,142 
F-test of excluded instruments      24.20***  24.20***  48.18***  48.18*** 
Endogeneity test-statistic      66.77***  20.97***  58.34***  14.83*** 
Source: Own Calculations. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 31 presents the regression 
results for bank performance (
i RoE ) and bank risk (DROE). Data on bank performance and bank risk comes from the 
Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is defined as  [ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . A larger value for DROE indicates 
greater losses in 2008. Regressions use OLS (Model 1) and Two-Stage Least Squares (Model 2 and 3). We test for 
endogeneity using STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable can be treated as 
exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 31. To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust 
standard errors (White, 1980). The sample includes 1,142 banks. For a complete list and a description of the variables used 
in the regression analysis see Tables A7 and A8.  
 
While the results for STAKE and RIGHTS remain unchanged in the performance 
equation (ROE), the sign of STAKE changes from negative to positive in the risk 
equation (DROE). The reason is simultaneity. If risk increases with ownership 
concentration because large shareholders are better able to affect risk-taking, but 
ownership concentration decreases as risk increases – which is reasonable since 
                                           
36Test statistics indicate that this is indeed the case. 
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large owners are less diversified than minority shareholders –, the coefficient for 
STAKE may become negative if we do not control for endogeneity. This is 
consistent with the literature. Caprio et al. (2007), for example, argue that investor 
protection alone may not provide a sufficiently powerful corporate governance 
mechanism to small shareholders. Put differently, even with strong investor 
protection laws, small shareholders may lack the means to monitor and govern 
banks. Since tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, we from now on only 
report results using instrumental variables regressions. The positive and 
significant coefficients for STAKE and RIGHTS in the instrumental variable 
regression indicate that shareholders push for greater risk-taking and not 
managers. This is in line with recent findings by Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2009) and 
Beltratti & Stulz (2009). They show that stock price performance during the crisis 
was worse in those banks, in which the incentives of management were better 
aligned with the interests of shareholders.  
In the next step, we add bank type dummy variables. Gropp & Kashyap (2009), 
for example, show that due to differences in the market for corporate control 
(cooperative banks cannot be taken over) the bank type may be an important 
determinant of performance (and possibly risk) over the medium term. The results 
are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 31. We refer to this specification as our 
baseline model below. STAKE and RIGHTS remain highly significant and keep 
their positive sign indicating that a higher level of ownership concentration and 
better investor protection increase bank performance and bank risk-taking. In 
addition, the HOLDING, SAVINGS, and COOPERATIVE dummy indicate that 
the average performance of bank holding companies, savings banks, and 
cooperative banks was significantly better, while the performance of state-banks 
(STATEBANK) was significantly worse compared to commercial banks (the 
omitted category). Bank holding companies and savings banks also show, on 
average, larger downward deviation from long run averages in 2008 as indicated 
by the significant and positive coefficient for HOLDING and SAVINGS in the 
risk equation.  
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Using the baseline coefficients, we find that, evaluated at the sample mean, a one 
percent increase in ownership concentration, would result in 1.26 percent better 
average performance during 2000 to 2006 and 0.15 percent worse performance 
during 2008. A one percent increase in ownership rights, again evaluated at the 
mean, would result in a 0.74 percent better performance during 2000 to 2006 and 
0.12 percent larger loss in 2008 relative to average performance. An illustration 
may help to better understand the economic magnitudes. The coefficients suggest 
that a bank whose largest shareholder owns less than 10 percent and who is 
headquartered in a country with poor shareholder rights (RIGHTS equal to two, 
e.g. Switzerland) is estimated to have an 2000 to 2006 average ROE of 6.3 
percent. In 2008, the ROE was five percentage points lower. In contrast, a bank 
headquartered in a country with strong shareholder rights (RIGHTS equal to five, 
e.g. United Kingdom) and where the largest shareholder owns 75 percent of the 
shares would have an average 2000 to 2006 ROE of 30.1 percent and the 2008 
ROE would be 31 percentage points lower, i.e. a ROE of minus one percent. 
Overall, therefore, we find that owner-controlled banks performed significantly 
better before the crisis and significantly worse during the crisis compared to 
manager controlled banks. The effects are economically large. Bank owners seem 
to have been the driving force behind the risks that banks incurred in the wake of 
the crisis, not the managers. This is consistent with standard agency theoretic 
arguments (Amihud & Lev, 1981, Holmstrom & Ricart I Costa, 1986, and 
Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992). Risk-averse managers, faced with undiversifiable 
career and income risk, would like to incur fewer risks than desired by the owners 
of the bank. If agency conflicts between management and share holders are 
reduced when shareholder rights are stronger or ownership is more concentrated, 
the outcome is more risk-taking. We also find that controlling for shareholder 
rights, large stakeholders prefer more risk than management. Large stakeholders 
seem to use their power to control management to increase risk-taking. We find 
no evidence that their lack of diversification or their desire to protect private 
benefits is empirically important. 
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In the following sections, we extend and modify our model in order to check the 
robustness of the results. We add several bank-specific variables to examine 
whether our results are explained by other bank characteristics that happen to be 
correlated with the degree of shareholder control of management. Second, as 
suggested by Laeven & Levine (2009), we check whether the relationship 
between performance, risk, ownership concentration, and shareholder rights 
depends on the level of banking regulation and supervision. Third, we test 
whether the results for STAKE and RIGHTS change if we control for other 
important institutional factors and if the results are robust to controlling for the 
structure of the banking market in the country where the bank is located. Since 
our measures for bank risk and performance may be influenced by profit 
smoothing, we additionally check whether our results are robust if we control for 
profit smoothing. Finally, we test whether the likelihood that a bank received 
financial support from the government during the crisis is higher if ownership is 
concentrated and investor rights better protected. 
5  Bank Characteristics 
First, we add a set of dummy variables indicating whether a bank is state-owned 
(STATE), foreign-owned (FOREIGN), or listed (LIST). The results are reported 
in the  first two columns of Table 32. The dummy variables turn out to be highly 
significant. The results indicate that listed banks performed better in terms of 
ROE than banks that are not listed. This is consistent with the idea that better 
functioning markets for corporate control push managers towards better 
performance (Gropp & Kashyap, 2009). In contrast, banks owned by the state or 
by foreign shareholders perform significantly worse, consistent with the literature 
which usually finds that government (La Porta et al., 2002) and foreign ownership 
(De Young & Nolle, 1996 and Berger et al., 2000) reduces bank performance. 
Berger et al. (2000) explain the relative inefficiency of foreign credit institutions 
by organizational diseconomies to operating and monitoring banks from distance. 
Government ownership reduces bank performance, since politicians acquire 
control of bank to provide employment, subsidies, and other benefits to supporters 
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Table 32: Bank Characteristics 
  Model 4  Model 5 
  State and Foreign Ownership  Bank Characteristics 
 ROE DROE ROE DROE 
STAKE 0.0127** 0.0154* 0.00437*** 0.00458*** 
  (2.15) (1.79) (4.99) (2.93) 
RIGHTS 0.0721** 0.0971** 0.0294*** 0.0442*** 
  (2.46) (2.22) (5.47) (4.23) 
HOLDING 0.147*** 0.172** 0.166*** 0.209*** 
  (2.59) (2.08) (5.22) (3.67) 
SAVINGS 0.203** 0.301** 0.0365** 0.0719** 
  (2.01) (2.01) (2.04) (2.03) 
COOPERATIVE 0.392** 0.460 0.110*** 0.0708 
  (1.96) (1.58) (3.51) (1.42) 
INVESTMENT -0.0468 -0.0767 0.0339 0.0459 
  (-0.66) (-0.75) (1.01) (0.73) 
MORTGAGE 0.0993 0.106 -0.0298 -0.0427 
  (1.22) (0.91) (-1.12) (-0.88) 
STATE-BANK -0.00767 0.125 -0.0698*** -0.0186 
  (-0.12) (1.28) (-3.10) (-0.38) 
LIST 0.583** 0.778*  
  (2.00) (1.82)  
STATE -0.211* -0.380**  
  (-1.74) (-2.26)  
FOREIGN -0.0750** -0.0672  
  (-2.27) (-1.39)  
SIZE  0.0102** 0.0234*** 
  (2.21) (2.63) 
EQUITY -0.000750 -0.00181 
  (-0.63) (-0.97) 
DEPOSITS 0.0629* 0.0334 
  (1.89) (0.54) 
LOANS 0.102*** 0.188*** 
  (2.97) (2.96) 
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,073 1,073 
F-test of excluded instruments  5.04** 5.04** 33.48*** 33.48*** 
Endogeneity test-statistic 51.22*** 13.07*** 66.28*** 17.13*** 
Source: Own calculations. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 32 presents the results of 
robustness checks controlling for bank characteristics. Data on bank performance (
i RoE ) and bank risk (DROE) comes 
from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk.  DROE is defined as  [ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . A larger value for DROE, 
hence, indicates greater losses in 2008. Since tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, we only report the results of Two-
Stage Least Squares regressions. We test for endogeneity using STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the 
endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 32. To control for 
heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). The sample includes 1,142 banks. Since data on the 
bank characteristics is not available for the full samples, the number of observations in the regression including the bank 
variables is smaller than in the baseline model. For a complete list and a description of the variables used in the regression 
analysis see Tables A7 and A8.  
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who return the favor in the form of votes in the next election (La Porta et al., 
2002).
37 The results for DROE suggest that listed banks increased their 
performance in the pre-crisis by greater risk-taking (significant at the 10-percent 
level). In contrast, controlling for ownership concentration and shareholder rights, 
banks owned by the government reported, on average, smaller losses in 2008.
38 
The basic result of the paper remains unchanged, however: STAKE and RIGHTS 
remain significant and retain their positive sign. Next, we add several bank 
accounting variables to our model. Consistent with the dependent variable in the 
performance regressions, they are averaged over the period 2000 to 2006. Since 
we do not regard them as strictly exogenous to bank performance and bank risk, 
we do not include them in our baseline model.  
The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 32.
39 The first variable 
included is the logarithm of total bank assets to control for bank size (SIZE). SIZE 
turns out to be significant and positive in the regression with ROE indicating that 
larger banks performed better between 2000 and 2006 than smaller credit 
institutions. Larger banks may outperform smaller banks because of economies of 
scale and scope or greater market power (Berger et al., 2000). However, SIZE is 
also significant and positive in the risk equation. This suggests that at least part of 
the superior performance of large banks in the pre-crisis period can also be 
attributed to greater risk-taking. Bank risk increases with SIZE, because large 
banks may be more likely to engage in more risky transactions on the 
international financial market owing to the large fixed costs necessary to operate 
globally (Chen & Mazumdar, 1997). They may also have incurred greater risks 
                                           
37Sapienza (2004), for example, finds that state-owned banks in Italy charge systematically lower 
interest rates in regions in which the political party affiliated with the bank is stronger. 
38This finding is inconsistent with anecdotal evidence for Germany, where in particular the state-
owned Landesbanken were affected by the crisis. Several of these banks had to be bailed out by 
the Government. We checked whether these banks are in the sample and they are. It turns out that 
their performance before the crisis was already quite poor, which implies that their losses relative 
to average performance (DROE) were not as large as for some private sector banks. Furthermore, 
some Landesbanken recorded their largest losses in 2009. BayernLB, for example, announced 
additional losses of 3.8 billion euro in December 2009. Since we focus on the losses in 2008, the 
losses in 2009 are not included. The results for the government ownership dummy should, hence, 
be interpreted with caution. 
39Note that we lose a few observations due to missing values for the loans and deposits category 
(see also Table 8). 
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based on the expectation of a government bail-out in case things turn out poorly 
(Boyd & Runkle, 1993). 
The second bank characteristic included is the ratio of total equity to total assets 
(EQUITY). The effect of EQUITY on performance is not clear a priori. On the 
one hand, better capitalized banks should have lower refinancing costs owing to 
lower insolvency risk. This suggests that EQUITY is positively related to long-
term performance. However, a higher level of capital may also indicate that banks 
forego profitable investment opportunities. This should reduce performance. Our 
results suggest that neither of these effects dominates, since EQUITY is 
insignificant for ROE. While the effect on long-term performance is not clear a 
priori, better capitalized banks should have suffered smaller losses during the 
crisis, based on the idea that banks with larger charter values (more “skin in the 
game”) are hesitant to incur great risks (Keeley, 1990 and Cordella & Yeyati, 
2003). This implies that EQUITY should be negatively related to DROE in the 
risk equation. This is what we find. However, the effect of EQUITY is not 
statistically significant. This contrasts with Beltratti & Stulz (2009), who find a 
significant and positive link between EQUITY and performance during the crisis.  
To control for the liability side of the bank, we include DEPOSITS defined as the 
ratio of total deposits to total bank assets. DEPOSITS is significantly (at the 10-
percent level) related to long-term performance. The positive coefficient indicates 
that banks with a larger deposit base have a higher long-term performance than 
banks that have a smaller deposit base. This is reasonable, since refinancing via 
deposits is cheaper than other sources of funding, especially in light of deposit 
insurance. Some form of explicit deposit insurance existed in all countries of our 
sample (Barth et al., 2006). Since deposit funding usually also provides a more 
stable source of funding, in particular, when money markets work poorly, we 
expect that banks with a larger deposit base should have also experienced smaller 
losses in 2008. The results do not support this hypothesis. DEPOSITS is 
insignificant for DROE and consistent with evidence in Beltratti & Stulz (2009). 
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To control for the asset side of the bank, we include LOANS defined as the ratio 
of total loans to total assets. Banks where LOANS is higher should have a smaller 
portfolio of securities. We would expect such banks to have performed better 
during the crisis because their regulatory capital would have been less endangered 
by the increase in credit spreads that reduces securities values (Beltratti & Stulz, 
2009). However, these banks would have also had to increase loan loss reserves 
on their loans. The results suggest that the second effect dominates, since 
performance dropped more in 2008 if banks had a larger loan portfolio as 
indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for LOANS in the risk 
equation. Greater lending activities also seem to have raised average performance 
in the pre-crisis period. More importantly, however, bank performance and bank 
risk are still positively and significantly (at the 1-percent level) related to the 
degree of ownership concentration and the level of investor protection. 
6  Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Next, we test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of bank regulatory 
variables. Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven & Levine (2009) show that bank 
valuation and risk-taking depend on the level of banking regulation and 
supervision. Hence, we include RESTRICT, CAPITAL, OFFICIAL, and 
INDEPENDENCE. RESTRICT is an index that measures to which extent the 
regulator can restrict the activities of banks, while CAPITAL measures regulatory 
oversight over bank capital. OFFICIAL and INDEPENDENCE control for the 
power and the independence of the supervisory authority. For a more detailed 
description of these variables see Table A7. The results with the banking 
regulation and supervision variables are reported in Table 33. We follow the 
literature (Caprio et al., 2007, Laeven & Levine, 2009) and add each variable 
separately to our baseline model. A priori, if regulation is effective in reducing 
risk-taking by banks, bank losses in 2008 should be smaller in countries with 
tighter regulation and a more powerful and independent regulator. However, 
consistent with less risk-taking, we would also expect that banks located in 
countries with better regulation and supervision performed worse in the pre-crisisCHAPTER 5    124 
        Table 33: Banking Regulation and Supervision 
   Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  Model 9 Model 10
  Activity Restrictions Capital Regulation Power of the Supervisor Independence of the Supervisor Deposit Insurance 
   ROE  DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE 
STAKE 0.00316*** 0.00261*** 0.00435*** 0.00378*** 0.00370*** 0.00346*** 0.00404*** 0.00368*** 0.00346*** 0.00394***
  (6.25)  (2.67) (5.27) (2.59) (5.73) (2.85) (5.66) (2.82) (5.48) (2.98) 
RIGHTS 0.0241***  0.0297*** 0.0338*** 0.0432*** 0.0323*** 0.0361*** 0.0370*** 0.0456*** 0.0291*** 0.0441*** 
  (6.12)  (3.35) (5.41) (3.64) (6.13) (3.35) (6.23) (3.79) (5.62) (3.73) 
HOLDING 0.103***  0.102*** 0.159*** 0.173*** 0.139*** 0.159*** 0.152*** 0.169*** 0.131*** 0.174*** 
  (5.90)  (2.92) (5.38) (3.32) (5.86) (3.53) (5.74) (3.53) (5.68) (3.65) 
SAVINGS 0.0333**  0.0628** 0.0185 0.0574 0.0374** 0.0680** 0.0405** 0.0730** 0.0365** 0.0683** 
  (2.34)  (1.99) (1.06) (1.61) (2.42) (2.01) (2.51) (2.15) (2.44) (1.98) 
COOPERATIVE 0.103*** 0.0767* 0.119*** 0.0728 0.0913*** 0.0661 0.0836*** 0.0545 0.0883*** 0.0656 
  (4.48)  (1.94) (3.77) (1.51) (3.52) (1.55) (3.14) (1.31) (3.71) (1.52) 
INVESTMENT 0.0373*  0.0547 0.00956 0.0101 0.00969 0.00438 0.0156 0.00775 0.0108 -0.00674 
  (1.71)  (1.11) (0.31) (0.17) (0.38) (0.08) (0.59) (0.14) (0.43) (-0.12) 
MORTGAGE 0.0152  -0.00876 -0.0136 -0.0518 -0.00101 -0.0427 0.0134 -0.0264 -0.00926 -0.0418 
  (0.79)  (-0.21) (-0.55) (-1.21) (-0.05) (-1.04) (0.57) (-0.63) (-0.45) (-0.95) 
STATE-BANK -0.0488***  0.0155 -0.0465* 0.0557 -0.0563*** -0.0166 -0.0412** 0.00530 -0.0575*** -0.0114 
  (-3.03)  (0.38) (-1.90) (0.91) (-2.95) (-0.35) (-2.15) (0.12) (-3.33) (-0.25) 
RESTRICT 0 0148*** 0 0281***
(4 28) (4 11)
CAPITAL 0 00692* 0 00999
(1 80) (1 59)
OFFICIAL -0 00171 0 00571
(-0 77) (1 29)
INDEPENDENCE -0 0388*** -0 0178
(-3 72) (-0 92)
COVERAGE -0 0000547 -0 000221**
(-0 86) (-1 97)
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,070 1,070 1,125 1,125 1,142 1,142 1,123 1,123
F-test of excluded instruments 80.21***  80.21*** 35.50*** 32.50*** 50.00*** 50.00*** 44.51*** 44.51*** 48.73*** 48.73*** 
Endogeneity test-statistic 60.85*** 11.40*** 62.36*** 12.89*** 65.34*** 15.08*** 66.62*** 15.08*** 51.99*** 16.73*** 
Source: Own calculations. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 33 presents the results of robustness checks controlling for the level of banking regulation and supervision. Data on bank 
performance (
i RoE ) and bank risk (DROE) comes from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is defined as  [ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008. Since 
tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, we only report the results of Two-Stage Least Squares regressions. We test for endogeneity using STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable 
can be treated as exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 33. To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). The sample includes 1,142 banks. Since data on 
banking regulation and supervision is not available for all countries, the number of observations in the regressions including the banking regulation and supervision is smaller than in the baseline model. For a complete 
list and a description of the variables used in the regression analysis see Tables A7 and A8.  CHAPTER 5   125 
period. This suggests that the regulatory variables are negatively related to ROE 
and DROE. Our results show the opposite. RESTRICT is positive and significant 
at the 1-percent level in both regressions, while CAPITAL is positive and 
marginally significant at the 10-percent level. Limiting banks in their activities 
(RESTRICT) and the quality of capital requirements (CAPITAL) are positively 
related to bank performance and bank risk. This corresponds to recent empirical 
work by Caprio et al. (2007), Beltratti & Stulz (2009), and Laeven and Levine 
(2009). The latter argue that bank owners may seek to compensate for the utility 
loss from stricter activity restrictions by increasing risk on remaining activities, 
while stricter regulations on capital may have motivated banks to engage in off-
balance sheet activities to evade capital regulation. OFFICAL and 
INDEPENDENCE are not significantly related to bank performance and risk, 
consistent with Caprio et al. (2007).  
Finally, we add a variable that captures the level of deposit insurance coverage 
(COVERAGE). Deposit insurance may aggravate agency problems, since it 
lowers the incentive of depositors to monitor the bank, because their funds are 
protected regardless of the outcomes of the investment strategies the bank selects 
(Macey & O’Hara, 2003). This should increase the incentive of shareholders to 
engage in excessive risk-taking (Prowse, 1997 and Macey & O’Hara, 2003). 
Alternatively, deposit insurance may reduce the incentives for risk-taking as it 
increases the charter value of the bank (Keeley, 1990 and Cordella & Yeyati, 
2003). Unfairly priced deposit insurance constitutes an implicit government 
subsidy to the bank, increasing profits and the incentives to remain in business 
and, therefore, may reduce risk-taking. Our results are consistent with the second 
idea. While COVERAGE is insignificant in the performance equation, it is 
negative and significantly related to bank risk in the risk equation.  
Overall, as in all other regression that include banking regulation and supervision 
variables STAKE and RIGHTS remain significant and positively related to bank 
performance and risk-taking consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders and 
not managers push for greater risk-taking. CHAPTER 5 
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7  Other Country Characteristics 
Finally, to test whether our shareholder rights variables proxies for some other 
country variables, we follow Beltratti & Stulz (2009) and Caprio et al. (2007) and 
include variables that control for the overall institutional environment. The first 
index measures to what extent agents in a country have confidence in contract 
enforcement and property rights (RULE OF LAW), while the overall quality of 
the regulatory environment is proxied by REGULATORY QUALITY. 
Furthermore, we include an index on the level of corruption (CORRUPTION). 
Since these indices are correlated, we add each index separately to our baseline 
model. The results are reported in columns 1 to 6 of Table 34. The institutional 
variables turn out to be mostly insignificant. In contrast, STAKE and RIGHTS 
remain significant and positively correlated with ROE and DROE.  
To control for the structure of the banking system, we use DBAGDP and C3. 
DBAGDP measures the size of the banking system and is defined as the ratio of 
total deposit money bank assets to GDP. C3 proxies for the degree of banking 
market concentration by the sum of the market share of the three largest banks. 
The results are reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 34. They suggest that 
average long-term performance is higher in countries with a smaller banking 
system and a higher degree of banking market concentration. Bank risk, in 
contrast, does not seem to be higher in countries with a larger banking sector, but 
is lower in countries with a higher degree of banking market concentration. The 
latter may indicate that banks that operate in more concentrated markets may have 
fewer incentives to engage in more risky activities to increase their profits owing 
to a lower level of product market competition. This is consistent with the idea 
that bank charter values reduce risk-taking (Keeley, 1990). However, even 
controlling for the banking sector characteristics does not change our results for 
STAKE and RIGHTS.  
Since the financial crisis started in the United States and may have hit U.S. banks 
hardest, we were concerned that the large number of US banks in our sample – 
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Table 34: Other Country Characteristics  
   Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Rule ofL a w Regulatory Quality Corruption Banking Market Structure
ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE ROE DROE
STAKE 0.00362*** 0.00349*** 0.00424*** 0.00382** 0.00373*** 0.00359*** 0.00213*** 0.00265**
  (5.63)  (2.82) (4.11) (2.11)  (5.41) (2.74) (4.02) (2.04) 
RIGHTS 0.0333*** 0.0438*** 0.0374*** 0.0462***  0.0341*** 0.0458*** 0.0208*** 0.0240** 
  (5.66)  (3.55) (4.16) (2.78)  (5.42) (3.53) (4.88) (2.30) 
HOLDING 0.135*** 0.162*** 0.159*** 0.174***  0.139*** 0.166*** 0.0710*** 0.120** 
  (5.70)  (3.55) (4.15) (2.64)  (5.49) (3.47) (3.51) (2.33) 
SAVINGS 0.0403*** 0.0729** 0.0451** 0.0756**  0.0413*** 0.0750** 0.0126 0.0687** 
  (2.63)  (2.14) (2.48) (2.07)  (2.62) (2.18) (1.05) (1.97) 
COOPERATIVE 0.0928*** 0.0588 0.107*** 0.0665  0.0952*** 0.0606 0.0419** 0.0347 
  (3.85)  (1.45) (3.22) (1.27)  (3.78) (1.45) (2.13) (0.78) 
INVESTMENT 0.0150  0.00748 0.0118 0.00605  0.0158 0.00995 0.0315 0.0308 
  (0.61)  (0.14) (0.44) (0.11)  (0.63) (0.19) (1.60) (0.59) 
MORTGAGE 0.0117  -0.0272 0.0159 -0.0243  0.0147 -0.0201 -0.00673 -0.0225 
  (0.53)  (-0.63) (0.60) (-0.52)  (0.64) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.54) 
STATE-BANK -0.0523*** 0.000162 -0.0566*** -0.00166  -0.0519*** 0.00369 -0.0455*** 0.0207 
  (-2.91)  (0.00) (-2.89) (-0.04)  (-2.84) (0.08) (-3.11) (0.48) 
RULE OF LAW  -0.0220 -0.0100  
  (-1.64)  (-0.39)  
REGULATORY QUALITY  -0.0369 -0.0198   
   (-1.26) (-0.38)   
CORRUPTION   -0.0215* -0.0208  
   (-1.74) (-0.88)  
DBAGDP   -0.0703*** 0.00727 
   (-5.02) (0.21) 
C3   0.0538* -0.192** 
   (1.78) (-2.50) 
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
F-test of excluded instruments 48.85*** 48.85*** 23.53*** 23.53***  44.68*** 44.68*** 40.45*** 40.45*** 
Endogeneity test-statistic 58.89*** 15.10*** 47.38*** 8.843*** 59.10*** 14.34*** 25.55*** 8.08*** 
Source: Own calculations. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 34 presents the results of robustness checks controlling other country characteristics. Data on bank performance (ROE) and bank risk (
i RoE ) 
comes from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is defined as  [ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008 and greater risk-taking. Since tests indicate that STAKE is endogenous, 
we only report the results of Two-Stage Least Squares (IV) regressions. We test for endogeneity using STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The test-statistic is reported at the 
bottom of Table 34. To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). The sample includes 1,142 banks. Since data on banking regulation and supervision is not available for all countries, the number of 
observations in the regressions including other country characteristics is smaller than in the baseline model. For a complete list and a description of the variables used in the regression analysis see Table A7 and A8.  CHAPTER 5  128
almost one third of all banks in our sample are located in the US – could drive our 
results. For this reason, we check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of 
a dummy variable for the United States. The results are indeed weaker, but both 
STAKE and RIGHTS retain their positive relationship with performance before 
the crisis and losses during the crisis. The effect is significant at the 10-percent 
level. Furthermore, although we think that ROE comes closest to what may enter 
shareholders’ objective function, we replace ROE by the return-on-assets (ROA) 
to see whether our results are robust to the choice of the dependent variable. The 
results are the same: STAKE and RIGHTS remain positive and significant 
indicating that shareholders and not managers push for greater risk-taking to 
increase long-term performance. Both results are not reported for the sake of 
brevity.   
8  Profit Smoothing and Bail-Outs 
A fundamental concern is that our risk and performance measure may be 
influenced by profit smoothing incentives of managers. Managers may have the 
incentive to smooth profits to mask true firm performance and risk-taking and to 
conceal their private benefits from shareholders (Leuz et al., 2003). They can do 
so by using their accounting discretion to create reserves for future periods by 
understating earnings in years of good performance and by reporting higher 
profits in years with bad performance. Leuz et al. (2003) show that accounting 
discretion is particularly large in firms with a dispersed ownership structure and 
weak shareholder rights. This suggests that our results for bank performance may 
not driven by the incentive of managers to reduce risk, but by greater discretion of 
managers to smooth profits over time.  
To control for profit smoothing, we follow John et al. (2008) and include one 
minus the ratio of the bank-level standard deviation of operating income divided 
by the bank-level standard deviation of cash flow operations (SMOOTHING) 
between 2000 and 2006. The cash flow from operations is measured indirectly by 
subtracting accruals from operating income. Following Healy (1985), Jones 
(1991), Leuz et al. (2003), and John et al. (2008), we calculate accruals as 
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follows: (∆total current assets - ∆cash) - (∆total current liabilities - ∆short-term 
debt - ∆taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expenses. The latter is 
assumed to be zero in case of banks, while short-term debt is proxied by deposits 
and short-term funding. If a bank does not report information on any of these 
variables, we follow Leuz et al. (2003) and assume that the change in this variable 
is zero. If managers smooth profits over time the standard deviation operating 
income should be smaller than the standard deviation of cash-flows. Hence, a 
higher value for SMOOTHING indicates a higher level of earnings smoothing. 
Summary statistics for SMOOTHING are presented in Table A8. A priori, we 
would expect the impact of earnings smoothing on  i RoE  to be small, because 
i RoE  represents average performance over an extended period. The main focus 
is, therefore, on the risk equation with DROE as the dependent variable. Profit 
smoothing may explain at least part of the smaller drop in earnings in 2008 for 
banks with weak governance (Leuz et al., 2003). The results for the baseline 
model including SMOOTHING are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 35. Like 
John et al. (2008), we obtain a negative and significant coefficient for 
SMOOTHING in the profit equation, even though we use averages over 2000 to 
2006. This indicates that even average performance is lower if bank managers 
smooth profits over time. Somewhat surprisingly, SMOOTHING is insignificant 
in the risk equation and the coefficients for STAKE and RIGHTS remain 
significant and positive. This suggests that our results are not driven by profit 
smoothing. 
Our results indicate that owner-controlled banks incurred greater risks and had to 
report larger losses in 2008 than banks that are controlled by their managers. As a 
consequence, owner-controlled banks may be more likely to need financial 
support from the government during the crisis than manager-controlled banks. To 
test this hypothesis, we run an instrumental variables probit regression. The 
dependent variable takes a value of one if a bank has received any kind of 
financial support from the government during the crisis and zero otherwise 
(GOVAID). The results for the baseline model are reported in column 3 of Table 
 
 CHAPTER 5  130
Table 35: Further Robustness Checks and Model Extensions 
   Model 15                              Model 16 
  Profit Smoothing               Instrumental Variables Probit 
   ROE  DROE  GOVAID 
STAKE 0.00366*** 0.00321** 0.02522*** 
 (5.37)  (2.54)  -0.008 
RIGHTS 0.0320***  0.0407***  0.268*** 
 (5.81)  (3.60)  (0.0611) 
HOLDING 0.133***  0.152***  2.055*** 
 (5.47)  (3.33)  (0.321) 
SAVINGS 0.0356**  0.0729**  0.118 
 (2.29)  (2.15)  (0.255) 
COOPERATIVE 0.0979***  0.0508  0.785** 
 (3.81)  (1.23)  (0.348) 
INVESTMENT -0.000430  0.0280  -0.659* 
 (-0.02)  (0.50)  (0.339) 
MORTGAGE -0.000603  -0.0316  0.267 
 (-0.03)  (-0.73)  (0.278) 
STATE-BANK -0.0615***  -0.0226  0.109 
 (-3.33)  (-0.49)  (0.269) 
SMOOTHING2 -0.0629**  -0.00706   
 (-2.03)  (-0.13)   
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,142 
F-test of excluded instruments  43.72***  43.72***   
Endogeneity test-statistic  55.85***  12.59***    
Source: Own calculations. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table 35 presents the results of 
further robustness checks and model extensions. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of the baseline model including 
SMOOTHING. SMOOTHING is defined as one minus the ratio of the bank-level standard deviation of operating income 
divided by the bank-level standard deviation of cash flow operations between 2000 and 2006. Data on bank performance 
(ROE) and bank risk (DROE) comes from the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk. DROE is defined as 
[ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008. Since tests indicate that STAKE 
is endogenous, we only report the results of Two-Stage Least Squares (IV) regressions. We test for endogeneity using 
STATA’s endog option. The null hypothesis is that the endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. The test-statistic 
is reported at the bottom of Table 35. To control for heteroscedasticity, we use White-robust standard errors (White, 1980). 
The third column reports the results of an instrumental variables probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that is one if a bank received any kind of financial support from the government during the crisis and zero 
otherwise (GOVAID). For a complete list and a description of the variables used in the regression analysis see Table A7 
and A8. 
 
35. The results are consistent with our hypothesis. STAKE and RIGHTS are 
significant and positively related with the probability that a bank has received 
government aid. This indicates that owner-controlled banks took greater risk in 
the pre-crisis period and, thus, needed greater financial support from the 
government than manager-controlled banks once the crisis started to unfold and 
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the incurred risks to materialize.
40 The probit regression, hence, provides further 
evidence that banks that are controlled by their owners took greater risk than 
manager-controlled banks. RIGHTS are significant and positively related with the 
probability that a bank has received government aid. This indicates that owner-
controlled banks took greater risk in the pre-crisis period and, thus, needed greater 
financial support from the government than manager-controlled bank. 
9  Conclusions 
The results in this chapter suggest that owner-controlled banks experienced higher 
profits before the crisis and larger losses during the crisis. Both imply that owner-
controlled banks incurred greater risks compared to manager-controlled banks. 
Economically these effects are large. The profits of banks owned by a majority 
shareholder operating in a country with strong shareholder rights declined about 
five times as much during the recent crisis compared to widely held banks 
operating in countries with weak shareholder rights. These effects are robust to 
including a wide variety of regulatory, bank-specific, and country-specific 
variables. We also find that the probability of owner-controlled banks to receive 
government assistance during the crisis is significantly higher than that of 
manager-controlled banks. 
We obtain the results using a large dataset of OECD banks, for which we 
collected information on ownership concentration. In total, the sample consists of 
more than 1,100 banks for 24 OECD countries. In particular, in addition to most 
listed banks, the sample also includes many unlisted credit institutions. We think 
this is important for the broader applicability of the results, since unlisted banks 
represent the majority of banks in most countries around the world. The greater 
variability in ownership and corporate governance structures assists us in 
identifying the effects of governance on bank risk-taking. 
                                           
40 We made no attempt to control for the additional equity received in 2008 from the government 
in the DROE regressions. Most banks reported losses in 2008 and therefore not removing the 
government equity share understates the effect of STAKE and RIGHTS on DROE.   
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The results contradict the popular sentiment that managers took advantage of 
insufficient control by shareholders to obtain compensation packages that 
disproportionately reward short-term risk-taking (e.g. OECD, 2009). They do not 
support the idea that aligning the interests of management better with shareholders 
will reduce risk-taking of banks. Instead they suggest the opposite. If management 
is better controlled by shareholders, banks may increase their risk-taking. Indeed, 
one may be able to interpret the observed compensation schemes before the crisis 
as attempts by shareholders to induce management to increase their risk taking in 
line with the preferences of shareholders. At the same time, weakening the control 
of shareholders over management would not only reduce risk, but may entail 
significant efficiency costs for banks. Privately optimal management 
compensation schemes may not be socially optimal, as they do not take the 
externality of a higher probability of bank failure into account. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: The Questionnaire 
 
1. Restrictions on Ownership 
a) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could be owned by a 
single domestic investor (legal entity or natural person) between 1990 and 2005? 
Yes   No    
If yes, please fill out: 
  1990  1991 1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005
Ownershi
p limit 
(in % of 
total 
capital)                                                 
b) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could be owned by a 
single foreign investor (legal entity or natural person) between 1990 and 2005? 
Yes   No    




































(in % of 
total 
capital)                                                 
 
c) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could collectively be 
owned by foreign investors (legal entities or natural persons) between 1990 and 
2005?   
Yes   No    APPENDIX   154




































(in % of 
total 
capital)                                                 
 
2. Approval and Reporting Requirements 
a) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic investors have to be 
reported to the supervisory authority and/or any other institution (e.g. government, 
competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 and 2005? 
Yes   No   
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between 
domestic investors to be subject to reporting to an institution in your country 
between 1990 and 2005: 
 
 
b) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic and foreign investors 
have to be reported to the supervisory authority and/or any other institution (e.g. 
government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 
and 2005? 
Percent of Bank Capital:                 Name of the Institution to be informed:       Time Period: 
 
Yes   No   
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between 




Percent of Bank Capital:                 Name of the Institution to be informed:         Time Period: 
c) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic investors require 
approval by the supervisory authority and/or any other institution (e.g. 
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government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 
and 2005?  
Yes   No   
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between 
domestic investors to be subject to approval by any institution in your country: 
 
 
Percent of Bank Capital:               Name of the Institution that gives Approval:           Time Period: 
d) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic and foreign investors 
require approval by the supervisory authority and/or any other institution (e.g. 
government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 
and 2005? 
Yes   No  
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between 




Percent of Bank Capital:               Name of the Institution that gives Approval:           Time Period: 
3. Transparency of the Supervisory Review Process 
a) Bank supervisory authorities in the EU are allowed to block mergers in the 
banking sector to ensure sound and prudent management of credit institutions, if 
they are not satisfied with the “suitability and qualifications of the proposed 
investor” (Article 19 of the EU Banking Directive). Please note what criteria (e.g. 
financial solidity, reputation of the investor, potential benefits of a merger for 
customers in your country) your institution used between 1990 and 2005 to assess 
the suitability and the qualifications of the proposed investor: 
 
 
Criteria to assess the suitability of the proposed investor:                                    Time 
Period: 
b) Was the institution in your country legally required to publish the decision 
and the reasons, if it is not satisfied with the suitability and the qualifications of 
the proposed investor? 
Yes   No  
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If yes, please specify (X) in which years the supervisory authority in your country 
was legally required to publish the decision and the reasons for blocking a 
proposed merger in the banking sector in your country: 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005
Publicatio
n of the 
decision 
and the 
reasons                                                 
 
Table A2: Data Sources 
Country Source  Date 
       
AT  Bundesgesetz über das Bankwesen (BWG)  1993 
       
CZ Questionnaire  2007 
CZ  Czech Republic, Act of the Czech Republic No. 21/1992 Sb. on banks  1992 
CZ  New York University School of Law, Conditions for the Establishment of New Banks in the Czech  1994 
CZ  New York University School of Law, The Act of July 8, 1994 passed by the Czech Parliament  1994 
CZ  Matoušek, R.: The Czech Banking System in the Light of Regulation and Supervision, Selected Issues  2005 
       
DE Questionnaire  2007 
DE  Federal Republic of Germany, Kreditwesengesetz  1988 
       
EE  IMF, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Estonia  2000 
EE  Republic of Estonia, Eesti Pank, Law on Credit Institutions   1994 
EE  Eesti Pank, Credit Institutions Act  1999 
EE  Republic of Estonia,  Credit Institutions Act  2005 
       
ES  Republic of Spain, Law 26/1988: Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions  1988 
ES  Bank of Spain, Law 13/1994: Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España  1994 
ES  Republic of Spain, Royal Decree 1245/1995  1995 
ES  IMF, Country Report No. 06/218: Financial Sector Assessment Program  2006 
       
FI  Republic of Finland, Act on the Operation of a Foreign Credit Institution or Financial Institution in  2001 
FI  Republic of Finland, Act on Credit Institutions  2005 
       
FR  Banque de France, Comité des Établissements de Crédit et des Entreprises d'Investissement, Annual  2005 
FR  Banque de France, Comité de la Réglementation Bancaire et financière, French Banking Act 24  1984 
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FR  Republic of France, Regulation 96-16 of December 1996  2001 
FR  Republic of France,Regulation 92-13 of 23 December 1992  2005 
FR  IMF, Country Report No. 05/186  2005 
FR  Republic of France, Regulation 92-14 of December 1992  2006 
       
GR Questionnaire  2007 
GR  The Impact of the Banking Directives on the Greek Banking System  2004 
       
HU  Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Entreprises  1997 
HU  Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Entreprises  2006 
HU  Barsi, T., Overview on Banking Regulations. International Law Office Internet Publication  2000 
HU  Budai, J. und  H. Bozsonyik, Preperation for Single Market Supervision Tasks  2001 
HU  IMF, Country Report No. 05/348  2005 
HU  Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority: Authorization guidelines (Money Market).  2006 
       
IT Questionnaire  2007 
IT  Banca of Italy, The 1993 Banking Law  1993 
IT  Republic of Italy, The 1993 Banking Law  2000 
IT  IMF Country Report No. 04/133  2004 
IT  IMF, Financial System Stability Assessment  2006 
       
LI Questionnaire  2007 
LI  New York University School of Law, Law on Commercial (Joint Stock) Banks  1992 
LI  Bank of Lithuania, Operations of Credit Institutions in 2000  2000 
LI  Bank of Lithuania, The Law on the Bank of Lithuania  1994 
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Commercial Banks  1994 
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Banks  2004 
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Commercial (Joint Stock) Banks  2005 
LI  Operations of Credit Institutions in 2004  2005 
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Financial Institutions  2005 
       
LU Questionnaire  2007 
       
LV Questionnaire  2007 
LV  Bank of Latvia, Regulations on granting licenses to perform banking transactions  1993 
LV  Republic of Latvia, Law of National Republic of Latvia  1998 
LV  Bank of Latvia, Credit Institutions Supervision Department, Annual Report 1999  2000 
LV  Bank of Latvia, Operations of Credit Institutions in 2000  2000 
       
MA Questionnaire  2007 
MA  Banking Act, Act XV of 1994  1994 
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NL  Credit System Supervision Manual, Act on the Supervision of the Credit System 1992  2005 
NL  De Nederlandsche Bank, Bank Act 1998  2000 
       
PL  New York University School of Law, The Banking Law of January 31, 1989  1992 
PL  New York University School of Law, Act of December 19, 1992  1993 
PL  Republic of Poland, The Banking Act of August 29, 1997  1998 
PL  National Bank of Poland, The Polish Banking System in the Nineties   2001 
       
PT Questionnaire  2007 
PT  IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Program   2006 
       
SK Questionnaire  2007 
SK  National Bank of Slovakia, European Banking Directives and Their Implementation in the Slovak  2000 
SK  Republic of Slovakia, Act on Banks  2001 
       
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Law on Banks and Savings Banks  1991 
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Banking Act  1999 
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, Banking Act  1999 
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Act on the Amandements and Additions to the Banking Act  2001 
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Annual Overview  2004 
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Law on the Bank of Slovenia  1991 
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Bank of Slovenia Act  2002 
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Regulation on the Harmonisation of the Amounts of the minimum inital capital of a  2004 
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Act on the Amandements and Additions to the Banking Act 2   2004 
SL  New York University School of Law, Law on Banks and Savings Banks  2007 
       
SE Questionnaire  2007 
SE  Republic of Sweden, The Banking Business Act (SFS 1987:617)  1987 
Note: Table A2 shows the data sources used to construct the merger control indices presented in Chapter 3. The countries 
for which index values are available are Austria (AT), the Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LI), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Poland (PL), 
Portugal (PT), the Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SL), Spain (ES), and Sweden (SE). 
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Table A3: T-Test on the Sample Mean 












Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE) 14.30 13.53  -4.63***
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR) 82.51 71.03 -4.12***
Return-on-Assets (ROA) 0.21 0.66 2.54**
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL) 10.54 12.51  2.43**
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding (LIQUID) 25.86 37.62  5.45***
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV) 35.44 32.75 -2.16**











Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE) 14.44 13.53  -3.60***
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR) 87.64 71.03 -3.59***
Return-on-Assets (ROA) 0.07 0.66 2.28**
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL) 10.56 12.51  1.54
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding (LIQUID) 26.32 37.62  4.44***
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV) 32.84 32.75 -0.05











Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE) 14.15 13.53  -2.95***
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR) 77.18 71.03 -2.16**
Return-on-Assets (ROA) 0.35 0.66 1.27
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL) 10.53 12.51  2.04**
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding (LIQUID) 25.38 37.62  3.56***
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV) 38.19 32.75 -3.12***
T-Test on Sample Mean: Domestic Targets vs. Cross-Border Targets  




   Mean Mean 
T-Test 
Statistic 
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE) 14.44 14.15  0.88
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR) 87.64 77.18 1.94*
Return-on-Assets (ROA) 0.07 0.35 -0.81
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL) 10.56 10.53  0.02
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding (LIQUID) 26.32 25.38  0.22
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV) 32.84 38.19 -2.22**
Source: Own calculations (2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. Table A3 shows descriptive 





    Table A4: Correlation Analysis 
   SIZE ROA  NIREV  CAPITAL  LIQUID  LIST  EMU  CEEC  IMGDP STKMCAP  DBAGDP  C3  INVFREE FINFREE  INDEPEN- 
SIZE  1.0000                         
ROA  0.0037 1.0000                           
NIREV  -0.2290* 0.0903* 1.0000                         
CAPITAL  -0.4001* 0.1309* 0.1762*  1.0000                       
LIQUID  -0.1900* -0.0240*  -0.1052* 0.4530*  1.0000                     
LIST  0.0566* 0.0675*  0.1401*  -0.0007  -0.1018* 1.0000                   
EMU  0.0890* -0.0643*  -0.0828* -0.0202  0.0101 -0.1213* 1.0000                 
CEEC  -0.1476* 0.0264* 0.0008  0.0076  -0.1761* 0.0133 -0.4048* 1.0000               
IMGDP  -0.0583* 0.0148  -0.0651* -0.0602* -0.1260*  0.0285*  -0.2194* 0.5775*  1.0000             
STKMCAP  0.1344* 0.0497*  -0.0149  0.0601*  0.1450*  -0.1031* -0.0025  -0.4727* -0.2762*  1.0000           
DBAGDP  0.1711* -0.0302*  -0.0679* -0.0100  0.1701* -0.0170 0.2111*  -0.7016* -0.3407*  0.4020*  1.0000         
C3  -0.0494* 0.0256* 0.0152  -0.0880*  -0.0979* 0.2495*  -0.1405* 0.0524*  0.4395*  -0.1539*  0.0582*  1.0000       
INVFREE  0.0769* -0.0303*  -0.0008  0.0041  0.1095*  0.0022 0.1063*  -0.1556* 0.1077*  -0.0098  0.3949*  0.1850*  1.0000     
FINFREE  0.0537* 0.0787*  0.0900*  0.0545*  0.0446* 0.0880*  -0.4983* 0.0316*  0.2216*  0.3432*  0.1247* -0.0231* 0.2192*  1.0000   
INDEPENDENCE  -0.1126* 0.0119 0.0644* 0.0312* -0.0508*  0.0758*  -0.2708* 0.4562*  0.3289*  -0.2184*  -0.4198*  0.0000  -0.0709*  -0.0389*  1.0000 
TRANSPARENCY  -0.1648* 0.0414* 0.0764*  0.0203  -0.1088* 0.0653*  -0.3392* 0.5961*  0.5831*  -0.3631*  -0.5233*  0.1540*  0.0040  0.2020*  0.6563* 
Source: Own calculations (2209). * indicates significance at the 10-percent level. Table A4 presents correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables used in the regression analysis in Chapter 3. For a description 
of the variables see Table A5. 
 
 




Table A5: Variables  
SIZE  Log(Total Bank Assets)   Source: Bankscope (2008) 
ROA  Return-on-Assets   Source: Bankscope (2008) 
CIR  Cost-Income Ratio   Source: Bankscope (2008) 
CAPITAL Total  Equity/Total  Assets   Source: Bankscope (2008) 
LIQUID  Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding  Source: Bankscope (2008) 
NIREV  Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue   Source: Bankscope (2008) 
IMGDP  Total Imports/Total GDP      Source: Datastream (2008) 
DBAGDP  Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP        Source: World Bank (2008) 
STKMCAP  Stock Market Capitalization/GDP      Source: World Bank (2008) 
C3  Market Share of the Three Largest Banks     Source: World Bank (2008) 
FINFREE  Financial Freedom Index   Source: Heritage Foundation (2008) 
INVFREE  Investment Freedom Index       Source: Heritage Foundation (2008) 
INDEPENDENCE  Independence of Supervisory Authority Index      Source: Köhler (2007) 
TRANSPARENCY  Transparency of Merger Control Index     Source: Köhler (2007) 
EMU  Dummy Variable indicating whether a bank is located in a country that is member of the European Monetary Union  
CEEC  Dummy Variable indicating whether a bank is located in Central and Eastern Europe 
SMALL   Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is small. Banks are considered as small if their assets are below the 25-percentile. 
MEDIUM  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is small. Banks are considered as medium-sized if their assets are above the 25-percentile, but below the 75-percentile. 
LARGE  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is small. Banks are considered as large if their assets are above the 75-percentile. 
TRANSPARENCY*SMALL  Interaction term between INDEPENDENCE and SMALL 
TRANSPARENCY*MEDIUM  Interaction term between INDEPENDENCE and MEDIUM 
TRANSPARENCY*LARGE  Interaction term between INDEPENDENCE and LARGE 
Note: Table A5 presents the variables used in Chapter 3 to estimate the probability that a bank is taken over.  
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Table A6: Bank Sample  
France  Number of 
Shareholders  Percent Cumulative 
ABC Arbitrage  13 2.67 2.67 
Affine 24  4.93  7.6 
Altarea 14  2.87  10.47 
BNP Paribas  85  17.45  27.93 
Banque Tarneaud  2  0.41  28.34 
Banque de Savoie  1  0.21  28.54 
Banque de la Réunion  1  0.21  28.75 
Bourse Direct  10  2.05  30.8 
Boursorama 19  3.9  34.7 
CFCAL Banque-Crédit Foncier et Communal  4  0.82  35.52 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mut  1  0.21  35.73 
Cofitem - Cofimur  25  5.13  40.86 
Compagnie Financière Martin-Maurel  6  1.23  42.09 
Credit Agricole Alpes Provence-Caisse r  1  0.21  42.3 
Credit Agricole Centre Loire-Caisse Reg  1  0.21  42.51 
Credit Agricole Sud Rhône Alpes-Caisse  4  0.82  43.33 
Credit Agricole de la Touraine et du Po  1  0.21  43.53 
Crédit Agricole Atlantique Vendée-Caiss  2  0.41  43.94 
Crédit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire-Caiss  4  0.82  44.76 
Crédit Agricole Nord de France-Caisse r  2  0.41  45.17 
Crédit Agricole S.A.  37  7.6  52.77 
Crédit Agricole d'Aquitaine-Caisse régi  1  0.21  52.98 
Crédit Agricole d'Ile-de-France-Caisse  1  0.21  53.18 
Crédit Agricole de Toulouse et du Midi  1  0.21  53.39 
Crédit Agricole de l'Ille-et-Vilaine-Ca 3  0.62  54 
Crédit Agricole du Morbihan-Caisse régi  3  0.62  54.62 
Crédit Industriel et Commercial - CIC  15  3.08  57.7 
Eurosic 23  4.72  62.42 
FALA 4  0.82  63.24 
I.R.D. Nord Pas-de-Calais-Institut Régi  10  2.05  65.3 
Initiative & Finance Investissement SA  3  0.62  65.91 
Locindus 17  3.49  69.4 
Natixis 21  4.31  73.72 
SDR Bretagne  21  4.31  78.03 
SIIC de PARIS  7  1.44  79.47 
SIIC de PARIS 8ème  9  1.85  81.31 
Société Générale  62  12.73  94.05 
Société financière pour le financement  7  1.44  95.48 
Union Financière de France Banque  14  2.87  98.36 
Viel & Compagnie  8  1.64  100.00 
Total 487  100.00  100.00 
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Germany  Number of 
Shareholders  Percent Cumulative 
AXG Investmentbank AG  2 0.41 0.41 
Aareal Bank AG  41  8.35  8.76 
Ahag Wertpapierhandelsbank AG  3  0.61  9.37 
Baader Wertpapierhandelsbank AG  10  2.04  11.41 
Bankverein Werther AG  1  0.2  11.61 
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG  3  0.61  12.22 
Berlin Hyp-Berlin-Hannoverschen Hypothe  5  1.02  13.24 
Comdirect Bank AG  13  2.65  15.89 
Commerzbank AG  67  13.65  29.53 
Concord Investmentbank AG  9  1.83  31.36 
DAB Bank AG  15  3.05  34.42 
DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengesellschaft  16  3.26  37.68 
DVB Bank AG  3  0.61  38.29 
Deutsche Bank AG  53  10.79  49.08 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesells 7  1.43  50.51 
Deutsche Postbank AG  42  8.55  59.06 
Eurohypo AG  3  0.61  59.67 
GFKL Financial Services AG  4  0.81  60.49 
GRENKELEASING AG  23  4.68  65.17 
Gebhard Bank-Gebhard & Co. Wertpapierha  5  1.02  66.19 
Gontard & Metallbank AG  8  1.63  67.82 
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG  4  0.81  68.64 
Hornblower Fischer AG  2  0.41  69.04 
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG  78  15.89  84.93 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG  9  1.83  86.76 
LBB Holding AG-Landesbank Berlin Holdin  2  0.41  87.17 
Merkur-Bank KGaA  2  0.41  87.58 
NORDAKTIENBANK AG  6  1.22  88.8 
Sino AG  11  2.24  91.04 
Tradegate AG Wertpapierhandelsbank  3  0.61  91.65 
UmweltBank AG  3  0.61  92.26 
VEM Aktienbank AG  5  1.02  93.28 
Varengold Wertpapierhandelsbank AG  7  1.43  94.7 
Wüstenrot & Württembergische  10  2.04  96.74 
mwb Wertpapierhandelsbank AG  9  1.83  98.57 
quirin bank AG  7  1.43  100.00 
Total 491  100.00  100.00 
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Italy 
Number of 
Shareholders  Percent Cumulative 
Anima S.G.R.p.A  14 1.51 1.51 
Apulia ProntoPrestito SpA  8  0.86  2.37 
Azimut Holding SpA  72  7.77  10.14 
Banca Carige SpA  17  1.83  11.97 
Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA  12  1.29  13.27 
Banca Ifis SpA  15  1.62  14.89 
Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e  17  1.83  16.72 
Banca Italease SpA  40  4.31  21.04 
Banca Popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio  14  1.51  22.55 
Banca Popolare di Intra SpA  13  1.4  23.95 
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL  66  7.12  31.07 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Coope  1  0.11  31.18 
Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA  13  1.4  32.58 
Banca Profilo SpA  21  2.27  34.84 
Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna  3  0.32  35.17 
Banco Desio - Banco di Desio e della Br  18  1.94  37.11 
Banco Popolare  44  4.75  41.86 
Banco di Sardegna SpA  4  0.43  42.29 
CREDEM-Credito Emiliano SpA  21  2.27  44.55 
Conafi Prestito SpA  28  3.02  47.57 
Credito Artigiano  5  0.54  48.11 
Credito Bergamasco  3  0.32  48.44 
Credito Valtellinese SCarl  13  1.4  49.84 
Generbanca-Banca Generali SpA  14  1.51  51.35 
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena-Banca  32  3.45  54.8 
IFI - Instituto Finanziario Industriale  33  3.56  58.36 
IW Bank SpA  14  1.51  59.87 
Intesa Sanpaolo  87  9.39  69.26 
Mediobanca SpA  88  9.49  78.75 
Meliorbanca SpA-Meliorbanca Group  19  2.05  80.8 
Mittel SpA  11  1.19  81.98 
Toscana Finanza SpA  23  2.48  84.47 
UBI Banca - Proforma-Unione di Banche I  36  3.88  88.35 
UniCredito Italiano SpA  91  9.82  98.17 
iNTEk SpA  17  1.83  100.00 
Total 927  100.00  100.00 
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Spain 
Number of 
Shareholders  Percent Cumulative 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA  183 23.22 23.22 
Banco Espanol de Crédito SA, BANESTO  43  5.46  28.68 
Banco Guipuzcoano SA  40  5.08  33.76 
Banco Pastor SA  51  6.47  40.23 
Banco Popular Espanol SA  94  11.93  52.16 
Banco Santander SA 178  22.59  74.75 
Banco de Andalucia SA  10  1.27  76.02 
Banco de Castilla SA  8  1.02  77.03 
Banco de Crédito Balear SA  10  1.27  78.3 
Banco de Galicia SA  6  0.76  79.06 
Banco de Sabadell SA  62  7.87  86.93 
Banco de Valencia SA  39  4.95  91.88 
Banco de Vasconia SA  7  0.89  92.77 
Bankinter SA  57  7.23  100.00 




Shareholders  Percent Cumulative 
3i Group plc  94 3.67 3.67 
Aberdeen Asset Management Plc  97  3.79  7.47 
Alliance & Leicester Plc  67  2.62  10.09 
Alliance Trust Plc  21  0.82  10.91 
Arbuthnot Banking Group Plc  46  1.8  12.71 
Baillie Gifford Japan Trust Plc (The)  16  0.63  13.33 
Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon Plc  15  0.59  13.92 
Bankers Investment Trust Plc  9  0.35  14.27 
Barclays Plc  99  3.87  18.14 
Bradford & Bingley Plc  67  2.62  20.76 
Brewin Dolphin Holdings Plc  73  2.85  23.61 
British Assets Trust Plc  17  0.66  24.28 
Cattles Plc  99  3.87  28.15 
Close Brothers Group Plc  84  3.28  31.43 
Dunedin Enterprise Investment Trust plc  21  0.82  32.25 
Dunedin Smaller Companies Investment Tr  10  0.39  32.64 
Edinburgh Investment Trust Plc (The)  17  0.66  33.31 
Edinburgh Worldwide Investment Trust Pl  14  0.55  33.85 
Electra Private Equity Plc  17  0.66  34.52 
Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust Plc  15  0.59  35.11 
HBOS Plc  91  3.56  38.66 
HSBC Holdings Plc  72  2.81  41.48 
ICAP Plc  92  3.6  45.07 
Intermediate Capital Group Plc  91  3.56  48.63 
Investec Plc  87  3.4  52.03 
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc  22  0.86  52.89 
Jupiter Primadona Growth Trust Plc  25  0.98  53.87 
Lloyds TSB Group Plc  112  4.38  58.25 
London Scottish Bank Plc  66  2.58  60.83 
Man Group Plc  113  4.42  65.25 
Mercantile Investment Trust plc (The)  16  0.63  65.87 
Mid Wynd International Investment  1  0.04  65.91 
Monks Investment Trust Plc  6  0.23  66.15 
Murray International Trust Plc  15  0.59  66.73 
Northern 3 VCT Plc  1  0.04  66.77 
Northern Aim VCT Plc  1  0.04  66.81 
Northern Investors Company Plc  28  1.09  67.9 
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Northern Venture Trust Plc  2  0.08  67.98 
Pacific Horizon Investment Trust plc  12  0.47  68.45 
Paragon Group of Companies Plc  78  3.05  71.5 
Polar Capital Technology Trust Plc  13  0.51  72.01 
Provident Financial Plc  93  3.64  75.65 
RIT Capital Partners Plc  9  0.35  76 
Rathbone Brothers Plc  99  3.87  79.87 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The)  135  5.28  85.14 
Schroders Plc  91  3.56  88.7 
Scottish Investment Trust Plc  19  0.74  89.44 
Scottish Mortgage Investment Trust Plc  13  0.51  89.95 
Standard Chartered Plc  118  4.61  94.57 
Throgmorton Trust PLC  20  0.78  95.35 
Tullett Prebon Plc  99  3.87  99.22 
Utilico Investment Trust Plc  7  0.27  99.49 
Witan Investment Trust Plc  13  0.51  100.00 
Total 2,558  100.00  100.00 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Table A6 shows the banks and the number of shareholders per bank that are included in the 
dataset in Chapter 4. 
 
 APPENDIX   167 
Table A7: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
i RoE   Average return-on-equity over the period between 2000 and 2006 for bank i. To eliminate outliers, ROE is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
DROE  DROE is defined as  [ ] RoE RoE − − 2008 1 . A larger value for DROE, hence, indicates greater losses in 2008 and thus greater risk-taking in the period between 2000 and 2006. To 
eliminate outliers, DROE is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level.  Source: Bankscope (2009) 
STAKE  The largest direct or indirect stake that an individual shareholder or an affiliated group of shareholders has. A direct stake involves shares registered in the shareholder’s name, 
while indirect ownership involves bank shares that are held by entities that are controlled by the ultimate shareholder. Every direct and indirect ownership stake below 10 percent is 
set to 0 Source: Bankscope (2008) 
RIGHTS  Index of anti-director rights for the country. Formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit 
their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 
10 percent (the sample median), or (6) when shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. The range for the index is from zero to six. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
SAVINGS  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as savings bank. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
COOPERATIVE  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as cooperative bank. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
HOLDING  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as bank holding company bank. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
INVESTMENT  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as investment bank or a securities house. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
MORTGAGE  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as real-estate or mortgage bank. Source: Bankscope (2009) 
STATEBANK  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is classified as a multi-lateral governmental bank, specialized governmental credit institution or medium- and long-term credit bank. 
Source: Bankscope (2008)
FOREIGN  Dummy variable indicating whether the largest shareholder is a foreign entity or individual. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
STATE   Dummy variable indicating whether the state or any other governmental institution is the largest shareholder. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
LIST  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is listed on a stock exchange. Source: Bankscope (2008) 
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SMOOTHING  SMOOTHING measures whether bank managers have smoothed profits over time. It is defined as one minus the ratio of the bank-level standard deviation of operating income 
divided by the bank-level standard deviation of cash flow operations between 2000 and 2006. A larger value for SMOOTHING indicates greater profit smoothing. The cash flow 
from operations is measured indirectly by subtracting accruals from operating income. Following Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Leuz et al. (2003) and John et al. (2008), we calculate 
accruals as follows: (∆total current assets - ∆cash) - (∆total current liabilities - ∆short-term debt - ∆taxes payable) - depreciation and amortization expenses. Depreciation and 
amortization expenses is assumed to be zero in case of banks. Short-term debt is proxied by deposits and short-term funding. To eliminate outliers, SMOOTHING is winsorized at 
the 1- and 99-percent level. Bank data is from Bankscope (2008). 
GOVAID  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank received any kind of financial support from the government during the crisis. Source: Petrovic and Tusch (2009), Sinn (2009) and Office 
of Financial Stability (2010). For countries where we did not find any information on government rescue programs for the financial sector, we randomly checked on the internet 
whether banks received any kind of financial support form the government during the crisis.  
SIZE  Average of the logarithm of total bank assets ($ Million) in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, SIZE is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. Source: 
Bankscope (2008) 
EQUITY  Average ratio of total equity to total bank assets in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, EQUITY is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. Source: 
Bankscope (2008) 
DEPOSITS  Average ratio of total deposits to total bank assets in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, DEPOSITS is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. Source: 
Bankscope (2008) 
SDPROFIT  Standard deviation of net operating profits in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, SDPROFIT is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. Source: Bankscope 
(2008) 
LOANS  Average ratio of total loans to total bank assets in the period between 2000 and 2006. To eliminate outliers, LOANS is winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. Source: Bankscope 
(2008) 
RESTRICT  Index of regulatory restrictions on banks ability to engage in securities market activities, the insurance business and conduct real estate activities. The index ranges from 4 to 12 with 
higher values indicating more restrictions. Data are for 2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006).
CAPITAL  Capital regulatory index. The index that includes information on the following questions. 1. Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with the Basel 
guidelines? 2. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 3. Are market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from capital? 4. Are 
unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? 5. Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted? 6. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 7. Are the 
sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 8. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other 
than cash or government securities? 9. Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating greater 
stringency. Data are for 2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). 
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OFFICIAL  Index of official supervisory power. Adds one for an affirmative response to each for the following 14 questions: 1.Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external 
auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2.Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of 
bank directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3.Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 4.Can the supervisory 
authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 5.Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's 
directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: a) Dividends? b) 
Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8.Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? 9.Does 
the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem bank? 10.Regarding bank restructuring and 
reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) Remove and 
replace directors? shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) Remove and replace directors? The index ranges from 0 to 14 with higher values indicating greater 
power of the supervisory authority. Data are for 2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). 
INDEPENDENCE  The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system. The index ranges from 0 to 2 with higher values 
indicating greater independence of the supervisory authority. Data are for 2003. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006).
COVERAGE  Ratio of deposit insurance coverage to per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2003. Source: Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2005) 
RULE OF LAW  The average value the Rule of Law Index in the period between 2000 and 2006. Source: Kaufman et al. (2008) 
REGULATORY 
QUALITY
The average value the Regulatory Quality in the period between 2000 and 2006. Source: Kaufman et al. (2008) 
CORRUPTION  The average value the Freedom of Corruption Index in the period between 2000 and 2006. Source: Kaufman et al. (2008) 
DBAGDP  Ratio of deposit-money bank assets to GDP. Source: World Bank (2009) 
C3  Market share of the three largest credit institutions. Source: World Bank (2009) 
Note: Table A7 shows the variables used in the regression analysis in Chapter 5. 
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Table A8: Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs.  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std.Dev. 
ROE 1,142  0.14 0.14 0.46 -0.16  0.10 
DROE  1,142  1.13 1.06 2.50 0.41 0.28 
STAKE  1,142 48.87 50.10  100.00 0.00  39.84 
RIGHTS  1,142  3.27 3.00 5.00 0.00 1.58 
HOLDING    1,142  0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 
SAVINGS  1,142  0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.28 
COOPERATIVE   1,142  0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.27 
INVESTMENT  1,142  0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.24 
MORTGAGE  1,142  0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 
STATEBANK  1,142  0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.24 
LIST  1,142  0.42 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 
FOREIGN  1,142  0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 
STATE      1,142  0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.21 
SMOOTHING  1,100  0.89 0.94 0.99 -0.31 0.16 
SIZE  1,142  8.79 8.62  13.57  5.92 1.71 
CAPITAL  1,142  8.79 7.48  52.18  1.02 7.23 
DEPOSITS  1,079  0.55 0.61 0.93 0.00 0.26 
LOANS 1,123  0.60  0.66 0.98 0.01 0.23 
SDPROFIT  1,101 120.31 17.36  2244.96 0.49  332.42 
RESTRICT 1,142  8.80  10.00  12.00  4.00  2.21 
CAPITAL  1,070  5.92 6.00  10.00  3.00 1.52 
OFFICIAL  1,125 10.66 12.00 14.00  5.00  2.59 
INDEPENDENCE  1,142  0.83 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.58 
RLAW  1,142  1.44 1.55 1.93 -0.39 0.42 
REGQUAL  1,142  1.35 1.54 1.84 0.14 0.34 
CORR  1,142  1.53 1.65 2.41 -0.29 0.53 
Source: Own calculations (2010). Table A8 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis in 
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Figure A1: Saving Rates, Investment Rates, and the Current Account 
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Source: International Monetary Fund (2005) and own calculations (2005). Figure A1 shows the development of the savings 
rate (S),  the investment rate (I), and the current account (CA) in the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), the 
Slovak Republic (SK), and Slovenia (SL) between 1993 and 2003. The investment rate is the ratio of gross fixed capital 
formation and changes in inventories divided by GDP. The savings rate is equal to the sum of gross investments and the 
balance of the current account divided by GDP. The current account series is the difference between the savings rate and 
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Correlation between DROE and ROE for the full sample: 0.2474*** 
Figure A2 illustrates the relationship between bank performance and bank risk-taking. Bank performance is measured by 
the average return-on-equity (ROE) in the period between 2000 and 2006. Bank risk is measured by the drop-off in ROE in 
2008 from the average ROE in the period between 2000 and 2006 (DROE). To eliminate outliers, all variables are 
winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. DROE is constructed in a way that a higher value for DROE indicates greater 
risk-taking. To make interpretation easier, we calculate the average ROE for every decile of the distribution. Hence, each 
dot reflects the combination of average bank performance in each decile and the corresponding average value for bank risk-
taking in the respective decile. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-% level. 
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